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INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States is currently experiencing a drug overdose epidemic. More than 
400,000 Americans have died from an opioid overdose between 1999 and 2017. The rate of 
opioid overdose deaths has more than doubled since the early 2000s. Policymakers, scholars, and 
the public at large are intensely interested in remedying this public health crisis. This dissertation 
studies the impact that state and federal policies have had on opioid overdoses and the 
relationship between opioid overdoses and worker injuries.  
Chapter 1 analyzes the effect of state naloxone access laws on opioid overdose rates. 
Naloxone is a prescription drug that reverses the effects of an ongoing opioid overdose. From 
2006 to 2016, most states enacted statutes expanding the ability of opioid users and others to 
access naloxone to administer to individuals experiencing an overdose. This chapter uses a richly 
detailed dataset to separately identify the effects of different naloxone access provisions on 
different subpopulations of opioid users. The results demonstrate that loosening naloxone 
prescription requirements saves thousands of lives annually, particularly among illegal drug 
users in urban areas.  
Chapter 2 investigates the effect of the U.S. Food and Drug Administration’s 2014 boxed 
warnings on opioid prescriptions. The FDA required manufacturers of opioids to place a boxed 
warning on the drug labels of all extended release opioid products in April 2014. Using the 
language of the warning, I explore how the warning affected opioid prescriptions among groups 
that the warning targeted. I find that the warning decreased prescriptions to repeat users of 
opioids by 30%. However, the substantial decrease in prescriptions to repeat users did not yield a 
decrease in opioid overdose fatalities.  
Finally, chapter 3 studies the relationship between fatal occupational injuries and opioid 
overdoses. This chapter investigates whether increases in opioid abuse in a geographic area are 
 x 
associated with increases in occupational injuries. Because increases in worker injuries could 
increase opioid use just as well as increases in opioid abuse could increase worker injuries, this 
chapter uses instrumental variables estimation to identify the direction of causation. I find 
consistent evidence that opioid abuse significantly increased fatal worker injuries, while finding 
no evidence that dangerous working conditions increase fatal opioid overdoses.  
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CHAPTER 1: THE RIGHT PRESCRIPTION: AN EMPIRICAL STUDY OF NALOXONE ACCESS LAWS AND 
FATAL OPIOID OVERDOSES 
 
 
I.  Introduction 
 State and local governments are at the forefront of the battle against the ongoing drug 
overdose epidemic. In 2014 the average state’s fatal opioid overdose rate increased by 13.5% 
over 2013 fatality rates.1 Fatalities escalated even faster in 2015, with average rates growing by 
15% relative to 2014 deaths, with individual state rates ranging from a 16% decrease to a 201% 
increase. Faced with rapidly escalating overdoses, state policymakers have adopted a variety of 
statutes and regulations to save lives (Davis and Carr 2015; Paulozzi, Kilbourne, and Desai 
2011). Identifying optimal policy responses to the epidemic has become a priority of state 
governments nationwide.  
This chapter evaluates the effect of legal changes that expanded access to naloxone. 
Naloxone is an opioid antagonist that works within a few minutes to treat an individual 
experiencing an opioid overdose (Lewanowitsch and Irvine 2002). Survival rates are extremely 
high if an individual experiencing an overdose receives sufficient naloxone quickly enough; one 
meta-analysis estimated a survival rate of 96% (McDonald and Strang 2016). Darke and Duflou 
(2016) presented evidence that naloxone administration within 20 to 30 minutes of use can 
reverse approximately half of opioid overdoses, while the remaining half could have been 
reversed by more rapid administration. While the United States Food and Drug Administration 
(“FDA”) classifies naloxone as a prescription drug (Egan 2014), naloxone has no known 
recreational or therapeutic benefit other than to mitigate the effects of opioids that an individual 
has consumed (Chamberlain and Klein 1994). The side effects of naloxone administration tend to 
                                                        
1 Year over year change calculated using the National Vital Statistics System’s Multiple Cause of Death Restricted 
Access Files.  
 2 
be mild. Naloxone has the added benefit of being simple to administer; the FDA has approved 
formulations of naloxone distributed via an autoinjector or nasal spray, allowing anyone in 
possession of the drug to easily treat someone experiencing an overdose (U.S. FDA 2018a, 
2018b). The FDA has also developed consumer-friendly drug facts labels intended to convey the 
information a consumer would need in order to effectively administer naloxone in the case of an 
overdose (Staman 2018). 
Because naloxone has significant potential to decrease fatal opioid overdoses, state 
legislatures have expanded legal access to naloxone in recent years.2 Expanded access has taken 
a variety of forms. Some states have extended criminal immunity or immunity from damages in 
any civil liability action to health care professionals that prescribe or dispense naloxone.3 Other 
naloxone access statutes have focused on the individuals who administer naloxone, offering them 
civil or criminal immunity under certain circumstances.4 Other provisions enable individuals 
who are friends or family members of opioid users to acquire naloxone to administer to an opioid 
user in the case of an overdose.5 Still more states have allowed pharmacists to dispense naloxone 
without patients receiving a patient-specific prescription from a medical professional other than 
the pharmacist.6 In 2006, only one state had adopted a naloxone access law, but by 2014 a 
majority of states had done so. Today, every single state has some form of a naloxone access law 
(Network for Public Health Law 2017). 
Despite the dramatic uptake in naloxone access laws among states and the attention that 
naloxone availability has received in the federal government, relatively little empirical evidence 
                                                        
2 E.g., State v. W.S.B., 180 A.3d 1168, 1177 (N.J. App. Div. 2018) (“Encouraging the wider prescription and 
distribution of naloxone or similarly acting drugs to those at risk for an opioid overdose, or to members of their 
families or peers, would reduce the number of opioid overdose deaths and be in the best interests of the citizens of 
this State.”) (quoting N.J. Stat. Ann. § 24:6J-2 (2018)).  
3 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-108.7(4)(a) (2018). 
4 E.g., Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1714.22(e)–(f) (2018). 
5 E.g., N.J. Stat. § 24:6J-4(a)(1) (2018). 
6 E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 217.186 (2018). 
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exists demonstrating what effect these statutes have had on opioid overdose fatalities (Davis and 
Carr 2015). To date, three rigorous empirical studies have examined these laws (Doleac and 
Mukherjee 2018; McClellan et al. 2018; Rees et al. 2019). Daniel Rees and co-authors 
demonstrated that the adoption of naloxone access laws decreased fatal opioid overdoses by 9-
11%. Shortly thereafter, Jennifer Doleac and Anita Mukherjee presented evidence that naloxone 
access laws had no effect on opioid overdose fatalities in urban areas but increased opioid-related 
crime and emergency room visits. Finally, Chandler McClellan and co-authors utilized a random 
effects model to demonstrate that naloxone access laws were associated with a 14% decrease in 
opioid mortality rates. These empirical studies focused on different aspects of the statutes, 
studied the laws at different geographic levels, and presented divergent results. Previous 
researchers have also evaluated the impact of individual naloxone access programs in localized 
areas and generally found that individuals participating in naloxone distribution programs 
successfully reversed overdoses (e.g., Doe-Simkins et al. 2009). The existing evidence does not 
provide a clear path forward for policymakers. The previous research provides insufficient 
evidence about which provisions of naloxone access laws are most beneficial and whether the 
benefits of naloxone only accrue to individuals in certain demographic groups or in certain areas. 
There is a pressing need for further information on what provisions to expand naloxone access 
work to reduce fatalities and in what circumstances.  
 In this chapter, I provide evidence that removing the need for a patient-specific 
prescription from a non-pharmacist practitioner decreases opioid overdose fatality rates. I do not 
find clear evidence that the other major provisions of naloxone access laws affect opioid 
overdose fatality rates. This empirical evidence is derived from the National Vital Statistics 
System’s restricted access county-level mortality data, augmented with several other data sources 
which I present in detail in Part III. My data contain every single documented fatal opioid 
 4 
overdose in the United States from 2006–2016. I aggregate these data to construct monthly 
opioid overdose fatality rates for every single county in the United States. Using these richly 
detailed data, I estimate the individual effect of four naloxone access law provisions. I utilize a 
difference-in-differences empirical methodology, which is commonly used to identify the effects 
of state policies (McMichael et al. 2019). I present my methodology in detail in Section III.B. 
Part IV presents the results of my estimates. Provisions that allow patients to purchase 
naloxone without a patient-specific prescription from a doctor7 cause a statistically significant 
decrease in the rate of fatal opioid overdoses. Subsequent analyses demonstrate that the 
decreased fatalities are concentrated among 35 to 44-year-old white men in urban areas8 and in 
heroin overdose fatalities. Removing the need for a patient-specific prescription by a doctor 
enables individuals to acquire naloxone at significantly lower cost. If every state permitted 
naloxone to be prescribed by standing order9 or permitted pharmacists to prescribe naloxone, or 
if the FDA permitted naloxone to be purchased over the counter nationwide, I estimate that 
approximately 3,000 lives would be saved every year, an 11% reduction relative to the mean 
number of fatalities between 2006 and 2016. My data also suggest that extending legal immunity 
to administrators may increase opioid overdoses, though the results are inconclusive.  
Part V discusses the broader implications of my results, including what additional steps 
federal, state, and local governments can take to further expand naloxone access. I propose that 
the Food and Drug Administration promulgate regulations to make naloxone available over the 
counter nationwide. The measure would yield even more benefits than state efforts to relax 
prescription requirements. In addition, state and local governments can expand efforts to ensure 
that naloxone is actually, rather than merely legally, accessible to opioid users.  
                                                        
7 E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 217.186 (2018); N.J. Stat. 24:6J-4 (2018). 
8 See also chapter 2, Table 2, indicating that this population is less likely to consume prescription opioids.  
9 A standing order is a prescription to dispense a drug to anyone meeting certain prescriber-specified criteria (Davis 
and Carr 2015). 
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II. The Naloxone Access Law Movement 
 In 2000, no state had passed a statute to make it easier for opioid users or their friends 
and family members to acquire naloxone (Prescription Drug Policy Abuse System 2018). Only 
17 years later, every state had passed a statute that expanded naloxone access (Prescription Drug 
Policy Abuse System 2018). This Part traces the evolution of the naloxone legal landscape over 
the intervening time period. Section A presents the timeline of naloxone access law adoption and 
discusses the major relevant provisions of the different statutes. Section B discusses the various 
mechanisms by which naloxone access laws may affect opioid overdose fatalities.  
 
A. History of Naloxone Access Law Adoption  
The FDA approved naloxone for use to treat an individual experiencing an opioid 
overdose in 1971 (Yardley 2013). Local governments and hospitals rapidly outfitted hospitals 
and ambulances with the new drug; by 1991, naloxone was one of the most commonly 
administered drugs by emergency medical services (Seidel 1991). As opioid overdoses have 
increased, emergency medical service providers have administered increasing amounts of 
naloxone (Faul et al. 2015). But naloxone use by first responders has not been sufficient to 
prevent opioid overdose fatalities. Overdose fatalities grew in many states in the late 1990s and 
early 2000s (Centers for Disease Control and Prevention 2018), spurring action from state and 
local governments.  
The earliest efforts to expand access to naloxone occurred through targeted programs in 
specific communities suffering above-average heroin overdose rates (Wheeler et al. 2015). Pilot 
programs in Boston, New York City, Baltimore, San Francisco, and Chicago provided active 
users and other individuals with naloxone, resulting in hundreds of overdose reversals (Doe-
Simkins et al. 2009; Galea et al. 2006; Maxwell et al. 2006; Seal et al. 2005; Tobin et al. 2009). 
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In Chicago, the introduction of the program coincided with a substantial reversal in the rate of 
opioid overdose fatalities; whereas overdoses in Cook County (where Chicago is located) 
doubled from 1996 to 2000, they decreased by approximately 25% following the establishment 
of the naloxone distribution program (Maxwell et al. 2006). In each program, individuals who 
received naloxone were provided with training that told them risk factors for overdoses 
generally, instructions on how to intravenously inject naloxone,10 and the importance of 
continued monitoring post-administration. Such programs also generally provided naloxone to 
participants free of charge. 
During the same time period, New Mexico was experiencing higher-than-average opioid 
overdose rates statewide (CDC 2018a). Observing the successes of community-based programs 
elsewhere, New Mexico adopted the country’s first broadly applicable statute expanding the 
authority of health care providers to distribute naloxone.11 Citing an emergency need to protect 
public safety, New Mexico decriminalized possession of naloxone without a prescription, 
authorized doctors to prescribe naloxone via standing order, authorized prescriptions to 
individuals who intended to use naloxone on a third party, and immunized individuals who 
dispense or administer naloxone to another from damages in a civil suit or criminal prosecution 
in any action arising out of such distribution or use of naloxone as long as the individual acted 
with reasonable care.12 Two years later, Connecticut became the second state to expand naloxone 
access,13 with legislators citing the success of the Chicago naloxone administration program 
(measured in decreased fatal overdoses) as evidence of the benefit of providing broad access.14 
                                                        
10 At the time of the Chicago program, the FDA had yet to approve the nasal spray or autoinjector naloxone 
formulations. 
11 2001 N.M. Laws Ch. 228 (H.B. 813). 
12 2001 N.M. Laws Ch. 228 (H.B. 813). 
13 2003 Conn. Acts 159 (Reg. Sess.).  
14 Conn. H.R. Tran., May 29, 2003. 
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In 2007, California followed suit and broadened naloxone access in seven of its largest 
counties.15  
The rate of naloxone access statute adoption has since accelerated. Figure 1 presents a 
series of state maps showing the evolution of naloxone access laws from 2006 to 2015. Other 
early adopters of naloxone access laws included Illinois,16 New York,17 Massachusetts,18 Rhode 
Island,19 and Washington.20 Then in 2014 and 2015, 33 states and Washington, D.C. adopted 
naloxone access laws, dramatically shifting the balance of states that had expanded naloxone 
access (Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System 2018). By the end of 2016, only three states had 
not enacted any naloxone access law. By 2018, every state had some form of naloxone access 
law. 
As with most state legal interventions, the particular statutory scheme that each state 
adopted varied from state to state. In this chapter, I focus on the effects of four naloxone access 
law provisions: (1) provider civil or criminal immunity provisions,21 (2) lay administrator civil or 
criminal immunity provisions,22 (3) third party provisions,23 and (4) provisions authorizing 
prescription by standing order (or other non-patient specific prescription) or authorizing 
pharmacists to directly prescribe naloxone.24 For brevity, I will generally refer to civil or 
criminal immunity provisions as “legal” immunity. Likewise, I refer to provisions which permit 
                                                        
15 2007 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 477 (West). California’s access law applied only in Alameda, Fresno, Humboldt, Los 
Angeles, Mendocino, San Francisco, and Santa Cruz counties until 2014. Compare 2007 Cal. Legis. Serv. Ch. 477 
(West). to Cal. Civ. Code § 1714.22 (2018) (applying to all of California). No other state passed a naloxone access 
law which only applied to particular counties. 
16 20 Ill. Comp. St. § 301/5-23 (2018). 
17 N.Y. Pub. Health  Law § 3309 (2018). 
18 Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 94c, §§ 19(d), 94c (2018). 
19 R.I. Gen. Laws § 31-2-9 (2018). 
20 Wash. Rev. Code § 69-50-315 (2018). 
21 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-108.7(4)(a) (2018); 20 Ill. Stat. § 301/5-23(d)(1) (2018); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 
1714.22(e)–(f) (2018).  
22 E.g., Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-108.7(3) (2018); Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1714.22(e)–(f) (2018). 
23 E.g., N.J. Stat. § 24:6J-4(a)(1) (2018). 
24 E.g., Ky. Rev. Stat. § 217.186 (2018). 
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patients to acquire naloxone without a patient specific prescription or with a pharmacist-written 
prescription as “relaxed prescription requirements.”  
Table 1 provides the adoption date of each naloxone access provision in each state until 
the end of 2016. By 2016, 40 states extended some form of legal immunity to naloxone 
providers, 45 states extended legal immunity to lay administrators of naloxone, 43 states 
authorized third party prescribing of naloxone, and 45 states authorized pharmacists to provide 
naloxone without a prescription from another medical practitioner. Previous research on 
naloxone access has largely focused on the effect of having any of these provisions, rather than 
analyzing each effect separately (Rees et al. 2019; Doleac and Mukherjee 2018). Research on 
other opioid policy responses (Buchmueller and Carey 2017; Dave et al. 2017; Powell et al. 
2018) and law and economics research generally (McMichael et al. 2019) demonstrates that the 
value of statutory schemes depend greatly on exactly which provisions states enact in a scheme. 
As a result, one of the core contributions of this empirical analysis is disentangling the effects of 
various naloxone access provisions.  
Naloxone access laws’ legal liability provisions immunize various groups from sanctions 
arising out of the provision or administration of naloxone. Colorado’s naloxone access law 
provides typical language for a statute providing civil immunity: “A person who is permitted by 
law to prescribe or dispense an opiate antagonist shall not be liable for any civil damages 
resulting from such prescribing or dispensing.”25 The Colorado statute provides similar language 
for anyone who administers, rather than prescribes or dispenses, naloxone: “A person . . . who 
acts in good faith to administer an opiate antagonist to another person whom the person believes 
to be suffering an opiate-related drug overdose event shall not be liable for any civil damages for 
                                                        
25 Colo. Rev. Stat. § 13-21-108.7(4)(a) (2018).  
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acts or omissions made as a result of such act.”26 Analogously, Illinois’ naloxone access law 
provides that “A health care professional who, acting in good faith . . . prescribes or dispenses an 
opioid antagonist” to patients who may be able to administer naloxone to themselves or another 
individual experiencing an overdose “shall not” be subject to “any criminal liability.”27  
Some states provide a more limited form of immunity to providers and administrators, 
conditioning criminal or civil damages immunity upon “reasonable care.”28 In Tennessee for 
example, immunity from damages attaches to “any licensed health care practitioner who 
prescribes or dispenses an opioid antagonist” to “a person at risk of experiencing an opiate 
related overdose” or “a family member, friend, or other person in a position to assist a person at 
risk of experiencing an opiate-related” overdose, but only if the practitioner exercises 
“reasonable care.”29 Tennessee’s statute provides a similar limitation for damages immunity for 
individuals that administer naloxone to individuals experiencing an overdose.30 Likewise, 
California’s naloxone access statute states that licensed health care providers who issue a 
prescription for naloxone, and any other person who possesses, distributes, or administers 
naloxone, who “acts with reasonable care shall not be subject to . . . criminal prosecution.”31  
The use of “reasonable care” as a limitation for damages from medical malpractice  is 
peculiar, given that the ordinary standard for proving negligence in a medical malpractice claim 
is itself reasonable care.32 Ordinary principles of statutory interpretation indicate that these 
immunity provisions must change something about the conditions under which a health care 
practitioner or individual administering naloxone may be held civilly liable, while 
                                                        
26 Id. at § 108.7(3) (2018). 
27 20 Ill. Stat. § 301/5-23(d)(1) (2018). 
28 E.g., Tenn. Code §§ 63-1-152(b), (g)(1) (2018). 
29 Id. 
30 Id. at §§ 152(b), (g)(2).  
31 Cal. Civ. Code §§ 1714.22(e)–(f) (2018).  
32 E.g., Tenn. Code § 29-26-115(a) (2018) (“In a health care liability action, the claimant shall have the burden of 
proving . . . that the defendant acted with less than or failed to act with ordinary and reasonable care in accordance 
with such standard.”).  
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simultaneously reading reasonable care to have the same meaning throughout a state’s code 
(Scalia and Garner 2013). A minority of statutes requiring reasonable care define particular acts 
by a provider or administrator as evidence of reasonable care.33 North Carolina provides that 
“evidence of the use of reasonable care in administering the drug shall include the receipt of 
basic instruction and information on how to administer the opioid antagonist.”34 Tennessee 
additionally requires that administrators complete an online overdose prevention course.35 Such 
reasonable care statutes probably require providers and administrators to take some step to make 
sure that the individual who receives naloxone can recognize an overdose, successfully use 
naloxone, and call for emergency medical services afterwards to ensure the person survives.36 
Such steps are not onerous, and it is unlikely that a doctor or pharmacist would furnish naloxone 
without providing such basic instructions. As a result, in my empirical analyses that follow I will 
pool these conditional legal immunity statutes together with the absolute immunity statutes I 
discuss above.37  
Third party provisions enable doctors to prescribe and pharmacists to dispense naloxone 
to individuals who intend to administer the medication to someone else who is at risk of 
experiencing an opioid overdose. For example, New Jersey’s statute provides that “A prescriber 
or other health care practitioner . . . may prescribe or dispense an opioid antidote directly or 
through a standing order, to any recipient who is deemed by the health care practitioner to be 
capable of administering the opioid antidote to an overdose victim in an emergency.”38 Such 
statutes recognize that the individual who is best situated to prevent an overdose might not be an 
                                                        
33 E.g., 2013 N.C. Laws 2013-23. 
34 2013 N.C. Laws 2013-23.  
35 Tenn. Code § 63-1-152(e) (2018). 
36 E.g., Idaho Stat. § 54-1733B (2018).  
37 My conclusions are generally robust to separating reasonable care statutes, but the results become harder to 
present the more statutes that are included.  
38 N.J. Stat. § 24:6J-4(a)(1) (2018).  
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opioid user themselves or even a first responder, but a family member or friend.39 The final 
category of statutes that this paper investigates are statutes which enable an individual to receive 
naloxone without a patient-specific prescription from a doctor. Exemplary statutes include 
Kentucky’s naloxone access law, which authorizes pharmacists to prescribe naloxone to a patient 
who has not seen a doctor,40 and New Jersey’s statute, which authorizes a prescription through 
standing order.41 
States passed each of these statutes hoping to reduce fatal opioid overdoses. However, 
making drug use safer has competing influences on the opioid overdose rate that a state will 
observe. On the one hand, saving an individual experiencing an overdose prevents a fatality; on 
the other, it is theoretically possible that it will induce users to engage in riskier activity. The 
next Section explores these two channels of action for naloxone policy and reviews the relevant 
academic literature.  
 
B. Life-Saving or Risk-Encouraging? The Effects of Naloxone Access  
Naloxone access laws have a theoretically ambiguous effect on the probability that an 
individual experiences a fatal overdose. The lifesaving medicine will tend to decrease the 
probability that any opioid overdose will ultimately take a person’s life; it also may create a 
moral hazard, inducing drug users to take more drugs as the drugs become less risky (Pauly 
1968). Moreover, legal access and actual access to naloxone are not equivalent, and the statutes 
may do little to make naloxone actually available if non-legal factors continue to prevent 
individuals from accessing the medicine. This Section explores those effects in detail and 
identifies why an empirical study is necessary to determine whether naloxone access laws are 
ultimately beneficial.  
                                                        
39 E.g., Tenn. Code. § 63-1-152(b)(2) (2018).  
40 Ky. Rev. Stat. § 217.186 (2018). 
41 N.J. Stat. 24:6J-4 (2018). 
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In the absence of a naloxone access law, naloxone will only be carried by emergency 
medical services personnel (and not even all of them) (Faul et al. 2015). Doctors will also 
generally be authorized to prescribe naloxone to an individual to self-administer if the individual 
experiences an overdose, but doctors will not be able to prescribe naloxone to a third party who 
could assist the individual.42 Studies that pre-date the onset of naloxone access laws indicate that 
most doctors were unwilling or unsure if they were willing to prescribe naloxone to patients for 
self-administration and that retail pharmacies failed to carry naloxone regardless (Coffin et al. 
2003). Nevertheless, similarly timed surveys of opioid users indicated strong support for being 
able to acquire a naloxone prescription to self-administer (Seal et al. 2003). Under this pre-
naloxone access regime, opioid users consume some level of drugs.43 Whatever level of opioids 
individuals consume, they face some risk of an overdose which is generally increasing in the 
amount of drugs consumed (Dasgupta et al. 2016). The actual risk any user faces is likely to vary 
with individual characteristics and the circumstances of use, particularly the individual’s 
tolerance to the drug and the type of drug used (Lipato and Terplan 2018).  
The first-order effect of any naloxone access law will be to decrease the risk that an 
opioid user experiences a fatal opioid overdose at any level of consumption. Provider criminal 
immunity provisions and civil immunity provisions decrease the cost of providing naloxone to 
any patient, thereby increasing the likelihood that a healthcare practitioner will provide naloxone 
to a current user (Shavell 2004). Administrator civil and criminal immunity provisions operate 
similarly, increasing the likelihood that an individual will seek out a naloxone prescription and 
                                                        
42 E.g., Commonwealth v. Brown, 904 N.E.2d 452, 454–55 (Mass. App. 2009) (affirming the conviction of a doctor 
who illegally prescribed medications to third parties in violation of Massachusetts’ controlled substances act).   
43 There is long-standing and unresolved debate in the health economics literature about whether addiction comports 
with rational actor models of consumption, such that it is fair to characterize an addict’s consumption as “choosing” 
to consume a good to maximize utility subject to a budget constraint (Becker and Murphy 1988; Laporte et al. 
2017). For my purposes here, it is sufficient that individuals consistently respond to economic incentives with regard 
to goods normally thought of as “addictive” (Manning et al. 1995) (finding evidence that light, medium, and heavy 
drinkers are responsive to price, though heavy drinkers are less responsive). 
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use that naloxone if they possess it. States that require reasonable care for immunity provide an 
additional wrinkle. On the one hand, requiring some costly level of care for immunity will chill 
the propensity to provide naloxone (Braddock and Snyder 2005). However, in the case of 
naloxone, the “reasonable care” standard ensures that most users who receive naloxone will have 
received information about how to recognize an overdose, how to administer naloxone, and the 
importance of calling for medical help after administration. Such measures may on net increase 
the effectiveness of naloxone provision beyond general immunity as a result. In any case, such 
measures are unlikely to eliminate any benefit that exists for extending immunity to providers or 
administrators. In the majority of states which also authorize naloxone access to third parties 
who may be in a position to assist someone experiencing an overdose, even more individuals are 
likely to possess naloxone because the population who can legally purchase the drug has 
increased; permitting patients to acquire naloxone from a pharmacist without an appointment 
from another practitioner will have a similar effect. The aggregate effect of such statutes will 
therefore be to increase the probability that an individual experiencing an overdose can either 
self-administer naloxone or will be near a third party who can do so, thereby decreasing the 
probability that a fatal overdose occurs for any level of opioids consumed. 
However, naloxone access laws could have a variety of secondary effects that undermine 
their tendency to save lives. If opioid use is safer, it is possible that users may choose to consume 
more opioids (Doleac and Mukherjee 2018). Anecdotal evidence from state legislators and police 
suggests that some opioid users engage in riskier drug use when naloxone is available 
(Siegelbaum 2016; Jorgensen 2017), though no statistical evidence exists supporting these 
anecdotes with respect to opioid use (Firah 2017).44 Moreover, previous research indicates that 
                                                        
44 Previous research has shown that consumption of other addictive substances, like cigarettes, varies with changes 
in the perceived riskiness of the good (Viscusi 1998). 
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individuals who voluntarily enrolled in naloxone pilot programs self-report using less heroin 
following the program (Seal et al. 2005; Wagner et al. 2010). In theory, potential increases in use 
could be so severe that the fatal overdose rate remains unchanged or even increases. Similarly, if 
doctors can co-prescribe naloxone to patients who use prescription opioids, doctors could 
possibly be more willing to prescribe opioids to patients who are more likely to abuse drugs 
(American Medical Association 2017). Those “marginal patients” are relatively riskier by 
definition and may be more likely to fatally overdose than other patients. Doctors are likely more 
willing to engage in such risky practices when they are protected from liability, though some 
researchers have argued that co-prescribing naloxone cannot increase liability risk (Davis et al. 
2016).  
Naloxone may also function as a substitute for calling for emergency medical assistance 
following an overdose (Seal et al. 2003). If naloxone was a perfect substitute for emergency 
medical services, this would not be a problem. But naloxone has a shorter half-life in the human 
body than the opioids causing the overdose it treats; calling emergency medical services is 
critical for saving individuals who overdose from a large quantity of opioids because otherwise 
they may suffer another overdose without consuming any more drugs (Kim et al. 2009). While it 
is virtually impossible for the re-overdose problem to eliminate all of the benefits of naloxone 
availability (as long as some naloxone treated individuals do not re-overdose, it cannot), it could 
dampen the lifesaving effects that would exist if medical assistance was always summoned 
following administration. Additionally, emergency medical services may be an effective 
institution for guiding opioid dependent patients toward medication-assisted addiction treatment, 
which would have long-term benefits beyond an individual overdose reversal (D’Onofrio et al. 
2015). 
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Finally, naloxone access laws may have no effect or a perverse effect on individuals’ 
actual (rather than legal) access to naloxone. The FDA declared naloxone drug shortages for 
approximately 23 months between June 2010 to July 2013 (Rosenberg 2018). Media sources 
have documented that even in states that have passed naloxone access laws, many pharmacies do 
not actually stock the drug (Harper 2018). If statutes do not enable individuals to actually acquire 
naloxone, then they will have very little effect on opioid overdose rates. Worse, naloxone access 
laws could cause shortages and price increases that crowd out first responders from using 
naloxone. Over the same time period that states have enacted naloxone access laws, the retail 
price of naloxone has dramatically increased (Gupta et al. 2016; Rosenberg 2018). To the extent 
naloxone access laws may exacerbate the price increases that would have occurred otherwise by 
increasing demand for naloxone at any price, the statutes may be pricing out municipalities who 
would furnish first responders with naloxone if the price was lower (Honig 2017).  
Previous research has not clearly established whether the potential risk-decreasing or 
risk-increasing effects of widespread naloxone access dominate. Rees et al. (2019) found mixed 
evidence that the passage of a naloxone law decreased fatal opioid overdoses. Using annual 
state-level fatality rates covering 1999 to 2014 from the National Vital Statistics System 
(“NVSS”), they investigated the effect of naloxone access laws on all opioid fatalities as well as 
heroin and non-heroin fatalities separately. They defined a naloxone access law as any statute 
that provides civil and criminal immunity for a lay administrator, any statute that provides civil 
and criminal immunity for naloxone prescribers, or any statute that permits third party 
prescribing. Their empirical estimates utilized a difference-in-differences empirical specification 
and demonstrated that the adoption of naloxone access laws decreased the opioid fatality rate by 
9-11%, with the largest effects concentrated on non-heroin overdoses.  
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Similarly, McClellan et al. (2018) used a random effects model to estimate the 
association between annual-state level overdose fatality rates (from the 2000 to 2014 NVSS data) 
and lagged naloxone access laws. They demonstrated that passing any naloxone access law 
(defined as a statute designed to increase layperson naloxone access) was associated with a 
decrease in overdose fatality rates of 14%, with the strongest effects observed among African 
Americans and states that extended immunity to physicians. Both Rees et al. (2019) and 
McClellan et al. (2018) drew on the National Survey of Drug Use and Health to present evidence 
that naloxone access laws did not increase the probability that an individual reported non-
medical use of prescription opioids. 
Rees et al. (2019) and McClellan et al. (2018)’s results sharply contrast with those of 
Jennifer Doleac and Anita Mukherjee (2018), who presented evidence that naloxone access laws 
had no effect on overdose fatalities, and in some circumstances, may have even increased them. 
Doleac and Mukherjee (2018) analyzed the effect of naloxone access laws on metropolitan areas 
across the U.S. using fatal overdose data from the NVSS45 covering the years 2010 to 2015 and 
using the same definition of a naloxone access law as Rees et al. (2019). They present evidence 
that naloxone access laws generally had no discernible effect on fatalities, but they did increase 
opioid-related crime and emergency room visits. 
Overall, the existing research on naloxone access does not provide clear evidence for 
states to rely on. The previous research leaves open several crucial questions, most prominently 
whether naloxone access laws decrease fatalities. Beyond that threshold question, the literature 
provides little evidence of what effect the several naloxone statutes passed in 2015 and 2016 had, 
or the effectiveness of different naloxone access provisions on the basis of race, sex, or age. No 
                                                        
45 Duleac and Mukherjee (2018), use the restricted access National Vital Statistics data, which contains more 
detailed geographic information associated with fatalities, while Rees et al. (2019) uses the publicly available 
version of the data. I use the restricted access data for my fatalities, though I do not limit myself to urban areas as 
Duleac and Mukherjee (2018) do. See infra, Part 3.B.  
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research has yet investigated the effectiveness of naloxone access laws by county urbanization. 
This chapter investigates each of these questions, providing a holistic view of which naloxone 
provisions provide a benefit and which provisions cause risky behavior, for whom, and in which 
contexts. To do so, this chapter exploits a rich and detailed dataset on opioid fatalities and state 
laws, which I present in the next Part.  
 
III. Empirical Methodology  
 This chapter draws on several data sources to study the effects of naloxone access laws. 
As discussed in Section A, I combine monthly fatality data at the county level with several 
sources of information on counties to measure the causal effect of naloxone access laws while 
controlling for a variety of confounding variables. Section B presents the methodology that I 
apply to this data to arrive at my empirical estimates.  
 
 A. Data Sources 
I use the National Vital Statistics System’s multiple cause of death all county micro data 
files. The data contain detailed information on each individual death certificate issued in the 
United States, including the decedent’s date of death, the location of death at the state and county 
level, the decedent’s state and county of residence, and the decedent’s education, sex, race, age, 
marital status, and causes of death indexed by International Classification of Diseases (Tenth 
Revision) (“ICD-10”) code. The ICD-10 coding system is the standard method for classifying 
causes of death in U.S. government data. The ICD-10 codes associated with fatal overdoses from 
opiates are T40.0 (opium), T40.1 (heroin), T40.2 (other opioids), T40.3 (methadone), T40.4 
(other synthetic narcotics), and T40.6 (other/unspecified narcotics). I utilize NVSS data covering 
the period from 2006 – 2016.  
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From the fatality counts in the vital statistics data, I construct monthly counts of fatalities 
due to any opioid, heroin, pain medication, synthetic opioids, and other opioids46 that occur in 
each U.S. county and month that the data cover.47 The different categories are not mutually 
exclusive—overdoses that involved multiple types of opioids (e.g., heroin and pain medication) 
constitute 15.1% of the sample; I include such fatalities in the counts of all relevant categories. 
Analyzing the data at the county-month level is consistent with Jennifer Doleac and Anita 
Mukherjee’s previous research and enables me to identify the effect of individual naloxone 
access law provisions; analyzing the data at the state-year level would prevent accurate 
identification of the individual provisions which are the focus of this research. Because my data 
is at the county-month level, many (approximately 75%) of the observations exhibit no fatal 
overdoses. As discussed in Section IV.1, I perform Poisson regressions to determine whether this 
characteristic of the dataset drives my results and find that it does not. 
Figure 2 presents opioid fatalities over time across the U.S. as a whole. As the figure 
shows, fatalities increased every year that my data cover from approximately 18,000 fatalities in 
2006 to approximately 44,000 in 2016. Fatalities increased steadily until 2013, at which point 
fatal overdoses grew rapidly in each following year. I further transform these counts into 
monthly fatality rates per 100,000 county residents by dividing each by the population of the 
relevant county and multiplying by 100,000. The monthly rates of fatal overdoses constitute the 
dependent variables in my analyses that follow.  
                                                        
46 I classify any fatality with an ICD-10 code of T40.2 and T40.3 as pain medication fatalities, T40.4 deaths are 
classified as synthetic opioids, and T40.6 are classified as “other.” This classification scheme is consistent with other 
work documenting opioid fatalities (Rudd et al. 2016). 
47 Importantly, I assign fatalities to the county that an individual died in rather than their county of residence. The 
NVSS data indicate that approximately 86% of individuals experiencing a fatal opioid overdose do so in the county 
in which they live. Counting fatalities where they occur, rather than where the decedent resided, is likely most 
appropriate for this research given that naloxone availability in the area in which an individual uses opioids, rather 
than the jurisdiction in which they live (when the two differ), is more likely to determine whether naloxone is 
available to administer in the case of an overdose. The results that I present in Part IV are robust to using either 
method of counting fatalities because the overwhelming majority of overdoses occur in an individual’s county of 
residence. 
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My primary explanatory variables of interest are a series of binary variables indicating 
whether a county is in a state that has enacted a naloxone access law in the relevant time period. I 
include four variables to control for different naloxone access law regimes. The variables 
indicate whether a statute included: (1) provider criminal or civil immunity, (2) administrator 
criminal or civil immunity, (3) third party prescription authorization, and (4) provisions enabling 
prescription by standing order or authorizing a pharmacist to prescribe naloxone. As Table 1 
demonstrated, the provider and administrator immunity provisions are often paired, but there is 
sufficient heterogeneity in what provisions states passed and the timing of passage to identify all 
four provisions separately. The relevant statutes were identified using the Prescription Drug 
Abuse Policy System’s database, and I read each statute to confirm the coding assigned by the 
System. The model treats a statute as in effect (and sets the value of the corresponding variable 
equal to 1) in any month where the provision was in effect for a majority of days in that month.   
In addition to naloxone access laws, I determine whether a state had a functioning 
prescription drug monitoring program or medical marijuana law that permitted marijuana to be 
dispensed to treat pain. Prescription drug monitoring programs require or permit prescribers to 
record prescriptions of certain substances (particularly opioids) in a database that other medical 
providers can (and in some cases and states, must) access (Paulozzi et al. 2011). The goal of such 
programs is to prevent patients from receiving multiple concurrent opioid prescriptions. Scholars 
have credited monitoring programs with reducing opioid overdoses associated with doctor 
shopping and pill mills (Johnson et al. 2014; Griggs 2015). Medical marijuana laws, on the other 
hand, potentially provide patients with an alternative therapy for pain. Some studies have found 
that medical marijuana laws have decreased opioid fatalities (Powell et al. 2018). However, the 
estimated effects of such statutes have varied greatly depending on the exact provisions in such 
statutes; in the aggregate, the evidence of the effect of medical marijuana laws on opioid use, 
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abuse, and overdoses is mixed. I also control for whether a state has enacted medical malpractice 
tort reforms; data on each state’s provisions are from Avraham (2018). In particular, I control for 
whether a state has caps on non-economic damages or punitive damages in medical malpractice 
cases and whether the state has eliminated joint and several liability in medical malpractice. 
Finally, I gather time-variant county characteristics from several different sources. I 
gather data on county-level macroeconomic characteristics from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. The Quarterly Census on Employment and Wages 
publishes quarterly reports on employment and wages at the county level. Controlling for local 
macroeconomic conditions is important given that several papers have demonstrated that local 
macroeconomic conditions are positively associated with drug abuse (Carpenter et al 2017), 
although opioid-specific studies have found the opposite effect (Hollingsworth et al. 2017). I 
utilize county-level demographic information from the Census Bureau, including the county 
population, the percentage of the county population that is white, and the average age of county 
residents. I gather an annual count of the amount of police officers in each county in the United 
States from the 2006 to 2016 FBI Crime in the United States Publications. Police presence will 
have a complex relationship with the overdose fatality rate—more police may decrease drug use 
through enforcement or serve as first responders who can treat an overdosing individual with 
naloxone. Local communities may also hire more police as drug rates increase.  
I also draw on National Plan and Provider Enumeration System’s National Provider 
Identifier (“NPI”) Registry to construct counts of various medical providers at the county level 
throughout the time that my data cover. All medical providers who are required to comply with 
the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (more commonly referred to by 
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its acronym, “HIPAA”)48 or who bill Medicare for services must obtain an NPI.49 The 
information associated with any given NPI is publicly available. The NPI Registry provides the 
taxonomy of the provider as well as the provider’s address. I collapse the NPI registry’s data into 
a count of pharmacies, hospitals, pain clinics, and emergency medical technicians in each county 
in the United States for each month that my data cover. The NPI data will not capture every such 
medical provider, as some may choose not to accept Medicare. For example, EMTs are 
particularly likely to be undercounted, as they will not always be required to register 
individually.  
Table 2 provides summary statistics for each of the variables I use in this chapter. The 
average county has a monthly opioid fatality rate of 0.815 per 100,000 residents, which 
corresponds to 8.2 fatalities per year in an average county50—double the average rate at which 
individuals die at work (Viscusi and Masterman 2017) and only 30% smaller than the nationwide 
rate of suicide fatalities (National Institute of Mental Health 2018). More than half of all opioid 
fatalities involved semi-synthetic opioids, which include pain medications prescribed by a 
doctor, as well as any illicitly obtained drugs which contain the same compounds. Urban 
counties have the highest rate of opioid fatalities, though many fatalities occur in suburban and 
rural areas as well. The mean weekly wage is $890, and the average age is 38 years.  
 
B. Identifying the Causal Effect of State Laws 
The primary goal of the empirical analysis in this chapter is to provide evidence of the 
causal effect that each naloxone access law provision has on opioid fatality rates, rather than 
demonstrating how naloxone access laws correlate with fatal overdose rates. Of course, the gold 
                                                        
48 42 U.S.C. §§ 300gg, 1320 (2018).  
49 See generally 45 C.F.R. Part 162 (2018) (explaining the rationale for the NPI system and the exact circumstances 
under which a health provider must obtain one). 
50 This was calculated using the unweighted average county population of 839,645 individuals. 
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standard for causal inference would be a randomized experiment (Greiner 2008; McMichael 
2019).51 Ideally, an experiment would randomly enact naloxone access laws containing different 
combinations of provisions in each county in the United States. In such a world, the causal effect 
of any single provision would simply be the difference between average fatal overdose rates in 
counties with the provision of interest and average fatal overdose rates in counties without the 
provision of interest. Clearly, it is impossible to perform such an experiment—a researcher 
cannot practically or ethically randomly assign individuals to live under different legal regimes 
or create county-specific legal regimes that differ from the states that they are in.52 The best 
alternative approach to measuring a causal effect is to identify treatment and control groups and 
eliminate all possible confounding factors, thereby mimicking a laboratory experiment to the 
closest extent possible.53 In my study, the “treatment groups” will be counties located in a state 
that has enacted a naloxone access law at the time of interest. Conversely, the “control groups” 
will be counties located in a state that has not enacted a naloxone access law at the time of 
interest.  
Counties in both the treatment and control groups will exhibit different fatal opioid 
overdose rates over time. Such differences can be broken down into components that are related 
to the adoption of a naloxone access law and those that are not. The factors that affect opioid 
fatality rates but do not correlate with the adoption of a naloxone access law can be ignored 
when trying to determine the effect of naloxone access laws, because such factors will not cause 
counties under a naloxone access law to have systematically higher or lower fatality rates than 
                                                        
51 An important caveat to the superiority of laboratory experiments is the limits to their external validity (Schram 
2005). 
52 State home rule provisions dictate the powers of city and county governments in each state. For a recent review of 
each state’s home rule provisions, see Baker and Rodriguez (2009). 
53 Empirical research designs that replicate as much as possible the random treatments of a laboratory experiment 
are often referred to as quasi-experimental (Carr 2017) (exploring differences-in-differences approaches to studying 
the effect of policy technology like license plate readers). 
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counties not under a naloxone access law (Wooldridge 2009). However, changes in opioid 
fatality rates that are attributable to factors which correlate with both fatality rates and the 
adoption of a naloxone access law must be accounted for in my analysis. For example, the opioid 
fatality rate has grown generally over time, as has the quantity of states which have adopted 
naloxone access laws—a simple “before and after” estimate of the effect of naloxone access laws 
would therefore mistakenly attribute increases in fatalities attributable to general time trends to 
the naloxone access law. Similarly, time-invariant state and county characteristics like the 
number of months the state legislature is in session or county geography may correlate with 
opioid fatality rates and affect the state’s ability to enact a naloxone access law. Rural states and 
counties may have higher opioid fatality rates, and they may also be less likely to adopt naloxone 
access laws because states would incur higher costs to train geographically spread-out first 
responders in treating overdoses. Simply comparing counties that are subject to a law with those 
that are not would, as a result, attribute the higher fatality rates to not having a naloxone access 
law rather than the underlying geographic characteristics. Because of these non-random 
correlations between county opioid fatality rates and the existence of a law, the simple 
comparison that would be appropriate in a real experiment will probably not yield an accurate 
estimate of the effect of naloxone access laws on opioid fatality rates. 
Isolating the changes in fatal opioid overdose rates attributable to naloxone access laws 
can be accomplished using a “differences-in-differences” model (Bertrand et al. 2002). Such 
models have been used extensively in the academic literature and in courts54 to estimate the 
causal effects of laws and private conduct. To illustrate how the model works, consider Davidson 
                                                        
54 E.g., Messner v. Northshore Univ. Health Sys., 669 F.3d 802, 825–26 (2012) (concluding that a differences-in-
differences model was an appropriate methodology for an expert to determine the likely impact of a merger); In re 
Chocolate Confectionary Antitrust Litig., Civil Action No. 1:08–MDL–1935, 2013 WL 11305184, at *7–8 (M.D. 
Pa. May 10, 2013) (discussing an expert’s differences-in-differences estimates of price increases that an antitrust 
conspiracy caused). 
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County, Tennessee and Jefferson County, Alabama as examples. Both counties are urban, 
contain the most populous cities of the states in which they are located (Nashville and 
Birmingham), and Tennessee and Alabama themselves neighbor each other. In June 2014, the 
fatal opioid overdose rate in Davidson County was 1.94 fatalities per 100,000 county residents. 
In July 2014, Tennessee’s naloxone access law became effective, enabling friends or family 
members of opioid users to acquire a prescription for naloxone, immunizing prescribing doctors 
and individuals who administer naloxone from damages attributable to the naloxone prescription 
or administration, and authorizing doctors to prescribe naloxone via standing order.55 In August 
2014, Davidson County’s overdose fatality rate increased to 2.39 fatalities per 100,000 county 
residents. The difference between the two rates (0.45 fatalities per 100,000 residents) includes 
both the effect of the naloxone access law as well as general time trends. Meanwhile, in June 
2014, Jefferson County’s fatal overdose rate was 2.12 fatalities per 100,000 residents, and the 
fatality rate increased to 3.33 fatalities per 100,000 residents in August 2014. Alabama’s 
naloxone access law was not in force until June 2015, so the increased fatality rate of 1.21 
fatalities per 100,000 residents is entirely attributable to general time trends, not a naloxone 
access law. Taking the difference between both of these differences isolates the portion of 
Davidson County’s fatality rate change that is attributable to Tennessee’s naloxone access law 
rather than the nationwide increases in fatality rates over time that affected Jefferson County. 
The “difference-in-differences” model therefore estimates that Tennessee’s naloxone access law 
decreased Davidson County’s fatal opioid overdose rate by 0.76 fatalities per 100,000 county 
residents.  
The differences-in-differences model that I employ performs an analogous calculation for 
every county in the United States during each month from January 2006 to December 2015. I 
                                                        
55 Tenn. Code Ann. § 63-1-152 (2018). 
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calculate the effect using ordinary least squares regression.56 To account for correlations in the 
error term for multiple counties within a single state, I cluster the standard errors in my model at 
the state level (Cameron and Miller 2015). I also weight each county-month observation by the 
population of the county in that month, consistent with previous research estimating the effect of 
naloxone access laws (Doleac and Mukherjee 2018; Rees et al 2019). Doing so ensures that 
naloxone access provisions that affect greater amounts of people will count “more” in my 
estimates. The result of the model is an estimate of the average effect across the United States of 
the effect of adopting a naloxone access law. Further, because I use data from every state and 
each state adopted naloxone access laws with slightly different combinations of provisions, I can 
isolate the effect of each naloxone access law’s provision individually.57  
The basic differences-in-differences model provides a valid estimate of the causal effect 
of a naloxone access law’s effect as long as the evolution of overdose fatality rates in each 
county in the model is occurring at the same rate before the county is treated by a naloxone 
access law. This requirement is known as the “parallel trends assumption.” For example, the 
Davidson County-Jefferson County estimate above would be invalid if the general effect of time 
in Jefferson County was greater than that in Davidson County. If similar factors caused fatality 
rates to increase by 0.45 in both counties, but Jefferson County-specific factors that vary over 
time also increased Jefferson County’s fatality rate by 0.76, then the naloxone access law would 
                                                        
56 I utilize the reghdfe Stata package to perform the ordinary least squares estimation, as it is dramatically faster than 
the default package in Stata (Correia 2017). Some research, such as Rees et al. (2019), favors Poisson regression for 
estimating the effects of count data (such as the number of fatalities occurring at a particular time). Post estimation 
tests on Poisson estimates of my data indicate that my sample is significantly overdispersed, which biases Poisson 
standard errors (Cameron and Trivedi 1990). While the usual alternative to Poisson regression for overdispersed 
count data is negative binomial regression, negative binomial regression suffers from incidental parameters bias 
when differences-in-difference models are used (Allison and Waterman 2002). I use ordinary least squares over the 
alternatives because it provides an unbiased estimate for overdispersed count data in a differences-in-differences 
model.  
57 The fact that I observe fatality rates every month is critical for isolating the effect of naloxone access laws. 
Because so many states adopted statutes in the same year (see Figure 1), annual analysis would consider each of 
those statutes to have occurred at the same time and it would be impossible to isolate the effect of the provisions I 
consider.  
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have actually had no effect on opioid fatality rates, and the difference-in-differences estimate 
would have been positively biased.  
In my estimates in Part IV, I account for the potential bias from time-variant county 
characteristics by controlling for other factors that could possibly be correlated with both the 
adoption of a naloxone access law and the opioid fatality rate, including the average wage of 
workers in the county, county employment-to-population ratios, the county population, the 
percent of the county’s population that is white, the average age in the county, and the number of 
pharmacies, pain clinics, EMTs per 100,000 residents, and police per 100,000 residents that are 
in each county during each time period in my data. All time invariant county characteristics 
(such as geography or the structure of state governments) are also accounted for in the model by 
comparing the evolution of fatality rates within a county over time, as was done in the Davidson 
and Jefferson county examples. Mechanically, within-county variation is calculated by including 
county-specific indicator variables for each of the 3,145 counties in my data. I also include 
county-specific time trends in the model to account for county characteristics that evolve over 
time which may influence the opioid fatality rate in a particular county. For example, if some 
states adopt policies over time that influence opioid fatalities but I do not control for those 
policies in the model, the county-specific time trends will limit the bias from excluding those 
policies. Including these time trends relaxes the parallel trends assumption so that the model 
provides an unbiased estimate of the effect of naloxone access laws as long as the changes in 
opioid fatality rates themselves are changing at parallel rates (Mora and Reggia 2018). Statistical 
tests examining whether this empirical specification satisfies the parallel trends assumption are in 
the Technical Appendix and indicate that my differences-in-differences model provides a valid 
estimate of the causal effect of naloxone access laws.  
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IV. The Effect of Naloxone Access Laws on Fatal Opioid Overdoses 
 This Part presents my empirical estimates of the effect of naloxone access laws on opioid 
overdose fatalities. As the results in Section A demonstrate, studying naloxone access laws at a 
broad level is inadequate to reveal the effects of these laws. Examining the different provisions 
of naloxone access laws reveals that provisions enabling individuals to receive naloxone without 
visiting a medical professional other than a pharmacist decrease opioid overdose rates. Section B 
examines whether the effectiveness of naloxone access differs on the basis of an individuals’ sex, 
race, ethnicity, or age. The effects of naloxone access are concentrated in individuals who are 
white, male, and 25 to 44 years old—the demographic groups with some of the highest opioid 
fatality rates. Section C analyzes how naloxone access affects fatalities caused by different 
opioids. The effects are heterogeneous; the evidence suggests that naloxone is most effective at 
reducing fatalities from heroin and synthetic opioids such as fentanyl. Section D divides my 
sample into rural, suburban, and urban counties. Difference-in-differences estimates in the rural, 
suburban, and urban subsamples indicate that naloxone access exclusively benefits individuals in 
urban areas.    
 
A. Naloxone Access Laws and the Need for Provision-Level Analysis 
 Figure 3 presents the difference-in-differences estimates of naloxone access laws. Each 
bar represents a different estimate. For brevity, I provide only the estimated effects of the 
naloxone access laws; the full results of the difference-in-differences model are available in the 
Technical Appendix. The first estimate corresponds to the estimated average effect of any 
naloxone access law, while every other bar corresponds to the estimated average effect of a 
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particular provision.58 The lines that bracket the main bar illustrate the 95% confidence interval 
for each estimate.59  
 My difference-in-differences estimates indicate that enacting any naloxone access law 
has little effect on the monthly opioid overdose rate. The difference-in-differences model 
indicates that the average county in a state with a naloxone access law has a 7.7% higher 
monthly opioid fatality rate.60 However, the standard error of the estimate is sufficiently large 
such that the estimate is not statistically significant, meaning there is insufficient evidence that 
the true effect is greater than zero.61 If the empirical analysis stopped at this level of generality, 
we would conclude that naloxone access laws most likely had little to no effect on overdose 
fatalities.  
 However, estimating the model at the naloxone access provision level reveals that two 
different provisions have statistically significant effects on monthly opioid overdose rates. 
Extending legal immunity to naloxone providers has no statistically significant impact on 
overdose fatality rates.62 Statutes that provide legal immunity to lay administrators of naloxone 
increase opioid overdose rates by 0.09 fatalities per month per 100,000 residents, or about 11%.63 
Statutes that authorize prescribers to prescribe naloxone to individuals who are friends or family 
members of opioid users has no significant effect.64 Finally, statutes that authorize pharmacists to 
provide naloxone without the patient needing to receive a prescription from a medical 
                                                        
58 See supra, Part 3.2 for a discussion of all county characteristics that the model controls for.  
59 The 95% confidence interval contains the set of values such that, conditional on the observed data, the probability 
that the true effect of the indicated provision is within the confidence interval is 95% (Kmenta 1997). The 95% 
confidence interval is calculated by adding and subtracting the standard error of the difference-in-differences 
estimate multiplied by 1.96 to and from the difference-in-differences estimate.  
60 The point estimate from the model is an increase of 0.06 fatalities per 100,000 county residents. Dividing the 
point estimate by the mean fatality rate of 0.76 provides the percent increase.  
61 ! = 0.254 
62 ! = 0.557. 
63 ! = 0.073. 
64 ! = 0.193. 
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professional other than the pharmacist decrease fatalities by 0.08 fatalities per month per 100,000 
residents, about 9% relative to the base opioid fatality rate.65 
 The results demonstrating that relaxing prescription requirements reduces fatal overdoses 
are robust to changes to the empirical model that I utilize. As evidence, the Technical Appendix 
provides regression results which use Poisson regression,66 rather than ordinary least squares as 
well as estimates varying the use of geography-specific time trends. The Poisson regression 
results are entirely consistent with the ordinary least squares results and indicate that 
administrator legal immunity increases overdose fatalities while relaxing prescription 
requirements decreases fatalities. Likewise, the ordinary least squares models using different 
geographic time trends find results consistent with those in Figure 3. The models including no 
geography-specific time trends tend to find larger effects of naloxone access but are otherwise 
similar. 
 These initial results demonstrate the importance of analyzing naloxone access statutes at 
the provisional level. While the basic “any law” results are consistent with previous research 
finding no effect of naloxone access (Doleac and Mukherjee 2018), the estimated effect of 
provisions removing the requirement for a patient-specific prescription is consistent with 
research that demonstrated naloxone access laws decrease fatalities (Rees et al. 2019). However, 
it remains unclear why provisions extending legal immunity to individuals who administer 
naloxone increases fatalities. In order to further explore what fatalities the naloxone access laws 
are preventing and what mechanisms are driving the effects, the next Section examines how 
naloxone affects different demographic groups. 
                                                        
65 ! = 0.022. 
66 Poisson regression assumes that the dependent variable follows a Poisson distribution, and is often used to analyze 
count data (such as the number of fatalities occurring over a particular time frame. When Poisson regression is 
appropriate, it will yield more precise estimates than ordinary least squares. However, as discussed supra, note 56, 
Poisson regression has drawbacks of its own in this particular research, chiefly the risk of biased standard errors that 
increase the risk of finding no effect where one actually exists, or finding an effect where one does not exist.   
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B. Differences by Sex, Race, Ethnicity and Age 
A long line of research demonstrates that drug use and abuse patterns differ substantially 
on the basis of sex, race, and ethnicity (Wallace et al. 2000). Demographic characteristics vary 
with access to medical care (Pletcher et al. 2008) and interactions with the criminal justice 
system (Mustard 2001). Most germane to this research, fatal overdose rates differ significantly 
by sex, race, ethnicity, and age. The monthly fatal overdose rate of men is 0.91 fatalities per 
100,000 men, while the female monthly fatal overdose rate is 0.48 fatalities per 100,000 women. 
The average monthly opioid fatality rates for white, black, and Latino individuals are 0.91, 0.43, 
and 0.28 fatalities per 100,000 individuals in the relevant demographic groups. Fatality rates 
increase with age until individuals are 45 to 54 years old, with 1.29 fatalities per 100,000 45 to 
54-year-old individuals and decrease thereafter. Naloxone access laws operate at the intersection 
of drug use, medical care, and crime; as a result, it is worth examining whether the value of 
removing naloxone’s prescription requirement is shared equitably across demographic groups.  
Figure 4 presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of naloxone access 
provisions by sex. The first bar in each pair corresponds to the effect of the indicated naloxone 
access provision on fatal male opioid overdoses, while the second bar corresponds to the effect 
on fatal female opioid overdoses. The results are generally consistent with Figure 3. Provider 
legal immunity has no statistically significant effect on fatalities for either men or women.67 
Legal immunity for lay administrators increased male overdose fatalities by 0.11 fatalities per 
100,000 individuals, or 13%.68 Third party provisions do not have a statistically significant 
impact for either men or women.69 The provisions loosening prescription requirements 
                                                        
67 For men, ! = 0.770; for women, ! = 0.326. 
68 For men, ! = 0.042; for women, ! = 0.312. 
69 For men, ! = 0.333; for women, ! = 0.884. 
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significantly decrease male fatal overdoses by 0.09 overdoses per month and female fatal 
overdoses by 0.04 per month, approximately a 9% decrease for both men and women.70  
Next, Figure 5 presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effects of naloxone 
access provisions by race and ethnicity. The first bar in each set presents the effect of naloxone 
access provisions on fatal overdose rates of white individuals, the second bar presents the effect 
on fatal overdose rates of African Americans, and the third bar presents the effect on Latino fatal 
overdose rates.71 The results exhibit substantial heterogeneity by race and ethnicity. For white 
individuals, provider legal immunity and third party prescribing do not exhibit a significant 
impact on overdose rates.72 Administrator legal immunity causes a statistically significant 
increase in white opioid fatality rates.73 But as in many of the previous models, relaxed 
prescription requirements cause a significant decrease in overdose fatalities.74 The estimate 
indicates that permitting individuals to receive naloxone either via a standing order prescription 
or from a pharmacist with prescribing authority decreases the white overdose fatality rate by 
10%. For individuals who are black, the results indicate that providing legal immunity to 
naloxone providers causes a statistically significant increase in opioid fatality rates, but the 
coefficient on administrator immunity is insignificant.75 Third party provisions decrease black 
fatal overdose rates by 22%,76 though relaxing prescription requirements does not have an 
individually significant effect.77 Finally, for Latino individuals, provider legal immunity, 
administrator legal immunity, and the no prescription requirement exhibit no statistically 
                                                        
70 For men, ! = 0.052; for women, ! = 0.031. 
71 I also estimated analogous models for individuals of Native American, Pacific Islander, and Asian descent. The 
difference-in-differences model produced statistically insignificant results for each of these groups. Because many 
counties have extremely few individuals in these groups, the estimates exhibited very large standard errors, and I 
have omitted them from the figure to preserve the integrity of the figure.  
72 For provider immunity, ! = 0.848. For third party provisions, ! = 0.562. 
73 ! = 0.007. 
74 ! = 0.025.  
75 For provider immunity, ! = 0.006. For administrator immunity, ! = .412. 
76 ! = .009. 
77 ! = .360. 
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significant effect.78 Permitting third party prescribing significantly decreases the Latino opioid 
fatality rate by 21%.79 
Finally, Figure 6 presents the effects of naloxone access by 10-year age groups. Dividing 
the sample into several smaller groups increases the variance of each estimate, yielding larger 
confidence intervals on average. Nevertheless, the estimates exhibit several patterns based on 
age. Provider legal immunity has a statistically insignificant impact on fatality rates for every age 
group except for individuals who are 65 or older.80 Administrator legal immunity statistically 
significantly increases opioid fatalities for individuals who are between 25 and 44 years old, but 
has no significant effect on the other five age groups.81 Each estimate for third party prescription 
provisions is statistically insignificant.82 The results for provisions which loosen prescription 
requirements differ by age group; such provisions decrease the fatality rate for the 15 to 24 years 
age group by 13%,83 the 35 to 44 years age group by 11%,84 and the over 65 years age group by 
19%.85 
The differences in effects by demographic groups could manifest for multiple reasons. 
The statutes could differentially affect the probability that different demographic groups acquire 
naloxone for self-administration. Similarly, third party prescribing laws will have differential 
effects by demographic group if the probability that a friend or family member acquires naloxone 
is different by group. Finally, effects could differ because the likelihood of successfully using 
naloxone to revive someone differs by demographic group. For example, the effect of third party 
                                                        
78 The significance tests for provider immunity, administrator immunity, and no prescription requirements yield ! =0.700, ! = 0.233, and ! = 0.501. 
79 ! = 0.021. 
80 For the oldest group, ! = 0.054. For all other age groups, ! > 0.250. 
81 For the 35 to 44 years old age group, ! = 0.016. For the 15 to 24 years and 25 to 34 years age groups, ! = 0.130 
and ! = 0.096. For the remaining age groups, ! > 0.530. 
82 ! > 0.300 for all age groups. 
83 ! = 0.019. 
84 ! = 0.018. 
85 ! = 0.035. 
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prescribing for Latino and black individuals observed in Figure 3 could be the result of relatively 
more non-white individuals acquiring naloxone as a result of racial and ethnic differences in 
social networks (Ajrouch et al. 2001; Janevic 2001; Hofferth 1984); but, non-white users being 
more likely to be in a position to help when someone is actually experiencing an overdose could 
also explain the results. Because my data do not enable me to observe how many individuals 
actually purchase naloxone following adoption of the law, I cannot determine which mechanism 
drives the differential effects by demographic group. Nevertheless, the inability to determine 
precisely which mechanism drives the differential effect does not change the implications of the 
model as to the expected effect of implementing a particular naloxone access provision. 
 
C. Differences by Drug Type  
Different factors contribute to the use, misuse, and abuse of different opioids (Jones 
2013). Scholars in the public health literature continue to debate whether the “opioid epidemic” 
is truly a single epidemic, or whether the United States is really suffering from separate illicit 
opioid and prescription pain medication abuse epidemics (Kolodny et al. 2015). It is likely that 
policy responses will have differential effects on users of different opioids. Users of pain 
medication are more likely to see a doctor while acquiring the opioids they use, increasing the 
likelihood that a doctor could offer a prescription for naloxone.86 Heroin users may be relatively 
more likely to be committing a crime while using (because heroin is itself illegal); as a result, 
fatalities from such drugs could be more sensitive to statutes that provide criminal immunity 
while administering naloxone. If users of different drugs respond to naloxone access laws 
differently, or if naloxone administration is more effective in reversing overdoses associated with 
some drugs compared to others, policy responses will need to be tailored as the drugs involved in 
                                                        
86 For example, the CDC recommends co-prescribing naloxone to patients with a history of opioid overdose or 
substance abuse disorder, patients receiving high opioid doses, and patients with concurrent benzodiazepine use 
(Dowell 2016). 
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fatalities evolve over time. To illustrate, heroin and synthetic opioids (including fentanyl)87 were 
both individually involved in 13% of fatal overdoses from 2006 to 2008, but those numbers 
increased to 37% and 33% over 2014 to 2016. Because fentanyl is significantly more potent than 
prescription opioids, it can take more naloxone to reverse an overdose attributable to fentanyl 
consumption. As a result, it is critical that future policy responses be effective at decreasing 
heroin and synthetic opioid fatalities.  
Figure 7 presents the results of estimating a separate difference-in-differences model for 
fatalities from four different categories of opioids: heroin, pain medications, synthetic opioids, 
and other or unidentified opioids. The “other opioids” category includes opioids that could not be 
or otherwise were not identified at the time of autopsy.88 According to the NVSS data that I 
utilize, heroin, pain medication, synthetic opioid, and other opioid fatalities were associated with 
39%, 47%, 29%, and 9% of fatal opioid overdoses in 2015. Because some fatal overdoses 
involve multiple opioids and I include such multiple opioid fatalities in each appropriate 
category, these figures add up to more than 100%. 
The results in Figure 7 demonstrate that naloxone access laws have different effects on 
fatalities involving different drug types. Heroin fatalities are unaffected by provider legal 
immunity or third party prescribing, though administrator legal immunity and relaxed 
prescription requirements have a statistically significant impact. Administrator legal immunity 
increases heroin fatalities by 0.04 fatalities per month per 100,000 residents, while allowing 
prescribing without seeing a practitioner other than a pharmacist decreases heroin fatalities by 
                                                        
87 In recent years, fentanyl overdoses have accounted for an increasing proportion of fatal overdoses (Ingraham 
2018).  
88 More broadly, underidentified drug poisonings may be a major problem for determining an accurate count of 
individuals who have suffered opioid overdoses (Buchanich et al. 2018) (noting that the actual number of opioid 
overdose deaths may be substantially higher than reported numbers due to uncoded death certificates). Even if 
opioid fatalities are undercounted, the measurement error in my data will not bias my results if undercounting is 
random, as classic measurement error in dependent variables does not generally bias regression results (Kmenta 
1997).  
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0.06 per month per 100,000 residents.89 For pain medication fatalities only provider legal 
immunity has a statistically significant effect, which is estimated to increase fatalities involving 
pain medication by 0.05 fatalities per month per 100,000 county residents.90 No provision had a 
statistically significant impact on overdoses for synthetic opioids or “other” opioids.   
 
D. Differences by Urban and Rural Areas 
 As with the different drug types reviewed in Section C, opioid abuse patterns differ 
significantly between urban and rural areas (Keyes et al. 2014). The prevailing narrative of the 
opioid epidemic is that it has been largely fueled by opioid misuse in rural areas (CDC 2018b). 
The counties with the highest opioid prescribing rates tend to be rural—for example, Mohave 
County in Arizona and Nye County in Nevada have opioid prescribing rates more than double 
the national average (CDC 2016). In fact, average fatal opioid overdose rates are higher in urban 
counties than rural counties. But, the counties where the opioid epidemic has taken the most lives 
are disproportionately rural. Fifty-seven of the one hundred counties with the highest opioid 
overdose rates in 2015 were rural counties, even though the average overdose rate in rural 
counties is smaller. And, after other county characteristics are accounted for, areas with higher 
population have substantially smaller opioid fatality rates; a 1% increase in a county’s population 
is associated with a 0.6% decrease in the opioid fatality rate.91  
Many policy responses to the opioid epidemic rely upon institutions and actors that are 
lacking in rural areas. The challenge of few resources in rural areas is particularly germane to the 
effect of naloxone access laws—even if naloxone can be legally acquired, the few pharmacies in 
rural areas may simply not carry naloxone or may charge high prices that foreclose access for 
many individuals. If states do not permit pharmacists to prescribe naloxone or permit prescribing 
                                                        
89 For administrator immunity, ! = 0.048.	For the prescription provisions, ! < 0.001. 
90 ! = 0.061. 
91 See infra, Appendix Table A1.  
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by standing order, the cost of traveling to a doctor may be prohibitive in rural areas. More 
broadly, researchers in the health literature have recognized that individuals in rural areas lack 
financially and geographically accessible primary health care (Laditka et al. 2009; Richards et al. 
2015). If naloxone access laws have little effect in rural areas, policymakers will need to 
recalibrate policy efforts to reduce fatalities in rural areas. 
 To investigate whether naloxone access law effects differ based on how urban an area is, 
Figure 8 presents difference-in-differences estimates of naloxone access laws on urban, 
suburban, and rural counties.92 The estimates in Figure 8 indicate that naloxone access laws have 
very little effect on opioid fatality rates outside of urban counties. The estimated effects for all 
four provisions are statistically insignificant for both rural and suburban counties.93 The lack of 
an effect in rural counties is consistent with public health research demonstrating that physician 
shortages, cultural and financial barriers, and transportation difficulties plague rural access to 
health care (Douthit 2015). In urban counties, provisions extending legal immunity to lay 
administrators cause a significant increase of 0.13 fatalities per month per 100,000 residents.94 
And consistent with the evidence presented in Sections A, B, and C, provisions relaxing 
prescription requirements cause a significant decrease of 0.17 fatalities per month per 100,000 
residents.95  
 
                                                        
92 I adapt the National Council for Health Statistics (“NCHS”) Urban-Rural Classification scheme for this analysis. I 
classify a county as urban if the NCHS classification of a county is “Large central metro” or “Large fringe metro.” I 
classify a county as suburban if the NCHS classification of a county is “Medium metro” or “Small metro.” Finally, I 
classify a county as rural if the NCHS classification is “Micropolitan” or “Noncore” (U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services 2014).  
93 For rural counties, the p-values range from 0.425 (provider immunity) to 0.707 (lay administrator immunity). For 
suburban counties, the p-values range from 0.288 (third party prescribing) to 0.534 (relaxed prescription 
requirements).  
94 ! = 0.020. 
95 For third party provisions, ! = 0.072. For the prescription provisions, ! = 0.008. 
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V. Toward an Optimal Naloxone Policy 
The results in Part IV provide strong evidence that naloxone access without a prescription 
can save many lives. This Part explores what steps states and the federal government can take to 
capitalize on this evidence. In Section A, I recommend that the federal government and states 
take further steps to make naloxone available to anyone without a prescription. In Section B, I 
discuss the evidence that my regressions provide on the effect of liability immunity. While the 
provisions addressing provider immunity generally had no significant effect, the results of my 
difference-in-differences model offer evidence that providing legal immunity to administrators 
increases fatalities. 
 
 A. Removing Prescription Requirements 
 The results in Part IV indicate that naloxone access provisions that allow individuals to 
obtain naloxone via a standing order prescription or a prescription from a pharmacist could save 
approximately 3,030 lives nationwide per year.96 As of the end of 2016, five states and 
Washington, D.C. still did not permit prescribing naloxone by standing order or by a pharmacist. 
The provisions that relax prescription requirements enable individuals, be they opioid users 
themselves or friends or family members of opioid users, to obtain naloxone without the 
inconvenience or expense of going to a doctor first. The decreased financial cost of receiving 
naloxone from a pharmacy, without having to pay another health care provider’s fee, as well as 
removing geographic barriers to access associated with needing to visit a non-pharmacist 
prescriber, are likely the primary mechanism for the decreased fatalities. Drug users often face 
barriers to receiving medical treatment, and it is likely that those barriers also make it difficult to 
seek a prescription for naloxone that could save their lives (Mowbray et al. 2010). 
                                                        
96 Relaxing prescription requirements decreases the overdose rate in the average county by 0.077 fatalities per month 
per 100,000 residents. Multiplying by 12 to annualize the rate and multiplying by the whole U.S. population of 
approximately 328,000,000 (divided by 100,000) yields 3,030 lives saved annually. 
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 Optimal naloxone policy should therefore focus on making naloxone available without a 
prescription. Doing so would expand the benefits of the prescription relaxing statutes studied 
here. State laws that permit doctors to issue standing orders and that authorize pharmacists to 
prescribe naloxone work around the fact that the FDA continues to classify naloxone as a 
prescription drug. The best solution would be for the FDA to promulgate a regulation which 
allows naloxone to be sold at retail locations without any prescription at all. The Food, Drug, and 
Cosmetic Act requires drugs which are potentially toxic or which require supervision by a health 
care practitioner to safely use to be dispensed only upon a written prescription.97 The Act 
authorizes the FDA to permit a drug to be sold over-the-counter whenever a prescription 
requirement is “not necessary for the protection of the public health.”98 The FDA states that 
over-the-counter treatment is typically appropriate for drugs when (1) the benefits of over-the-
counter treatment outweigh the risks, (2) the potential for abuse is low, (3) consumers can use 
them for self-diagnosed conditions, (4) they can be adequately labeled, and (5) health care 
practitioners are not needed for the safe and effective use of the product (U.S. FDA 2018c).  
 Over-the-counter treatment for naloxone is appropriate under the FDA’s prevailing 
standard. Naloxone has no recreational benefit and cannot be abused (Chamberlain and Klein 
1994). Opioid users as well as their friends and family members are capable of diagnosing opioid 
overdoses, as ample evidence from pilot naloxone programs demonstrates. Moreover, the risks of 
mistaken diagnosis are small as the effects of inappropriate administration of naloxone are 
minimal. The FDA itself developed a consumer-friendly model Drug Facts Label for naloxone 
(Staman 2018). Naloxone may be safely administered in the case of an overdose using either the 
autoinjector or nasal spray administration methods without a doctor present. And as this research 
                                                        
97 21 U.S.C. § 353(b)(1) (2018). 
98 Id. at § 353(c). 
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has made clear, the public health benefits of allowing naloxone to be purchased without a 
prescription dramatically outweigh the costs. Thousands of lives could be saved annually by 
increasing the product’s availability. Even if there is some small moral hazard effect of naloxone 
access laws which causes increased consumption of opioids or an uptick in opioid related crime, 
the benefit in lives saved will outweigh such effects. 
Full over-the-counter classification is critical to ensuring that naloxone is available in 
rural areas. As Figure 8 demonstrates, current state regimes do not affect fatalities in rural areas. 
Even if every single state passed a standing order provision or pharmacist-prescribing provision, 
individuals would still need to access a pharmacy that actually stocks naloxone for naloxone 
access laws to have a meaningful impact. Because many individuals living in rural areas have 
few geographically or financially accessible pharmacies that would stock naloxone (Casey et al. 
2008), state level policies will be insufficient. Over-the-counter treatment would permit naloxone 
to be sold in gas stations, grocery stores, and other locations that are likely to be more accessible 
to individuals in rural areas. However, in the Technical Appendix, I test whether the effect of 
naloxone access laws is greater in urban, suburban, and rural areas with more pharmacies and 
find little evidence that geographic access to pharmacies drives the lack of an effect in rural 
areas.99 Expanding the number of retailers may yield more retailers willing to stock naloxone and 
may also have the added benefit of reducing naloxone prices, at least to the extent that market 
power of local retailers rather than the pricing decisions of manufacturers drives the high cost of 
naloxone currently in the market (Sorenson 2000). 
 
                                                        
99 See Appendix Table A9.  
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B. Removing Immunity for Liability 
My empirical results indicate that providing liability immunity to naloxone providers has 
a very small effect, if any, on opioid overdose fatalities. Conversely, my difference-in-
differences estimates consistently demonstrate that providing legal immunity to individuals who 
administer naloxone increases overdose fatalities. It is not clear why administration immunity 
has the opposite effect of making a prescription easier to acquire. This Section discusses why 
those estimates may exhibit increases in opioid fatalities as a result of the immunity.  
It is unlikely that the observed effect is the result of too many states enacting statutes with 
overlapping provisions at the same time, preventing proper isolation of the effect of 
administrator legal immunity. Twenty-eight states passed an administrator immunity provision in 
combination with other provisions and never altered their naloxone access regime again, but the 
remaining twenty-two states altered their regimes in a manner that enabled disentangling the 
effect of the administrator immunity provision. California, Connecticut, the District of Columbia, 
and Rhode Island each amended their code by adding only administrator immunity without any 
other naloxone access provisions at some point in my data. South Dakota’s naloxone access law 
enacted every provision except for the lay administrator immunity provision. These changes 
ensure that the effect I estimate is the average effect of a lay administrator provision rather than 
correlations with the other provisions that I analyze. 
It is possible that the effect is being driven by behavior in outlier states. Re-estimating the 
model 51 times and individually dropping each state and Washington, D.C. illustrates that the 
lay-administrator coefficient is only significant in regressions that include both New York and 
Washington state. In the extra models that I run which exclude New York, lay administrator 
immunity is statistically insignificant,100 but the sum effect of standing orders and pharmacist 
                                                        
100 ! = 0.122. 
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prescription authority remains significant.101 Likewise, in the models excluding Washington, lay 
administrator immunity is statistically insignificant,102 but the effect of the beneficial provision 
retains its statistical significance.103 The implementation of administrator immunity laws may 
have been systematically different in those two states in a way that causes the model to yield an 
increase in opioid fatalities.  
Finally, it is possible that extending immunity to administrators truly does cause a change 
in behavior that is different from the change caused by providing naloxone without a patient 
specific prescription from a non-pharmacist practitioner. The latter provisions are likely taken 
advantage of primarily by non-opioid using individuals, while the administration provision can 
affect individuals who use opioids as well as third parties. Perhaps such individuals tend to be 
more risk-seeking when naloxone access laws are implemented, or they are misinformed as to 
the circumstances under which legal immunity attaches. But it is not clear whether the 
administrator immunity actually changed legal incentives, given that there exists no evidence of 
any cases of states charging naloxone administrators with criminal assault for administering 
naloxone or plaintiffs suing for damages for battery in the absence of an immunity statute.104 
Another alternative is that the requirements for immunity in a naloxone statute are complex 
enough to actually make it less likely that an individual is immune from liability by 
administering naloxone rather merely than calling for emergency medical services (Sightes et al. 
2018). For example, in Indiana immunity only attaches to individuals who administer naloxone, 
summon emergency medical assistance, remain on the scene, and cooperate with law 
enforcement.105 Moreover, legal immunity only attaches to individuals who actually administer 
                                                        
101 ! = 0.042. 
102 ! = 0.147. 
103 ! = 0.033. 
104 A Westlaw search for “naloxone and administ*” performed on October 29, 2018 yielded no such cases. 
105 Ind. § 15-42-27-2 (2018).  
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naloxone; thus individuals who are engaged in illegal activity and present when emergency 
services arrive but did not administer naloxone will not be immune from criminal or civil 
liability generally. Such statutes could chill attempts to seek medical care for individuals 
experiencing an overdose as a result. Finally, it is possible that liability is not salient to providers 
until the discussion of conditions for immunity highlights the circumstances under which health 
care providers could be held liable. If providers do not know that providing naloxone could 
expose them to civil or criminal liability, a statute providing immunity may chill naloxone 
provision that was already occurring if it informs doctors about a new risk. 
Future naloxone policy should focus less on the legal immunity of providers and 
administrators and more on actually making naloxone accessible to individuals and communities 
that need it. If naloxone is made available without a prescription, the immunity of naloxone 
providers will not generally matter. Moreover, as an empirical matter, states have brought more 
criminal charges or civil suits against doctors for inappropriately prescribing opioid medications 
than for prescribing naloxone to individuals.106 Doctors and administrators may simply not 
respond strongly to legal sanctions as an incentive when deciding whether to provide life-saving 
medicine (Shavell 2002). Because my estimates for the effect of administrator immunity are 
positive and significant, avoiding such statutes may be the best course of action until further 
research identifies why those statutes increase opioid fatalities, though as discussed above, the 
evidence on the effect of immunity is mixed.  
 
                                                        
106 A Westlaw search for “crim* and naloxone” performed on October 29, 2018 yielded no cases indicating that a 
defendant was charged with criminal possession of naloxone or inappropriate prescribing of naloxone, nor being 
sued for negligence by any plaintiff. See also (Davis et al. 2015). Though, defendants have been charged with 
distributing Suboxone, a prescription drug containing both buprenorphine and naloxone that is used for treating 
opioid addiction. E.g., Commonwealth v. Wilks, No. 2132, 2013 WL 11254080, at *1–2 (Sup. Ct. Penn. Oct 2, 
2013); Commonwealth v. Caraballo, 965 N.E. 2d 194, 196 (Mass. App. Ct. 2012). Unlike pure naloxone, Suboxone 
does have recreational benefits and is not generally used to reverse an overdose. Contrast the lack of suits for 
naloxone with media reports of several lawsuits against doctors for negligent distribution of opioids (Nedelman 
2017).  
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VI. Conclusion 
 Opioid fatalities continue to grow year over year, with an estimated 72,000 individuals 
experiencing a fatal overdose in 2017. Providing naloxone to third parties and enabling 
individuals to acquire naloxone without first incurring the expense of visiting a non-pharmacist 
medical professional have significantly decrease the opioid fatalities experienced each year. 
There is also evidence that extending legal immunity to administrators may increase the amount 
of opioid fatalities. I estimate that extending legal immunity to naloxone providers has no effect 
on fatalities. The effects are concentrated among opioid users in urban areas, suggesting that 
alternative policy responses will be necessary to reduce fatalities in rural areas that exhibit the 
highest opioid fatality rates. These results contribute significantly to the literature examining the 
effects of naloxone access by isolating which provisions tend to decrease fatalities, offering 
evidence of provisions that increase fatalities, and exploring exactly who the provisions have 
benefitted and harmed.  
The federal government can continue the push to broaden naloxone access. I recommend 
that the FDA promulgate regulations which permit individuals to acquire naloxone nationwide 
without any form of a prescription. Given that naloxone access today still puts some barriers in 
front of consumers (asking a pharmacist for a prescription, determining whether a standing order 
is in effect), my estimates are an understatement of how many lives could be saved if the FDA 
took this measure. Moreover, my data do not answer how many individuals actually receive 
naloxone. In rural areas, naloxone being legal to acquire will not be the same as naloxone being 
easy to acquire. For counties that the opioid epidemic has hit the hardest, the distinction will 
make the difference between life and death for opioid users. Further research must be done to 
investigate how policymakers can expand possession of naloxone rather than merely expand 
legal access to it. Direct distribution similar to the early pilot programs that began the naloxone 
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movement may be key. State naloxone access statutes, even those that evidence demonstrates are 
helpful at reducing fatalities, are a single part of the numerous steps that policymakers must take 
to turn the tide on the epidemic.   
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Evolution of state naloxone access laws over time 
 
2006 2012 
  
2013 2014 
  
2015 2016 
  
Note: Highlighted states have naloxone access laws in force at the end of the specified year.  
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Figure 2: National opioid fatalities  
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Figure 3: Effect of naloxone access provisions 
 
 
Notes: N = 414,498. Each bar represents the change in monthly 
opioid fatalities in the average county per 100,000 county 
residents. The average monthly fatality rate is 0.815 fatalities per 
month per 100,000 residents. The regression results from which 
this figure was derived are reported in Appendix Table A1.  
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Figure 4: Effects of naloxone access provisions by sex 
 
 
Notes: N = 414,498. Each bar represents the change in monthly 
fatalities in the average county per 100,000 male or female county 
residents. The average monthly fatality rates for men and women 
are 0.910 and 0.477 fatalities per month per 100,000 male and 
female residents. This figure was derived from regression results 
reported in Appendix Table A2. 
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Figure 5: Effects of naloxone access provisions by race and ethnicity 
 
 
Notes: N = 414,498. Each bar represents the change in monthly 
fatalities in the average county per 100,000 white, black, or Latino 
county residents. The average monthly fatality rates for white, 
black and Latino individuals are 0.914, 0.431, and 0.277 fatalities 
per month per 100,000 residents of the relevant group. This figure 
was derived from regression results reported in Appendix Table 
A3. 
 
 58 
Figure 6: Effects of naloxone access provisions by age group 
 
 
Notes: N = 414,498. Each bar represents the change in monthly 
fatalities in the average county per 100,000 county residents in the 
indicated age group. The average monthly fatality rate for each age 
group is 0.010 (14 years or younger), 0.513 (15 to 24 years), 1.212 
(25 to 34 years), 1.203 (35 to 44 years), 1.290 (45 to 54 years), 
0.923 (55 to 64 years), and 0.192 (65 years or older) fatalities per 
100,000 county residents in the indicated age group. This figure 
was derived from regression results reported in Appendix Table 
A4. 
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Figure 7: Effect of naloxone access provisions by drug type 
 
 
Notes: N = 414,498. Each bar represents the change in monthly 
fatalities associated with the indicated opioid in the average county 
per 100,000 county residents. The average monthly fatality rates 
for heroin, pain medication, synthetic opioids, and other opioids 
are 0.210, 0.470, 0.166, and 0.091 fatalities per month per 100,000 
residents. This figure was derived from regression results reported 
in Appendix Table A5.  
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Figure 8: Effect of naloxone access provisions by urbanization 
 
 
Notes: N = 414,498. Each bar represents the change in monthly 
fatalities in the average rural, suburban, or urban county per 
100,000 county residents. The average monthly fatality rates for 
rural, suburban, and urban counties are 0.510, 0.610, and 0.782 
fatalities per month per 100,000 residents. This figure was derived 
from regression results reported in Appendix Table A6. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Naloxone access provision adoption date by state 
 
State Provider legal immunity Lay administrator legal immunity Third party prescribing No prescription 
Alabama June 2015 June 2015 June 2015 June 2015 
Alaska March 2016 March 2016 March 2016 March 2016 
Arizona August 2016 August 2016 August 2016 August 2016 
Arkansas July 2015 July 2015 July 2015 July 2015 
California January 2008* January 2011* January 2014 January 2014 
Colorado May 2013 May 2013 April 2015 April 2015 
Connecticut October 2003 October 2014 July 2015 July 2015 
Delaware August 2014 - - August 2014 
District of Columbia - April 2013 - - 
Florida June 2015 June 2015 June 2015 July 2016 
Georgia May 2014 May 2014 May 2014 May 2014 
Hawaii August 2016 August 2016 August 2016 August 2016 
Idaho July 2015 July 2015 July 2015 July 2015 
Illinois August 2015 January 2010 January 2010 January 2010 
Indiana May 2015 May 2015 May 2015 May 2015 
Iowa July 2016 July 2016  July 2016 July 2016 
Kansas - - - - 
Kentucky - July 2013 July 2013 July 2013 
Louisiana August 2015 August 2015 August 2015 August 2015 
Maine August 2016 August 2016 May 2014 October 2015 
Maryland October 2015 October 2015 October 2013 October 2015 
Massachusetts - July 2014 July 2012 July 2014 
Michigan October 2014 October 2014 October 2014 - 
Minnesota May 2014 May 2014 - May 2014 
Mississippi July 2015 July 2015 July 2015 July 2015 
Missouri September 2016 September 2016 - September 2016 
Montana - - - - 
Nebraska June 2015 June 2015 June 2015 - 
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Nevada October 2015 October 2015 October 2015 October 2015 
New Hampshire June 2015 June 2015 June 2015 June 2015 
New Jersey July 2013 July 2013 July 2013 July 2013 
New Mexico April 2001 April 2001 April 2001 March 2013 
New York - July 2014 February 2007 July 2014 
North Carolina April 2013 April 2013 April 2013 April 2013 
North Dakota August 2015 August 2015 August 2015 August 2015 
Ohio March 2014 March 2014 March 2014 August 2015 
Oklahoma - - November 2013 November 2014 
Oregon - June 2013 June 2013 June 2013 
Pennsylvania December 2014 December 2014 December 2014 December 2014 
Rhode Island - July 2012 March 2014 March 2014 
South Carolina June 2015 June 2015 June 2015 June 2016 
South Dakota July 2016 - July 2016 July 2016 
Tennessee July 2014 July 2014 July 2014 July 2014 
Texas September 2015 September 2015 September 2015 September 2015 
Utah May 2014 May 2014 May 2014 June 2016 
Vermont July 2013 July 2013 July 2013 July 2013 
Virginia April 2014 July 2013 July 2013† April 2014 
Washington August 2015 June 2010 June 2010 August 2015 
West Virginia June 2015 June 2015 June 2015 June 2016 
Wisconsin April 2014 April 2014 April 2014 April 2014 
Wyoming - - - - 
Note: Each cell provides the first month and year that a state’s naloxone access provision was in effect for a majority of the month. 
Data on the effective dates of each statute were obtained from the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System 
(http://pdaps.org/datasets/laws-regulating-administration-of-naloxone-1501695139).  The table does not provide information on 
laws passed after December 2016.  
* California’s provider legal immunity and lay administrator legal immunity provisions applied only to Alameda, Fresno, 
Humboldt, Los Angeles, Mendocino, San Francisco, and Santa Cruz counties until January 2014.  
† Virginia repealed its third-party prescription provision when it enacted its provision permitting prescription by standing order, 
effective April 2014. Between July 2013 and April 2014, doctors in state approved programs could prescribe naloxone to third 
parties. 
 63 
 
Table 2: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard deviation 
Monthly opioid fatalities per 100,000 residents    
  All opioids  0.815 0.486 1.174 
  Heroin  0.210 0.000 0.484 
  Pain medication (semi-synthetic opioids)  0.470 0.198 0.831 
  Synthetic opioids  0.166 0.000 0.536 
  Other opioids  0.091 0.000 0.338 
    
Naloxone access laws:    
  Any naloxone access law 0.341 0.000 0.474 
  Provider legal immunity 0.195 0.000 0.396 
  Administrator legal immunity 0.238 0.000 0.426 
  Third party provision permitted 0.266 0.000 0.442 
  Relaxed prescription requirements 0.191 0.000 0.393 
    
County characteristics    
  Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.893 0.849 0.242 
  Employment to population ratio 0.498 0.413 0.440 
  Population (hundreds of thousands) 4.235 3.072 3.710 
  White population (%) 0.769 0.834 0.204 
  Mean age 38.101 37.901 2.964 
    
Medical services and first responder counts:    
  Pharmacies 1.126 0.190 5.366 
  Hospitals 0.249 0.060 0.539 
  Pain clinics 0.013 0.060 0.042 
  Police (per 1,000 residents) 0.819 0.614 0.950 
  EMTs (per 1,000 residents) 0.006 0.002 0.025 
    
Other laws:    
  PDMP 0.883 1.000 0.321 
  Must-access PDMP 0.086 0.000 0.281 
  Medical marijuana legal 0.147 0.000 0.354 
  Recreational marijuana legal 0.013 0.000 0.114 
  Noneconomic damage caps 0.603 1.000 0.489 
  Punitive damage caps 0.687 1.000 0.464 
  Joint and several liability reforms 0.673 1.000 0.469 
    
Note: N = 414,498. Summary statistics are weighted by county population. 
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Technical Appendix  
 
The regression equation that I use to estimate my difference-in-differences models is as 
follows:  
 !"#$#%	'()(*#)+	,()-./ = 1 + 345678/ + 9./3 + :. + ;/ + <=/ + -./ (1) 
 
In this equation, > indexes counties, ? indexes states, and ) indexes months. The variable 5678/ 
indicates whether state ? has an active naloxone access law at time ). The variable 1 is a constant 
term. The variables 9./ are time-variant county characteristics. The term :. is a series of county-
specific fixed effects, which account for the variation in fatality rates attributable to time-
invariant county characteristics. The term ;/ is a series of monthly fixed effects, accounting for 
the variation in fatality rates attributable to national time trends. The term <=/ is a series of 
county-specific time trends. The error term is -./. The parameter 34 is the difference-in-
differences estimate of the effect of naloxone access laws and is therefore the parameter of 
interest.  
The results that I present in Figures 3 through 8 use some variant of the regression model 
presented in equation 1. In Figure 3, I estimate two variants of this equation. In the first, 5678/ 
is a single indicator variable equal to one if state ? has any naloxone access law in force at time ). In the second variant, 5678/ is a vector of four indicator variables. The four variables indicate 
whether state ? has a naloxone access law in force which contains one of the four naloxone 
access provisions of interest. Figures 4 through 8 use substantially the same regression equation 
but estimate it with a different dependent variable. In Figure 4, the dependent variables are either 
the male or female opioid fatality rate. In Figure 5, the dependent variables are the fatality rates 
for individuals who are white, black, or Latino. Figure 6 uses opioid fatality rate by ten-year age 
groups as the dependent variable. Figure 7 uses four different dependent variables: the heroin 
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fatality rate, the pain medication fatality rate, the synthetic opioid fatality rate, and the fatality 
rate for unidentified opioids. Finally, Figure 8 applies equation 1 to three distinct subsamples of 
my data: rural counties, suburban counties, and urban counties. The full regression results for 
each of these models are presented in Appendix Tables A1 through A6. 
In addition, Figures Appendix A1 and A2 provide explicit tests of the parallel trends 
assumption necessary for the model to provide a valid estimate of the causal effect of naloxone 
access laws. Both figures are an event study of the effects of naloxone access law. The bold 
center line in each figure is a three-period moving average of the estimated difference between 
opioid fatality rates in counties where a naloxone access law is in effect and those where a 
naloxone access law is not in effect, after controlling for county fixed effects, monthly time 
trends, county-specific time trends, and the time-varying county characteristics in my dataset. 
The lighter lines bracketing the bold line are the 95% confidence intervals associated with the 
estimate. The estimates to the left of the vertical line at the time of enactment test the parallel 
trends assumption, while the estimates to the right show the evolution of the effect of naloxone 
access laws over time. Statistically insignificant pre-enactment estimates indicate that the parallel 
trends assumption is satisfied. The results broadly indicate the assumption is not violated and the 
model is valid. Figure A1 shows pre-enactment estimates which are never distinguishable from 
zero. For most provisions, Figure A2 supports an analogous conclusion. The pre-enactment 
estimates are only ever statistically significant for statutes extending immunity to providers or 
administrators. As a result, the results corresponding to these statutes should be interpreted with 
caution. The remaining pre-trends are generally very close to zero, indicating that the difference-
in-differences model provides valid estimates of the causal effect of naloxone access provisions. 
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Appendix Figures 
 
Figure A1: Naloxone access laws generally 
 
 
Note: N = 414,498. The center line presents a three-month moving average of the difference-in-differences point 
estimates of the difference in opioid fatality rates between counties treated by any naloxone access law and 
untreated counties. The bracketing lines provide the 95% confidence interval. The underlying regression controls 
for state fixed effects, month fixed effects, county-level time trends, and the covariates in Appendix Table A1, 
column 1. 
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Figure A2: Provision level estimates of the effect of naloxone access laws 
 
Provider legal immunity Administrator legal immunity 
  
Third party prescribing Relaxed prescription requirements 
  
Note: N = 414,498. The center line presents a three-month moving average of the difference-in-differences point 
estimates of the difference in opioid fatality rates between counties treated by the relevant provision and untreated 
counties. The bracketing lines provide the 95% confidence interval. The underlying regression controls for state 
fixed effects, month fixed effects, county-level time trends, and the covariates in Appendix Table A1, column 2.  
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of naloxone access laws 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Any law model Provision level analysis 
Any naloxone access law 0.059 -- 
 (0.051)  
Provider legal immunity -- 0.044 
  (0.075) 
Administrator legal immunity -- 0.088 
  (0.049)* 
Third party prescribing -- -0.042 
  (0.032) 
Relaxed prescription requirements -- -0.077 
  (0.034)** 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.040 0.032 
 (0.055) (0.054) 
Employment to population ratio 0.428 0.406 
 (0.594) (0.605) 
Population (hundreds of thousands) -0.150 -0.146 
 (0.130) (0.127) 
White Population (%) -2.922 -3.270 
 (1.667)* (1.621)** 
Mean age -0.021 -0.017 
 (0.039) (0.040) 
Pharmacies -0.016 -0.016 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** 
Hospitals -0.265 -0.256 
 (0.267) (0.268) 
Pain clinics 1.095 1.044 
 (1.554) (1.487) 
Police (per 1,000 residents) -0.020 -0.021 
 (0.020) (0.021) 
EMTs (per 1,000 residents) -0.385 -0.354 
 (0.329) (0.334) 
PDMP 0.098 0.109 
 (0.059) (0.064)* 
Must access PDMP 0.107 0.106 
 (0.031)*** (0.031)*** 
Medical marijuana legal 0.130 0.116 
 (0.052)** (0.050)** 
Recreational marijuana legal -0.076 -0.068 
 (0.060) (0.055) 
Noneconomic damage caps -0.026 -0.017 
 (0.038) (0.037) 
Punitive damage caps 0.103 0.103 
 (0.038)*** (0.038)** 
Joint and several liability reforms -0.165 -0.156 
 (0.056)*** (0.054)*** 
   
Note: N = 414,498. All regressions include county and month fixed effects and county-specific linear time trends. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *** " < 0.01, ** " < 0.05, * " < 0.10. 
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Table A2: Poisson regression estimates of the effect of naloxone access laws 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Provider legal immunity -0.018 0.024 0.049 
 (0.077) (0.045) (0.057) 
Administrator legal immunity 0.167 0.101 0.081 
 (0.058)*** (0.029)*** (0.034)** 
Third party prescribing -0.001 -0.028 -0.041 
 (0.046) (0.034) (0.030) 
Relaxed prescription requirements -0.127 -0.073 -0.065 
 (0.068)* (0.037)** (0.034)* 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.017 0.022 -0.032 
 (0.059) (0.066) (0.046) 
Employment to population ratio -0.311 -0.226 -0.263 
 (0.158)** (0.149) (0.138)* 
Population (hundreds of thousands) 3.416 -0.317 -2.060 
 (0.822)*** (0.821) (1.097)* 
White Population (%) -0.039 -0.010 0.024 
 (0.011)*** (0.014) (0.031) 
Mean age -0.006 -0.009 -0.013 
 (0.004)* (0.004)** (0.005)** 
Pharmacies -0.104 -0.069 -0.020 
 (0.039)*** (0.026)*** (0.083) 
Hospitals -0.104 0.455 1.063 
 (0.480) (0.276)* (0.920) 
Pain clinics -0.000 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000)** (0.000) 
Police (per 1,000 residents) -0.018 -0.001 -0.002 
 (0.024) (0.017) (0.027) 
EMTs (per 1,000 residents) 0.221 0.024 0.028 
 (0.077)*** (0.057) (0.058) 
PDMP 0.099 0.108 0.115 
 (0.076) (0.056)* (0.056)** 
Must access PDMP -0.031 0.099 0.107 
 (0.070) (0.048)** (0.044)** 
Medical marijuana legal -0.205 -0.063 -0.043 
 (0.093)** (0.061) (0.056) 
Recreational marijuana legal 0.061 0.115 0.106 
 (0.056) (0.060)* (0.053)** 
Noneconomic damage caps 0.091 0.146 0.143 
 (0.065) (0.091) (0.086)* 
Punitive damage caps 0.389 -0.193 -0.190 
 (0.060)*** (0.090)** (0.085)** 
Joint and several liability reforms -6.901 -3.852 -1.066 
 (0.928)*** (0.677)*** (0.838) 
    
State and month fixed effects X X X 
State time trends  X X 
County time trends   X 
    
Note: N = 414,498. All regressions include county and month fixed effects and county-specific linear time trends. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *** " < 0.01, ** " < 0.05, * " < 0.10. 
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Table A3: Ordinary least squares estimates under different specifications 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) 
Provider legal immunity -0.044 0.027 0.044 
 (0.110) (0.072) (0.075) 
Administrator legal immunity 0.141 0.087 0.088 
 (0.087) (0.050)* (0.049)* 
Third party prescribing 0.081 -0.032 -0.042 
 (0.057) (0.032) (0.032) 
Relaxed prescription requirements -0.161 -0.076 -0.077 
 (0.086)* (0.035)** (0.034)** 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) -0.051 0.062 0.032 
 (0.074) (0.051) (0.054) 
Employment to population ratio 0.313 0.433 0.406 
 (0.315) (0.305) (0.605) 
Population (hundreds of thousands) -0.224 -0.136 -0.146 
 (0.063)*** (0.063)** (0.127) 
White Population (%) 0.966 -1.080 -3.270 
 (1.184) (0.876) (1.621)** 
Mean age -0.078 -0.081 -0.017 
 (0.021)*** (0.024)*** (0.040) 
Pharmacies 0.000 -0.006 -0.016 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.006)*** 
Hospitals 0.111 0.077 -0.256 
 (0.099) (0.087) (0.268) 
Pain clinics 0.170 0.821 1.044 
 (0.385) (0.242)*** (1.487) 
Police (per 1,000 residents) -0.001 -0.001 -0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EMTs (per 1,000 residents) -0.002 -0.000 -0.004 
 (0.001)* (0.001) (0.003) 
PDMP 0.275 0.109 0.109 
 (0.097)*** (0.064)* (0.064)* 
Must access PDMP 0.029 0.106 0.106 
 (0.066) (0.030)*** (0.031)*** 
Medical marijuana legal 0.073 0.124 0.116 
 (0.092) (0.053)** (0.050)** 
Recreational marijuana legal -0.235 -0.067 -0.068 
 (0.105)** (0.056) (0.055) 
Noneconomic damage caps 0.031 -0.015 -0.017 
 (0.030) (0.037) (0.037) 
Punitive damage caps 0.073 0.104 0.103 
 (0.063) (0.038)*** (0.038)** 
Joint and several liability reforms 0.334 -0.156 -0.156 
 (0.066)*** (0.057)*** (0.054)*** 
    
State and month fixed effects X X X 
State time trends  X X 
County time trends   X 
    
Note: N = 414,498. All regressions include county and month fixed effects and county-specific linear time trends. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *** " < 0.01, ** " < 0.05, * " < 0.10. 
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Table A4: Naloxone access provision effects by sex 
 
 (1) (2) 
Variable Male fatalities Female fatalities 
Provider legal immunity 0.023 0.027 
 (0.080) (0.027) 
Administrator legal immunity 0.111 0.027 
 (0.055)** (0.027) 
Third party prescribing -0.036 0.003 
 (0.037) (0.020) 
Relaxed prescription requirements -0.086 -0.043 
 (0.044)* (0.020)** 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.036 0.005 
 (0.074) (0.030) 
Employment to population ratio -0.287 -0.096 
 (0.161)* (0.069) 
Population (hundreds of thousands) -0.133 -0.053 
 (0.114) (0.052) 
White Population (%) -1.618 -0.805 
 (0.987) (0.492) 
Mean age 0.009 -0.001 
 (0.028) (0.011) 
Pharmacies -0.021 -0.004 
 (0.004)*** (0.001)*** 
Hospitals -0.052 -0.021 
 (0.110) (0.032) 
Pain clinics 0.540 0.730 
 (0.942) (0.540) 
Police (per 1,000 residents) 0.003 -0.019 
 (0.023) (0.015) 
EMTs (per 1,000 residents) 0.001 -0.136 
 (0.541) (0.276) 
PDMP 0.170 0.069 
 (0.098)* (0.036)* 
Must access PDMP 0.123 0.049 
 (0.042)*** (0.019)** 
Medical marijuana legal 0.157 0.037 
 (0.064)** (0.024) 
Recreational marijuana legal -0.035 -0.044 
 (0.080) (0.025)* 
Noneconomic damage caps -0.016 -0.014 
 (0.059) (0.023) 
Punitive damage caps 0.100 0.065 
 (0.054)* (0.019)*** 
Joint and several liability reforms -0.189 -0.108 
 (0.085)** (0.067) 
   
Note: N = 414,498. All regressions include county and month fixed effects and county-specific linear time trends. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *** " < 0.01, ** " < 0.05, * " < 0.10. 
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Table A5: Naloxone access provision effects by race and ethnicity 
 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Variable White Black Latino 
Provider legal immunity -0.014 0.173 -0.020 
 (0.071) (0.063)*** (0.051) 
Administrator legal immunity 0.140 -0.047 0.047 
 (0.052)*** (0.057) (0.040) 
Third party prescribing -0.023 -0.096 -0.059 
 (0.040) (0.036)** (0.026)** 
Relaxed prescription requirements -0.088 -0.047 0.019 
 (0.039)** (0.051) (0.028) 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.045 -0.003 0.012 
 (0.073) (0.059) (0.034) 
Employment to population ratio -0.310 -0.311 -0.062 
 (0.166)* (0.117)** (0.079) 
Population (hundreds of thousands) -0.140 -0.070 -0.029 
 (0.105) (0.074) (0.041) 
White Population (%) -0.914 -4.050 -0.639 
 (0.851) (1.194)*** (0.619) 
Mean age -0.005 0.041 -0.002 
 (0.031) (0.018)** (0.009) 
Pharmacies -0.015 -0.012 -0.013 
 (0.003)*** (0.010) (0.006)** 
Hospitals -0.068 -0.180 0.042 
 (0.086) (0.112) (0.043) 
Pain clinics 1.271 0.124 0.121 
 (1.051) (0.806) (0.407) 
Police (per 1,000 residents) -0.000 0.000 0.000 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
EMTs (per 1,000 residents) -0.000 -0.004 0.004 
 (0.005) (0.002)** (0.005) 
PDMP 0.168 0.006 0.119 
 (0.082)** (0.062) (0.079) 
Must access PDMP 0.073 0.088 -0.004 
 (0.037)* (0.037)** (0.034) 
Medical marijuana legal 0.110 0.230 0.055 
 (0.062)* (0.092)** (0.024)** 
Recreational marijuana legal -0.096 0.408 0.027 
 (0.072) (0.240)* (0.034) 
Noneconomic damage caps -0.001 -0.015 0.008 
 (0.039) (0.036) (0.050) 
Punitive damage caps 0.110 -0.017 -0.008 
 (0.054)** (0.056) (0.032) 
Joint and several liability reforms -0.120 -0.524 -0.143 
 (0.079) (0.344) (0.040)*** 
    
Note: N = 414,498. All regressions include county and month fixed effects and county-specific linear time trends. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *** " < 0.01, ** " < 0.05, * " < 0.10. 
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Table A6: Naloxone access provision effects by age group 
 
Variable ≤ 14 years 15–24 years 25–34 years  35–44 years 45–54 years 55–64 years ≥ 65 years 
Provider legal immunity -0.001 0.003 -0.039 0.091 0.044 0.074 0.038 
 (0.002) (0.037) (0.110) (0.101) (0.106) (0.066) (0.021)* 
Administrator legal immunity -0.001 0.062 0.163 0.137 0.055 0.051 -0.013 
 (0.003) (0.041) (0.098) (0.057)** (0.087) (0.099) (0.027) 
Third party prescribing 0.001 0.004 -0.009 -0.056 -0.022 -0.011 0.004 
 (0.002) (0.028) (0.084) (0.054) (0.055) (0.094) (0.022) 
Relaxed prescription requirements 0.001 -0.067 -0.089 -0.139 -0.034 -0.092 -0.036 
 (0.003) (0.028)** (0.075) (0.058)** (0.081) (0.063) (0.017)** 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.007 -0.007 -0.015 -0.078 0.110 0.216 -0.080 
 (0.009) (0.058) (0.131) (0.123) (0.080) (0.086)** (0.038)** 
Employment to population ratio -0.001 -0.185 -0.434 -0.360 -0.417 -0.149 -0.139 
 (0.011) (0.090)** (0.194)** (0.212)* (0.229)* (0.348) (0.121) 
Population (hundreds of thousands) -0.003 -0.025 -0.210 -0.215 -0.179 -0.143 -0.039 
 (0.004) (0.057) (0.159) (0.137) (0.179) (0.177) (0.047) 
White Population (%) 0.021 -1.065 -1.832 0.001 -3.008 1.067 0.439 
 (0.064) (0.552)* (1.351) (1.765) (1.836) (1.413) (0.685) 
Mean age 0.001 0.003 -0.031 -0.019 0.031 -0.012 -0.006 
 (0.001) (0.021) (0.052) (0.039) (0.038) (0.020) (0.012) 
Pharmacies -0.000 -0.009 -0.020 -0.029 -0.020 0.124 0.014 
 (0.000) (0.005)* (0.004)*** (0.005)*** (0.007)*** (0.169) (0.066) 
Hospitals 0.003 -0.050 -0.028 -0.025 -0.119 -0.055 -0.084 
 (0.005) (0.035) (0.111) (0.136) (0.170) (0.356) (0.084) 
Pain clinics -0.029 0.757 -0.101 -0.275 1.866 0.849 0.723 
 (0.037) (1.143) (1.544) (0.852) (1.319) (1.304) (0.510) 
Police (per 1,000 residents) 0.001 -0.005 0.028 -0.004 -0.020 -0.066 0.016 
 (0.001) (0.019) (0.111) (0.046) (0.032) (0.037)* (0.018) 
EMTs (per 1,000 residents) -0.050 0.147 -0.798 -0.458 -0.515 0.284 0.835 
 (0.041) (0.281) (0.828) (0.899) (0.832) (0.853) (0.526) 
PDMP -0.004 0.106 0.385 0.188 0.106 0.064 -0.002 
 (0.002)* (0.054)* (0.153)** (0.140) (0.101) (0.068) (0.021) 
Must access PDMP -0.002 0.054 0.135 0.119 0.194 -0.082 -0.002 
 (0.002) (0.037) (0.062)** (0.065)* (0.063)*** (0.128) (0.028) 
Medical marijuana legal -0.002 0.031 0.176 0.194 0.185 0.019 0.009 
 (0.002) (0.035) (0.084)** (0.078)** (0.089)** (0.040) (0.014) 
Recreational marijuana legal -0.006 -0.064 -0.090 -0.313 0.050 -0.021 0.004 
 (0.003) (0.078) (0.137) (0.117)*** (0.117) (0.052) (0.013) 
Noneconomic damage caps -0.003 -0.010 -0.022 -0.005 -0.089 0.046 0.005 
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 (0.004) (0.034) (0.101) (0.090) (0.068) (0.043) (0.027) 
Punitive damage caps -0.004 -0.023 0.172 0.255 0.201 -0.186 0.036 
 (0.005) (0.044) (0.107) (0.073)*** (0.111)* (0.060)*** (0.021)* 
Joint and several liability reforms 0.010 -0.139 -0.275 -0.203 -0.299 -0.309 -0.058 
 (0.005)* (0.038)*** (0.102)*** (0.171) (0.089)*** (0.056)*** (0.016)*** 
        
Note: N = 414,498. All regressions include county and month fixed effects and county-specific linear time trends. Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the 
state level. *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A7: Naloxone access provision effects by drug type 
 
Variable Heroin 
Pain 
medication 
Synthetic 
opioids Other opioids 
Provider legal immunity 0.022 0.049 -0.008 -0.036 
 (0.038) (0.026)* (0.085) (0.024) 
Administrator legal immunity 0.041 -0.005 0.109 0.039 
 (0.021)* (0.022) (0.071) (0.024) 
Third party prescribing -0.026 0.002 -0.073 0.002 
 (0.018) (0.015) (0.050) (0.024) 
Relaxed prescription requirements -0.062 -0.034 -0.041 0.015 
 (0.017)*** (0.023) (0.039) (0.013) 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.002 0.028 0.044 -0.003 
 (0.016) (0.032) (0.042) (0.019) 
Employment to population ratio 0.576 -0.183 0.504 -0.243 
 (0.517) (0.182) (0.610) (0.290) 
Population (hundreds of thousands) 0.046 -0.104 0.010 -0.127 
 (0.122) (0.056)* (0.108) (0.124) 
White Population (%) -3.485 -1.265 -2.586 3.138 
 (3.125) (0.997) (1.657) (3.389) 
Mean age -0.010 -0.009 0.002 -0.019 
 (0.018) (0.017) (0.027) (0.014) 
Pharmacies -0.006 -0.005 -0.010 -0.002 
 (0.004)* (0.002)*** (0.005)** (0.002) 
Hospitals -0.132 0.008 -0.392 0.051 
 (0.158) (0.058) (0.301) (0.092) 
Pain clinics -0.569 2.080 -0.653 0.528 
 (0.871) (0.817)** (1.318) (0.675) 
Police (per 1,000 residents) 0.015 -0.031 0.007 -0.011 
 (0.013) (0.018)* (0.017) (0.012) 
EMTs (per 1,000 residents) -0.270 0.109 -0.323 0.035 
 (0.147)* (0.186) (0.265) (0.086) 
PDMP 0.045 -0.005 0.141 0.017 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.074)* (0.008)** 
Must access PDMP 0.018 0.056 0.047 0.011 
 (0.013) (0.027)** (0.035) (0.013) 
Medical marijuana legal 0.041 0.039 0.108 0.001 
 (0.021)* (0.027) (0.035)*** (0.023) 
Recreational marijuana legal -0.039 0.037 -0.163 0.060 
 (0.033) (0.025) (0.056)*** (0.028)** 
Noneconomic damage caps -0.003 0.008 -0.041 0.004 
 (0.022) (0.020) (0.048) (0.008) 
Punitive damage caps 0.039 0.040 0.030 0.016 
 (0.049) (0.014)*** (0.035) (0.008)** 
Joint and several liability reforms -0.085 -0.055 -0.123 0.007 
 (0.051) (0.053) (0.041)*** (0.009) 
     
Note: N = 414,498. All regressions include county and month fixed effects and county-specific linear time trends. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A8: Naloxone access effects by county urbanization 
 
Variable Rural Suburban Urban 
Provider legal immunity 0.058 -0.066 0.115 
 (0.073) (0.072) (0.093) 
Administrator legal immunity -0.032 0.046 0.134 
 (0.085) (0.058) (0.056)** 
Third party prescribing -0.029 0.048 -0.052 
 (0.053) (0.045) (0.032) 
Relaxed prescription requirements 0.026 -0.022 -0.166 
 (0.046) (0.035) (0.053)*** 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.306 -0.068 -0.025 
 (0.153)* (0.095) (0.057) 
Employment to population ratio 0.612 0.628 0.205 
 (0.293)** (0.550) (0.613) 
Population (hundreds of thousands) -0.565 -0.237 -0.104 
 (1.523) (0.163) (0.125) 
White Population (%) 1.049 -4.847 -4.562 
 (2.368) (5.903) (1.886)** 
Mean age -0.054 -0.092 0.004 
 (0.046) (0.084) (0.047) 
Pharmacies -0.074 0.000 -0.022 
 (0.182) (0.003) (0.012)* 
Hospitals 0.476 -0.568 -0.216 
 (0.700) (0.451) (0.243) 
Pain clinics -11.330 -2.421 1.245 
 (8.964) (2.693) (1.664) 
Police (per 1,000 residents) -0.000 0.000 -0.001 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) 
EMTs (per 1,000 residents) -0.001 -0.005 0.002 
 (0.003) (0.004) (0.053) 
PDMP 0.012 0.120 0.111 
 (0.073) (0.099) (0.074) 
Must access PDMP 0.031 0.072 0.165 
 (0.033) (0.037)* (0.044)*** 
Medical marijuana legal 0.033 0.039 0.176 
 (0.052) (0.047) (0.061)*** 
Recreational marijuana legal -0.031 -0.108 -0.074 
 (0.049) (0.082) (0.079) 
Noneconomic damage caps -0.035 -0.051 -0.007 
 (0.035) (0.055) (0.040) 
Punitive damage caps 0.090 0.061 0.133 
 (0.045)* (0.044) (0.065)** 
Joint and several liability reforms -0.053 -0.154 -0.329 
 (0.056) (0.097) (0.062)*** 
    
Observations 238,488 82,232 50,484 
Note: All regressions include county and month fixed effects and county-specific linear time trends. Standard 
errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A9: Naloxone access effects by county pharmacy counts 
 
Variable All counties Rural Suburban Urban 
Provider legal immunity 0.005 0.043 -0.061 -0.099 
 (0.069) (0.060) (0.073) (0.115) 
Provider legal immunity × 0.028 0.317 -0.000 0.116 
  pharmacies (0.017)* (1.032) (0.001) (0.048)** 
Administrator legal immunity 0.100 -0.034 0.152 0.161 
 (0.049)** (0.081) (0.065)** (0.063)** 
Administrator legal immunity × -0.004 0.032 -0.269 -0.005 
  pharmacies (0.005) (0.931) (0.115)** (0.007) 
Third party prescribing -0.037 -0.012 0.019 -0.064 
 (0.036) (0.054) (0.052) (0.046) 
Third party prescribing × -0.007 -0.377 0.054 -0.005 
  pharmacies (0.010) (0.471) (0.146) (0.013) 
Relaxed prescription requirements -0.077 0.008 -0.102 -0.123 
 (0.036)** (0.048) (0.042)** (0.059)** 
Relaxed prescription requirements 0.005 0.351 0.214 0.005 
  ×  pharmacies (0.009) (0.476) (0.084)** (0.013) 
     
Effect in mean county:     
Provider legal immunity 0.037 0.058 -0.062 0.116 
 (0.070) (0.072) (0.073) (0.086) 
Administrator legal immunity 0.095 -0.033 -0.047 0.151 
 (0.049)* (0.083) (0.083) (0.061) 
Third party prescribing -0.044 -0.031 0.058 -0.073 
 (0.033) (0.052) (0.085) (0.042)* 
Relaxed prescription requirements -0.071 0.025 0.056 -0.113 
 (0.034)** (0.046) (0.049) (0.070)* 
     
Observations 414,498 238,488 82,232 50,484 
Note: All regressions control for mean weekly wage, employment to population ratios, population levels, white 
population (%), mean age, number of pharmacies, hospitals, and pain clinics, police and EMTs per capita, 
whether a state has a PDMP or must-access PDMP, whether medical and recreational marijuana are legal, and 
whether the state has non-economic damage caps, punitive damage caps, and joint and several liability reform in 
medical malpractice cases. All regressions include county and month fixed effects and county-specific linear time 
trends. The effects in the mean county are calculated by adding the relevant provision coefficient to the product of 
the relevant interaction and the number of pharmacies in the average counties in the appropriate subsample. 
Standard errors in parentheses are clustered at the state level. *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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CHAPTER 2: THE EFFECTIVENESS OF FDA BOXED WARNINGS: EVIDENCE FROM PRESCRIPTION 
OPIOIDS 
 
 
I. Introduction 
The United States is currently in the midst of the worst drug overdose epidemic in its 
history (Kolodny et al. 2015). More than 330,000 individuals in the United States have 
experienced a fatal opioid overdose since 1999, with 33,000 individuals dying in 2015 alone. 
The increasing rate of opioid overdoses has contributed significantly to the uptick in overall 
mortality for white Americans that researchers in the health economics literature have 
documented (Case and Deaton 2015, 2017). Remedying this public health crisis has become a 
policy priority and an intense area of scholarly and popular interest.  
This chapter evaluates one of the Food and Drug Administration’s (“FDA”) responses to 
the epidemic: requirements that manufacturers of opioids place boxed warnings on their 
medications’ drug labels. Boxed warnings (also known as “black box warnings” due to the bold 
black box that surrounds them on drug labels) are the FDA’s strongest signal that a medication 
bears serious risks that a health care provider should know before prescribing it. Approximately 
15% of drugs that the FDA approved between 1975 and 2009 have received one or more boxed 
warnings (Frank et al. 2014). In September 2013, the FDA announced that it would require a 
boxed waring informing providers and patients about the risks of abuse, overdose, and death 
from taking or misusing extended release opioid analgesics. Measuring the effect of these boxed 
warnings is critical, as both the FDA and other federal agencies have argued that information 
shocks can be effective in combatting the opioid epidemic (President’s Commission on 
Combating Drug Addiction and the Opioid Crisis 2017). While researchers have found boxed 
warnings effective in other circumstances (Bradford and Kleit 2014; Parkinson et al. 2014; 
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Viscusi 1991), no existing research has measured the effect that opioid boxed warnings have had 
on prescriptions or fatal overdoses.  
I use a differences-in-differences methodology to measure the effect of opioid boxed 
warnings. The 2013 boxed warnings directed prescribers to “assess each patient’s risk,” and 
“monitor patients regularly for the development” of addictive behaviors.1 Such language 
indicates that prescribers should prescribe fewer opioids to patients who may develop abusive 
behaviors, such as individuals with repeat opioid prescriptions. Likewise, patients at an 
objectively higher risk of an opioid overdose should also receive fewer prescriptions following 
the boxed warnings. The warnings also explicitly identified two subgroups of patients presenting 
unique risks: children, who are particularly at risk of opioid poisoning due to accidental 
ingestion, and women who are pregnant, whose prolonged opioid use could cause neonatal 
opioid withdrawal symptoms. I exploit the warning’s targeted language to separate my sample 
into treated and untreated populations. Using the 2011–2016 waves of the Medical Expenditure 
Panel Survey, I isolate the causal effect of the boxed warning on the treated populations by 
comparing the proportion of individuals with an active opioid prescription before and after the 
warning across the targeted and non-targeted groups. 
My analyses demonstrate that the FDA’s boxed warning was effective at reducing 
prescriptions to individuals who had previously had an opioid prescription. Individuals with a 
previous opioid prescription were 35.5% less likely to be prescribed an opioid after the 
introduction of the boxed warning. Patients who are high risk or that the warning specifically 
targeted had opioid prescriptions at rates that are statistically indistinguishable from patients who 
are low risk or not targeted before and after the introduction of the boxed warning. I also present 
                                                        
1 The full text of the boxed warning is provided and discussed in Section II.  
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evidence that when health care providers prescribed opioids to individuals who have previously 
had a prescription, they prescribed 6% fewer pills per month on average.  
 The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. Section II provides relevant background on 
boxed warnings in general and the boxed warning I study here. Section III reviews the relevant 
academic literature. Section IV presents a brief theoretical model of health care practitioner and 
patient interaction that informs this empirical study. Section V presents my empirical strategy in 
greater detail and identifies the data sources that I utilize. Section VI presents the effect of the 
2013 boxed warnings on opioid prescriptions rates as well as the average quantity of opioids that 
a patient receives. Section VI also presents evidence that the reduction in prescriptions is 
attributable to changes in both patient and provider risk perceptions. Section VII discusses the 
implications of my results.  
 
II.  Background 
 The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938 required that prescription drugs bear 
adequate warnings against dangerous uses and dosages. 21 U.S.C. §§ 301 et seq. (2018). As a 
result, the FDA requires drug manufacturers to create drug labels directed to healthcare 
professionals that include detailed information including indications and contraindications, 
dosage, administration instructions, as well as any risks of adverse reactions or abuse. 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 201, 314, 601 (2018). Manufacturers then make these practitioner-directed drug labels 
available to physicians, pharmacists, and other healthcare providers by renting space in the 
Physicians’ Desk Reference and online resources. By default, prescription drug labels are not 
made generally available to patients, though a curious patient could find a particular drug label 
using resources on the Internet.2 In circumstances where patient-directed labeling is necessary 
                                                        
2 The FDA makes many prescription drug labels available on its website. For example, the label for oxycontin is 
available here: https://www.accessdata.fda.gov/drugsatfda_docs/label/2016/022272s034lbl.pdf (last visited Oct. 21, 
2018).  
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for patients to safely use a drug, the FDA additionally requires that manufacturers create a non-
technical label in the form of a medication guide or patient package insert.3  
Boxed warnings are the most serious warnings that the FDA can provide on a 
prescription drug label, patient package insert, or medication guide. As an illustration of the final 
language and the prominence of boxed warnings on drug labels, Figure 1 presents the first page 
of the current OxyContin drug label.4 The FDA states that it will require a boxed warning 
whenever (1) a drug presents a risk of a life-threatening or permanently disabling adverse 
reaction, (2) there is a serious adverse reaction that can be prevented or mitigated by appropriate 
patient selection and management, avoiding or adding concomitant therapies, or avoiding uses in 
certain clinical situations, or (3) the FDA has concluded that the drug can only be safely used 
under restricted use or distribution under 21 CFR §§ 314.520 and 601.42 (2018) (U.S. FDA 
2011). The FDA’s criteria for requiring boxed warnings have remained stable over time; while 
the FDA issued its guidance on the issue in 2011, researchers documented the same factors 
guiding the FDA’s decision many years earlier (Beach et al. 1998). A requirement that 
prescription drug labels contain a boxed warning is usually paired with a requirement that a 
medication guide containing similar information be distributed to patients with prescriptions. For 
example, the FDA requirement to add a boxed warning studied here also required manufacturers 
to provide substantially similar but more patient-accessible language in a medication guide (U.S. 
FDA 2018). 
                                                        
3 In particular, the FDA requires patient labeling in the form of a medication guide if (1) patient labeling could 
prevent serious adverse effects, (2) the drug has serious risks that a patient should be made aware of, because 
information concerning the risk could affect the patient’s decision to use, or to continue to use, the drug, or (3) the 
drug is important to health and adherence to directions is critical to ensure the drug’s effectiveness. 21 C.F.R. § 
208.1. (2018). Patient package inserts are required for oral contraceptives and estrogens (21 C.F.R. §§ 310.501, 
310.515 (2018)), and are otherwise voluntarily provided by manufacturers. The FDA must approve the language 
included in both medication guides and patient package inserts.  
4 The “recent change” noted below the boxed warning on the OxyContin label is the addition of the bottom-most 
bullet in the warning, which warns of the danger of combining benzodiazepine medications and opioids. 
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 Because boxed warnings are the strongest information signal that the FDA can send to 
prescribers and patients, prescription opioids have been a natural target for such warnings as the 
prescription drug epidemic has developed. In September 2013, the FDA announced that it would 
require manufacturers of extended-release opioids to place a boxed warning on the labels of their 
medications. The 2013 announcement contained proposed language, which remained the same 
when the warnings were finalized in April 2014. The boxed warnings reflected regulators’ 
growing concern with overdoses attributable to extended release opioid abuse. The language that 
the FDA required on the warnings is as follows:  
WARNING: ADDICTION, ABUSE AND MISUSE; LIFE-THREATENING RESPIRATORY 
DEPRESSION; ACCIDENTAL EXPOSURE; NEONATAL OPIOID WITHDRAWAL 
SYNDROME. 
 
Addiction, Abuse, and Misuse 
[Tradename] exposes patients and other users to the risks of opioid addiction, abuse, and misuse, 
which can lead to overdose and death. Assess each patient’s risk prior to prescribing [Tradename], 
and monitor all patients regularly for the development of these behaviors and conditions. 
 
Life-threatening Respiratory Depression 
Serious, life-threatening, or fatal respiratory depression may occur with use of [Tradename]. 
Monitor for respiratory depression, especially during initiation of [Tradename] or following a dose 
increase. Instruct patients to swallow [Tradename] whole; crushing, chewing, or dissolving 
[Tradename] can cause rapid release and absorption of a potentially fatal dose of [Tradename]. 
 
Accidental Exposure 
Accidental consumption of even one dose of [Tradename], especially by children, can result in a 
fatal overdose of [Tradename]. 
 
Neonatal Opioid Withdrawal Syndrome 
For patients who require opioid therapy while pregnant, be aware that infants may require 
treatment for neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome. Prolonged maternal use of [Tradename] 
during pregnancy can result in neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome, which may be life 
threatening and requires management according to protocols developed by neonatology experts.  
 
(FDA 2013).5  
The warning provides concrete, operative language that informs prescribers what the 
risks of opioids are and who faces those risks. The warning informs prescribers that opioid abuse 
can kill a patient. If this portion of the warning provided any new information to prescribers and 
                                                        
5 The warning also contained additional language not included here for products that interact with alcohol.  
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prescribers are able to predict which patients are relatively more or less likely to suffer a fatal 
overdose from a prescription opioid (alone or in combination with other opioids and 
medications), the warning may decrease prescriptions to riskier patients. Researchers and the 
Centers for Disease Control (“CDC”) have developed guidelines to assist prescribers in 
determining the risk of opioid abuse (CDC 2018; Ciersielska et al. 2016), but it is not clear 
whether such tools enable prescribers to distinguish patients likely to suffer a fatality rather than 
those likely to abuse opioids without suffering an overdose. If doctors cannot successfully 
discern which patients are high risk, the boxed warning may not actually change prescribing 
patterns to high-risk patients.  
In the same paragraph, the warning instructs prescribers to monitor patients for the 
development of abusive behaviors. Such a warning may encourage prescribers to scrutinize 
patients who have had a previous opioid prescription. Relatedly, because patients will very rarely 
observe the boxed warning for a drug before they have received a prescription for the drug, any 
effect of the warning on the preferences of patients is unlikely to manifest until after a patient has 
received a drug once. Prescribers may also rely on repeat use as a heuristic for overdose risk, 
given that current opioid use is correlated with future opioid use, (Shah, Hayes, and Margin 
2017; Mierch et al. 2015) and an individual’s risk of overdose is associated with length of opioid 
use (Sehgal et al. 2012).  
Finally, the latter half of the warning explicitly identifies risks to two particular 
demographic groups: children and pregnant women. Children may suffer an overdose easily 
through accidental consumption, so prescribing such drugs to children is inadvisable. 
Alternatively, doctors may emphasize proper drug storage techniques to patients with a large 
family at the time of prescribing, in which case the boxed warning would have no effect on 
prescriptions to children. The warning also states that the use of opioids by pregnant women may 
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cause neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome,6 and so the warning could prompt prescribers to 
prescribe fewer opioids to this population as well. As discussed further in Section 4, the 
operative language discussed here provides the basis for my empirical identification strategy. 
 
III. Literature Review 
 This chapter contributes to the expanding literature evaluating policy responses to the 
opioid epidemic. A large part of this literature has focused on evaluating state policy responses. 
For example, researchers have found mixed evidence of the effects of naloxone access laws, 
which expand the ability of opioid users, their friends or family members, or others to access 
naloxone, which rapidly reverses the effect of an overdose (Doleac and Mukherjee 2018; 
McClellan et al. 2018; Rees et al. 2019). Other work has demonstrated that state Medicaid 
expansions under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. 111-148 (2010), 
dramatically increased medication-assisted treatment for opioid use disorders (Meinhofer and 
Witman 2018). Another line of research has investigated whether medical marijuana laws 
decrease opioid abuse and overdoses, as marijuana is a plausible substitute for both medical and 
non-medical opioid use (Bradford and Bradford 2016). Such work has generally found that 
medical marijuana is associated with fewer opioid overdose deaths, though the results depend on 
how liberal or stringent regulations on dispensaries are (Powell et al. 2018).  
 Of particular relevance to this research, a subset of the research on state policies and 
opioids has focused on the effectiveness of state laws designed to reduce multiple provider 
episodes. Beyond users visiting multiple providers to acquire drugs for their own use, previous 
                                                        
6 The most recent evidence suggests that pain medication use during pregnancy may not cause neonatal opioid 
withdrawal syndrome as often as the boxed warning suggests. Older evidence indicates that between 55% and 94% 
of neonates exposed to any opioid in utero develop withdrawal symptoms (Hudak and Tan 2012). But more recent 
work finds that in the absence of other risk factors, short term prescription opioid use is associated with neonatal 
withdrawal symptoms in 0.4% of cases, and long-term use is associated with symptoms in 2.4% of cases (Desai et 
al. 2015). Co-exposure to certain other substances and genetic factors also affect the risk of symptoms (Sanlorenzo 
et al. 2018).  
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research has demonstrated that sellers of illicit opioids widely visit multiple providers to acquire 
a supply of prescription drugs (Rigg et al. 2012). Johnson et al. (2014) found that the adoption of 
a prescription drug monitoring program successfully reduced multiple provider episodes in 
Florida between 2010 and 2012. Similarly, Dave et al. (2017) and Buchmueller and Carey (2017) 
found that mandatory-access prescription drug monitoring programs, which require prescribers 
to confirm that a patient has not received another prescription for a controlled substance before 
prescribing the same substance to that patient, significantly curbed drug abuse. Using 
administrative data on overdose deaths and opioid addiction treatment, Popovici et al. (2017) 
found that statutes that make it a crime for a patient to knowingly fail to inform a prescriber that 
the patient is receiving a drug that the prescriber is prescribing from another prescriber as well 
decrease opioid treatment admissions. The previous research generally demonstrates that forcing 
prescribers to take certain actions, or punishing patients for failing to act, can effectively curtail 
drug abuse. This research contributes to the existing literature by providing evidence of how 
prescribing patterns change with information regulation approaches rather than behavioral 
mandates. 
 Relatively fewer papers have focused on the effect of federal responses to the opioid 
epidemic. Johnson et al. (2018) reviewed many of those efforts to date, including rapidly 
accelerating the release of opioid fatality data, increasing federal funds for opioid use disorder 
treatment, creating guidelines for opioid prescribing, and supporting community-based 
prevention efforts. Evidence suggests that funding treatment and community-based efforts may 
be an effective method of decreasing abuse (Weiss et al. 2015). However, the empirical effects of 
many federal efforts remain unmeasured. The FDA in particular has taken several actions, 
including the boxed warnings studied here, reformatting many opioids to make them abuse-
deterrent, and reevaluating whether particular products should be withdrawn from the market due 
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to their excessive risk. Alpert et al. (2016) presents evidence that the abuse-deterrent 
reformulation caused users to substitute heroin for the oxycontin they formerly abused. This 
analysis of the effect of opioid boxed warning contributes to this literature on federal responses 
to the opioid epidemic, particularly given recommendations from the White House that 
information regulation is appropriate in the future.  
 Finally, this paper contributes to the literature investigating the effects of boxed warnings 
and information regulation broadly. Like this chapter, this literature generally identifies the effect 
of boxed warnings by comparing prescribing rates to groups that warnings may have affected 
and groups the warnings should not have affected. Bradford and Kleit (2014) find that the boxed 
warnings that the FDA placed on non-steroidal inflammatory drugs in 2005 decreased the 
prescribing of such medications to patients, but the warning caused a small number of patients to 
substitute to prescription opioids. Shah et al. (2017) demonstrate that boxed warnings on 
smoking cessation agents, which warn of adverse neuropsychiatric events, were effective at 
decreasing use of one, but not both, of the medications bearing the warnings. The authors reason 
that the newness of one medication contributes to prescribers’ willingness to discontinue 
prescribing it, as prescribers fail to update their risk beliefs for the older medication. Parkinson et 
al. (2014) demonstrates that FDA boxed warnings on antidepressant medications successfully 
reduce prescriptions to the group the warning targets, but that the effects of the boxed warning 
also spill over to non-targeted groups. Finally, Viscusi (1991) demonstrated that boxed warnings 
substantially decreased tetracycline prescriptions to children. These evaluations are part of a 
broader literature on the effect of regulating health and safety risks through information 
disclosure. As Magat and Viscusi (1992) discussed, risk warnings tend to induce rational 
responses from the audience of the warning. But, in situations of information overload or where 
reacting to a warning requires even modest effort, recipients of warnings will often fail to react 
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appropriately to those warnings. This paper tests whether prescribers generally appropriately 
apply long and detailed boxed warnings informing prescriber about different risks to different 
groups. 
 
IV. Model of Practitioner-Patient Interactions 
 The following game-theoretic model frames how boxed warnings may affect opioid 
prescription levels. Consider a patient who could visit a health care practitioner with prescribing 
authority for a condition for which the practitioner may prescribe an opioid. The patient could be 
seeking treatment for an acute injury, chronic pain, or the patient could claim to have either form 
of pain but actually be seeking to abuse opioids. In the first stage of the game, patients choose 
whether or not to incur a cost ( to seek care. The cost ( includes any fee the patient pays to seek 
care as well as the inherent value that the patient places upon being examined by a health care 
practitioner aside from receiving any medication. I assume that  ( > 0; otherwise patients would 
seek care at every available opportunity.7 If the patient visits the health care practitioner, the 
practitioner receives some value * > 0, which incorporates their share of the fee and the value 
they place upon examining any patient. I assume without loss of generality that if a patient 
chooses not to seek care, both the patient and practitioner receive no benefit (a payout of 0).  
If the patient visits the practitioner, the practitioner chooses whether to prescribe an 
opioid to the patient, prescribe the best alternative medication,8 or provide no medication or 
therapy that the patient would not have consumed without visiting the practitioner. Patients know 
that practitioners will choose between a menu of treatment options (including possibly 
prescribing no medication at all). If the practitioner prescribes the patient an opioid, the patient 
                                                        
7 Patients regularly elect to not seek care as a result of prices, though medical care is a relatively inelastic good 
(Ellis, Martins, and Zhu 2017).  
8 Circumstances where the health care practitioner recommends consuming over-the-counter medications are within 
the “best alternative medication” category as long as the patient would not have consumed them without visiting the 
health care practitioner.  
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receives some benefit +(-.), where -. ∈ [0,1] corresponds to the patient’s belief about the 
probability of an adverse event from taking an opioid. The function +(-.) encompasses both the 
benefit to the patient of receiving a prescription (regardless of whether the patient plans on using 
the opioid to treat acute pain, chronic pain, or for recreational or other inappropriate use) and the 
disutility attributable to the perceived risk of an adverse event. The practitioner receives some 
value 4(-.) from prescribing an opioid to patients, where 4(-.) encompasses both the 
practitioner’s altruistic value from helping a suffering patient, as well as their disutility from 
prescribing to a patient with a perceived adverse event risk of -5 ∈ [0,1]. I assume that 5567 +8-.9 < 0 and  556: 4(-5) < 0 so that patients value opioids less and practitioners are less 
likely to prescribe opioids when they each believe the risk of an adverse event is higher. 
Analogously, a patient receives some benefit ; from the best alternative medication to an opioid, 
and a practitioner receives some value < from prescribing the alternative medication. Regardless 
of whether an opioid is prescribed or not, if the patient visits the practitioner, the practitioner 
receives * and the patient loses (. I make no assumption about the relative values of +(-=), 4(-5), ;, and <; whether patients receive a greater benefit from opioids or alternatives and 
whether practitioners prefer to prescribe opioids or alternatives will vary with each individual 
patient and practitioner. Let 4.(-.) be the value that patients expect practitioners to receive from 
prescribing an opioid, which is an increasing function of the patient’s own risk beliefs. Let <. be 
the value that patients expect practitioners to receive from prescribing the non-opioid alternative 
therapy. While real patients likely do not consciously predict 4.(-.) or <., they likely predict 
what treatment a practitioner is likely to recommend, which yields implicit values of 4.(-.) or <.. Such implicit values are sufficient for this model. Figure 2 graphically presents this model 
using a game tree. 
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The Nash equilibrium behavior of practitioners and patients under the assumptions in the 
preceding paragraphs can be solved using backwards induction. Practitioners will prescribe an 
opioid to a particular patient if they believe it will have the greatest clinical benefit to the patient 
(4(-5) > < and 4(-5) > 0). Conversely, practitioners will prescribe the alternative medication 
when it has the greatest clinical benefit (< > 4(-5) and < > 0). The value * is irrelevant to the 
practitioner’s decision because the practitioner receives it regardless of the treatment they 
choose. Patients possessing beliefs 4.(-.) and <. will therefore expect a practitioner to prescribe 
an opioid when 4.8-.9 > <. and 4.8-.9 > 0 and will expect a practitioner to prescribe an 
alternative medication whenever <. > 4.8-.9 and <. > 0. When 4.8-.9 < 0	and <. < 0, 
patients will expect the practitioner to prescribe no medication. 
Whether a patient chooses to seek care will therefore be a function of the values they 
place on opioids and alternative medications (+8-.9 and ;), their beliefs about practitioner 
behavior (4.8-.9 and <.), and the cost of care (. Consider first the circumstances under which a 
patient will not seek care. If the value of any medication to the patient is smaller than the cost to 
seek care (+8-.9 < ( and ; < (), such as when a patient’s pain is very minor, the patient will 
not do so. If the perceived value of all treatments to a patient exceeds the cost of care (+8-.9 > ( 
and ; > () but the patient believes that the practitioner perceives all treatments as having no 
clinical benefit (4.8-.9 < 0 and <. < 0), the patient will not seek care. This possibility 
corresponds to patients who think the health care practitioner will perceive their condition as too 
trivial to provide a treatment for, though they themselves think differently. In contrast, if a 
patient values all possible treatments more than the cost of care (+8-.9 > ( and ; > () and 
believes that a practitioner will be willing to prescribe either medication (4.8-.9 > 0 or <. > 0) 
they will seek care. Patients who seek care without a clear idea of what treatment they want 
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(likely most patients) but are confident that the practitioner will provide some treatment more 
valuable than the cost of care fit into this latter category.  
Next, consider a patient who values an opioid more than the cost of care but not an 
alternative medication (+8-.9 > ( but ; < (). Such individuals may seek opioids for 
recreational or other misuse or may be patients for whom other treatments have proven 
ineffective. If such patients expect the practitioner to be unwilling to prescribe an opioid 
(4.8-.9 < 0) or if they believe the practitioner will prefer to prescribe the alternative therapy 
(<. > 4.8-.9), they will not seek care. Finally, if such patients expect the practitioner to be 
willing to prescribe an opioid and prefer an opioid to available alternatives (4.8-.9 > 0	and 4.8-.9 > <.), they will seek care. For patients who value alternative treatments more than the 
cost of care but not an opioid, the results are symmetric. Such patients believe that opioids are 
too risky (or perhaps insufficiently effective) to be worth receiving but that alternative therapies 
are worth seeking.  
Boxed warnings will affect the probability that a patient receives a prescription by 
affecting -5, -., both -5 and -., or neither.9 Let -.@A	and -5@A be the patient and practitioner’s 
beliefs about the risks of opioids following the introduction of the boxed warning. The effect of 
boxed warnings that do not influence anyone’s risk beliefs is trivial—prescription levels remain 
unchanged relative to the original Nash equilibrium. Consider the scenario where a boxed 
warning increases only a practitioners’ risk beliefs, so that -5@A > -5. This scenario is 
particularly plausible given that boxed warnings are primarily directed to prescribers. Patients 
will generally only learn about a boxed warning after they have received a prescription in the 
medication guide or patient package insert, though a particularly diligent patient could research 
                                                        
9 The analysis that follows assumes that boxed warnings increase the perceived risk of opioids. A boxed warning 
that decreases perceived risks causes prescription level increases analogous to the decreases explored here.  
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boxed warnings for all potential drugs that they may receive before seeking care. If -5@A > -5, 
the clinical benefit of prescribing an opioid is smaller (4(-5@A) < 4(-5)) and the probability of a 
prescription, conditional on the patient visiting the practitioner at all, is lower. If 4(-5) > < >4(-5@A) and < > 0, practitioners will substitute from prescribing opioids to alternative 
medications. If 4(-5) > 0 > 4(-5@A)  and < < 0, practitioners will instead prescribe no 
medication following the boxed warning. Because -= remains unchanged, patients will continue 
to seek care at the same rate. As a result, the probability of patients seeking care but receiving no 
prescription remains unchanged. If such patients are seeking an opioid for misuse, it is possible 
that multiple prescriber episodes may increase as such patients repeatedly seek out a practitioner 
willing to prescribe opioids. Eventually, such patients are likely to learn that practitioners risk 
beliefs have shifted and will reach an equilibrium level of prescription seeking, though the 
evolution of such beliefs are outside the scope of the model presented here. 
Next, consider the scenario where boxed warnings increase patient beliefs but not 
practitioners’ beliefs. This could occur if practitioners are already well-informed about the risks 
of opioids before the boxed warning, but patients are not. Patients could be exposed to the 
warning after they receive their first prescription and alter their risk beliefs when considering 
whether to seek a second prescription.10 Because -.@A > -., 556B +8-.9 > 0, and 556B 4.8-.9 > 0, 
the value of an opioid to patients is smaller C+8-.@A9 < +8-.9D and the patients’ beliefs about the 
practitioners’ perception of the benefit of an opioid is smaller 84=8-.@A9 < 4.(-.)9. Given the 
Nash equilibrium behavior discussed above, patient behavior will change in response to the 
boxed warning only if +8-.9 > ( > +(-.@A), 4.8-.9 > 0 > 4.8-.@A9,	or 4.8-.9 > <. >
                                                        
10 Of course, patients could also learn about how addictive or risky a drug is after taking it without the boxed 
warning. However, Badger et al. (2007) suggests that even experienced opioid users are very bad at predicting the 
strength of future cravings.  
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4.8-.@A9; in other words, if the change in risk beliefs causes either the value of opioids to the 
patient or the perceived value to the practitioner of prescribing opioids to cross a threshold value. 
Patients with +8-.9 > ( > +(-.@A) and ; < ( will no longer seek care. Patients with +8-.9 >( > +(-.@A) and ; > ( will only seek care if <. > 0 and 4.8-.@A9 > <.. If 4.8-.9 > 0 >4.(-=@A) and <. < 0, or 4.8-.9 > <. > 4.(-=@A), patients who are only willing to seek care if 
they believe they will receive an opioid (+8-.@A9 > ( and ; < () will no longer seek care. In 
sum, patients will be less likely to seek care at all. When they do seek care, they will expect to 
receive alternative medications more often. However, practitioner behavior will remain 
unchanged. The total proportion of patients receiving opioids should fall. Finally, if boxed 
warnings increase the risk beliefs of both practitioners and patients, the effect of boxed warnings 
will be a combination of both of the above scenarios. Practitioners perceive a smaller clinical 
benefit of opioids and will be less likely to prescribe them to any patient that visits their office. 
Patients value opioids less and expect practitioners to value prescribing opioids less, so patients 
are less likely to visit the practitioner’s office at all. The net impact will be fewer opioids in the 
population overall as well as fewer visits to the practitioner’s office. 
The model thus provides two critical insights. First, warnings will only affect observed 
opioid prescriptions if they affect either the risk beliefs of practitioners, patients, or both. If 
boxed warnings increase the perceived riskiness of prescribing opioids to certain groups of 
patients, then practitioners will be less likely to prescribe opioids to such patients, more likely to 
prescribe substitute medications, and more likely to prescribe nothing. Second, if warnings 
increase or decrease the risk beliefs of prescribers alone, patients will seek care at the same rate. 
If the game is considered dynamically, it is even possible that individuals could seek more care, 
as they search for a practitioner willing to provide beneficial treatment when patient and 
practitioner beliefs sufficiently diverge. But if boxed warnings increase the risk beliefs of 
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patients, individuals should seek care less often. Testing whether patients seek care less often 
provides a way to determine whether boxed warnings affected patients’ risk beliefs 
independently from prescribers’ risk beliefs.  
 
V. Identification Strategy and Data Sources 
 
A. Empirical Methodology 
 I identify the causal effect of the FDA’s boxed warnings on opioid prescriptions using a 
differences-in-differences methodology. My empirical specification estimates the following 
equation using ordinary least squares11 where E indexes individuals and F indexes time:  
 G!EHEI	J(KL = N + PQRK + PSRKTH(UI	V;-WEWXL + YKLP + ZK + [L + UKL. (1) 
The dependent variable G!EHEI	J(KL is a binary variable equal to one if the individual E was 
prescribed an opioid at time F. The variable RK is my main differencing variable, where RK is 
equal to one if individual E is a member of the treated group of interest. The variable TH(UI	V;-WEWXL is an indicator variable equal to one if the time period is after September of 
2013, the date the FDA announced the boxed warning changes.12 The variables YKL are 
characteristics of the individual E that vary over time. These include age, marital status, family 
size, wage income, health insurance status, self-rated propensity to take risks, self-reported 
health status, census region, and education. The final terms, ZK and [L, are individual and month-
by-year fixed effects. After estimating whether boxed warnings affected opioid prescriptions, I 
also estimate alternative models where the dependent variables are the quantity of opioids 
                                                        
11 I utilize the reghdfe Stata package to perform the ordinary least squares estimation, as it is dramatically faster than 
the default package in Stata (Correia 2017). 
12 Alternatively, I could utilize April 2014 as the trigger date for the boxed warning as this is when the requirements 
were finalized. However, because the language on the warnings remained the same and because media coverage of 
the warnings began in September 2013, I use the earlier date. My main results are robust to using either date.  
 94 
supplied to an individual, the number of annual visits to a health care provider’s office, and an 
indicator variable for whether a patient received a non-opioid pain medication.  
 The coefficient PS is the differences-in-differences causal estimate of the effect of boxed 
warnings on the treated population. The critical assumption for identification of the causal effect 
is that opioid prescribing rates would have evolved in a parallel fashion for the treated and 
untreated groups but-for the introduction of the opioid boxed warning.13 If the boxed warning 
has any effect on the untreated groups, then the differences-in-differences estimator will only 
provide the effect on the treated group over the untreated group. If such effects exist, my 
estimates will be a lower bound on the actual effect of the boxed warnings. In most of my 
models, I include individual level time trends to relax the conditions under which the models will 
provide the true causal effect of boxed warnings. Mora and Reggio (2018) demonstrate that the 
inclusion of individual-level linear time trends significantly relaxes the assumption necessary for 
differences-in-differences to identify a causal effect. Instead of requiring parallel trends for the 
treated and untreated groups, including individual time trends yields the causal effect of a 
treatment if the treated and untreated group’s trends are parallel or are evolving at a parallel rate.  
In each model, my standard errors are robust and clustered on the individual to account for serial 
autocorrelation of standard errors within multiple observations of the same person (Cameron and 
Miller 2015).  
Based on the language of the boxed warning discussed in Section III, I analyze the 
following treated groups: (1) patients with a previous opioid prescription, (2) patients with higher 
opioid overdose fatality risks, and (3) patients who are children or pregnant.14 Patients with a 
                                                        
13 Figures 3, 4, and 5, discussed in detail with my main results, explicitly test the parallel trends assumption using 
event study regressions. The figures indicate that the parallel trends assumption is met in my models controlling for 
individual time trends.  
14 As a robustness check, I also run each of the models classifying women who are married and between the ages of 
20 and 40 as treated, as in Gruber (1994). The results of the pregnancy alone and specifically targeted model 
continue to show no statistically significant impact of the boxed warnings. I also run each of the models classifying 
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previous opioid prescription and those with objectively higher risks of opioid fatalities based on 
observable demographic characteristics are prime targets for prescribers that adhere to the boxed 
warning’s command to assess each patient’s risk and monitor for the development of abusive 
behaviors. If doctors are unwilling to change prescriptions that seem to be working for patients 
following new warnings, the estimates could reveal no effect on repeat users. Similarly, if 
doctors cannot discern patient-level risk on the basis of observable demographic characteristics 
(or characteristics that correlate with demographics but are not observable in the data), then the 
warning may have no effect on prescriptions to riskier users. The warning states that children can 
easily accidentally overdose; it is therefore possible that the boxed warning will affect 
prescription rates for children. Alternatively, physicians may encourage patients to store 
medications in a safe location in an effort to reduce the risk of accidental consumption. Finally, 
the warning on neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome should only affect prescribers’ propensity 
to prescribe opioids to pregnant women. I pool children and pregnant women into one large 
“specifically targeted” group for two distinct reasons. First, an effect for any of the groups 
requires prescribers to respond to explicit commands that the warnings direct toward clearly 
identifiable populations. Pooling the two groups makes sense because the warnings about each 
group test involve similar kinds of information. Second, and more mechanically, a very small 
portion of my sample is actually pregnant at any time. To avoid identifying an effect from small 
samples I pool both specifically treated groups.15 
 
                                                        
individuals in the upper quartile of family size as treated or using a continuous measure of family size and found no 
effect of the boxed warning on this subpopulation.  
15 In the Appendix, I present the results without pooling the two groups and find results which are generally 
consistent with the pooled results.   
 96 
B. Data Sources and Sample Characteristics 
My primary data source in this chapter is the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey 
(“MEPS”). The MEPS is a set of large surveys of individuals and medical providers that collects 
data on the utilization of health services for the United States’ non-institutionalized population. 
The survey has an overlapping design; each household is surveyed five times over two years. 
New households enter the survey each year so that each year’s data contain responses from the 
new panel as well as the exiting panel. The months that each round of the survey covers differ 
from household to household. To facilitate comparisons across individuals, I transform the data 
so that observations are at the person-month level. Doing so prevents the duration of a round for 
a particular observation from affecting my estimates. I utilize data from the 2011–2016 waves in 
this chapter. My sample includes roughly 2,000,000 person-months from approximately 85,000 
different individuals.  
I use the prescribed medicines component of the MEPS to construct my primary 
dependent variables. The prescribed medicine file includes the prescription drugs that the 
respondent consumed during the survey period. Prescription drug records are collected from 
pharmacies following written release of records by a survey respondent. The data indicate what 
drugs (if any) the patient received, the Multum classification of the drugs,16 how many days of 
medication the patient received for each drug, the prices paid for the drugs, whether it was the 
patient’s first time taking the drugs, and if not, when the respondent first took the drugs. From 
these responses I identify whether a respondent took any opioid during the response period. 
                                                        
16 Multum codes provide a taxonomy of all drugs. The Multum classification system has three levels, with each level 
providing greater specificity. The codes corresponding to opioid analgesics are 57-58-60 (narcotic analgesics) and 
57-58-191 (narcotic analgesic combinations). 
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Additionally, for all individuals in my sample who use an opioid at any time, I identify whether 
they have previously received a prescription for the same opioid at any time.17  
I combine data from MEPS prescribed medicine files with data from the MEPS 
household component files. The household component of the MEPS collects detailed information 
on demographic characteristics and medical expenditures. Demographic variables that I draw 
from the survey include sex, race, marital status, family size, pregnancy status, hourly wage, 
whether the individual possesses prescription drug insurance, age, education, census region, 
whether the individual considers themselves more likely to take risks than the average person (on 
a five-point Likert scale), and self-reported health status (also on a five-point Likert scale).18  
Because the MEPS do not provide state identifiers for individuals, I cannot control for the 
state that an individual lives in or any relevant state policies that may affect my results. If 
omitted state policies were implemented after the introduction of the boxed warning, it could 
bias my results, attributing the effect of those omitted state laws to the boxed warning. 
Prescription drug monitoring programs, for example, likely decreased the probability of repeat 
users receiving opioids, while pain management clinic laws likely decreased the probability of 
anyone receiving a first or repeat prescription. But it is unlikely that omitted state policies drive 
the results I present. First, individual-level time trends would absorb some of the effect of such 
statutes. But more importantly, few states implemented monitoring programs or pain clinic 
regulations coincident with the introduction of the boxed warnings. By the beginning of 2013, 
every state but Missouri (and D.C.) had a prescription drug monitoring program; from 2013 to 
                                                        
17 The fact that I only observe previous prescriptions for individuals who take an opioid while I observe them does 
not endanger my estimates of the effect of boxed warnings on individuals who have a previous prescription. Because 
I include individual fixed effects in all of my empirical models, only individuals who switch from not having a 
previous prescription to having a previous prescription during the period I observe them would provide identifying 
variation for the model. Necessarily, such individuals will have an opioid while in my data, and no selection bias 
exists.  
18 In my analyses, I treat both five-point Likert scale variables as five individual indicator variables equal to 1 if a 
respondent provided a particular response and zero otherwise.  
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2016, only three states (Alabama, Georgia, and Wisconsin) adopted statutes meant to regulate 
pain management clinics (Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System 2018).  
Finally, I augment the MEPS data with an individual level measure of objective opioid 
overdose risk constructed using the National Vital Statistic System’s (“NVSS”) multiple cause of 
death data files, the Current Population Survey, and Census population counts. The detailed 
process used to construct the individual fatality risk is presented in the Technical Appendix. 
Table 1 presents summary statistics for each of the variables that I utilize in my analysis.19 
 
C. Personal Characteristics and Opioid Prescriptions 
Before investigating the causal effect of boxed warnings on opioid prescriptions, it is 
informative to generally investigate the relationship between opioid prescriptions and the various 
demographic characteristics that are included in my data. As discussed in Section 3.1, my 
difference-in-differences estimation strategy controls for time-invariant individual characteristics 
using fixed effects, so the correlations between time-invariant personal characteristics and opioid 
prescriptions are not apparent in those regressions.  
Table 2 presents the results of regressing opioid prescriptions on the individual 
characteristics presented in Table 1. The dependent variable in Table 2 is a binary variable equal 
to one if a respondent had an opioid prescription in the period of interest. In the first column, I 
present a basic model with no fixed effects. The second column adds monthly fixed effects to 
control for time-trends common across all individuals, including season effects and nationwide 
trends. The third column adds individual-level fixed effects to the previous models. The fourth 
and final column augments the model with individual-level time trends to control for any 
individual changes in propensity to consume opioids that change uniformly over time. While 
                                                        
19 These summary statistics and all regressions are weighted using the MEPS’ longitudinal weights so as to create a 
nationally representative sample.  
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many of the estimates in columns one and two are statistically significant (in the sense that they 
demonstrate a sufficiently strong relationship between opioid use and the relevant characteristic 
that the characteristic can be used to predict opioid use), most estimates lose their significance 
once individual time trends are included in the model. Statistical significance in the latter 
columns is more indicative of a causal relationship between individual characteristics and opioid 
use, while columns one and two demonstrate correlations that are useful for exploring who tends 
to use opioids. As discussed below, while many of the variables I study are associated with 
opioid use, only income, prescription drug insurance, age, and health appear causally related to 
the probability of having an opioid prescription. 
The first two columns demonstrate that various demographic characteristics are 
significantly correlated with opioid prescriptions. Men are 1.3 percentage points less likely to 
receive an opioid prescription, while individuals who are white are 1.3 percentage points more 
likely to receive an opioid prescription, consistent with prior research (Janakiram et al. 2018). 
Married individuals are 0.8 percentage points less likely to have a prescription. Opioid use is 
decreasing in weekly wages until weekly wages reach roughly $2,000, at which point there is a 
positive correlation between wages and opioid use. At least for weekly wages below $2,000, this 
is consistent with previous research on the relationship between macroeconomic conditions and 
opioid use (Carpenter, McClellan, and Rees 2017; Hollingsworth, Ruhm, and Simon 2017).  
Consistent with medication consumption generally (Borrescio-Higa 2015), and opioids in 
particular (Olmstead et al. 2015), being sensitive to price, individuals with prescription drug 
insurance are more likely to receive an opioid prescription. Older individuals are more likely to 
receive an opioid prescription. The age coefficients increase monotonically, with individuals 
who are 14 years or younger being 6.6 percentage points less likely to receive a prescription than 
those who are 65 or older. Education has a non-monotonic association with prescriptions; 
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individuals who have less than a high school education or have a bachelor’s degree or higher are 
(relative to those with a high school education) less likely to receive an opioid prescription. 
Relative to people who live in the Northeast census region, individuals in the South, Midwest, 
and West are 1.5, 2.1, and 0.1 percentage points more likely to receive an opioid prescription. 
Individuals who strongly disagree that they are riskier than the average person are half a 
percentage point more likely to receive an opioid prescription than others. This observation is 
consistent with Bretteville-Jensen (1999), who found that heroin users have a higher 
intertemporal discount rate (and implicitly are more risk averse), but in tension with Blondel, 
Lohéac, and Rinaudo (2007), which experimentally demonstrated that drug users exhibit risk-
seeking preferences. Finally, healthier individuals are universally less likely to be prescribed 
opioids; those who rated their own health as excellent are thirty percentage points less likely than 
individuals who rate their own health as poor to be prescribed opioids, all else equal.  
However, the correlations presented in the first two columns of Table 2 should be 
interpreted with caution. While including time fixed effects has little effect on the coefficients or 
the explanatory power of the model (the R2 increases by only 0.01), most of the time variant 
characteristics discussed above are not statistically significant after individual fixed effects and 
individual time-trends are included in the model. Wage remains statistically significant and while 
the coefficients are smaller in magnitude, the implied inflection point remains at $2,000. 
Prescription drug insurance remains significant and constant. The relationship between age and 
opioid use becomes convoluted, indicating that non-age characteristics that vary over time 
explain the significance of age in the less-identified models. The full model actually indicates 
that individuals who are between 45 and 64 years old may be less likely to have an opioid 
prescription after individual time trends are accounted for. Finally, self-rated health status 
remains highly significant. Because pain is a very salient feature in one’s own health, the health 
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status effect is likely being driven by individuals who incur an injury or other painful condition. 
Most of the variables have stable magnitudes across the model, though the coefficients 
corresponding to poor health in the models including individual fixed effects and time trends are 
substantially smaller. After controlling for individual fixed effects and time trends, individuals 
with excellent health are only eight percentage points less likely to consume opioids than 
individuals who rate their own health as poor.   
 
VI. The Effect of Opioid Boxed Warnings 
 
A. Opioid Prescriptions 
 Table 3 presents the results of estimating equation 1 on my sample. For brevity, Table 3 
only includes the coefficients of interest for each model.20 The first column provides the base 
model estimates, where the regression includes only the identifying variable, its interaction with 
a variable indicating the boxed warning requirement is in place, and individual and month-by-
year fixed effects. The second model is a covariate model which augments the base model by 
including each covariate from Table 2.21 Finally, the third column provides a full model which 
includes individual-level time trends. Because including individual time trends substantially 
relaxes the assumptions necessary for causal inference in the model, the full model provides my 
preferred estimates of the effect of the 2013 boxed warnings. To provide evidence that the 
parallel trends assumption is satisfied in the full model, I also graphically present an event study 
using the full model results in Figures 3, 4, and 5. Figure 3 corresponds to the previous opioid 
user model, Figure 4 presents the effect of the boxed warning on relatively more risky users, and 
Figure 5 presents the results for groups that the warning specifically targeted. For all three 
                                                        
20 Full results for each model are provided in the Appendix.  
21 Because individual level fatality risk from opioids is a linear combination of other variables in the model, the 
fatality risk regression omits the time-variant individual characteristics used to predict risk (marital status, region, 
and age variables) from the covariate and full models.  
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groups, the coefficients associated with the pre-warning period are statistically insignificant and 
do not exhibit a trend that threatens the validity of my difference-in-differences estimates. 
 The results in Table 3 and Figures 3, 4, and 5 demonstrate that boxed warnings only 
reduced prescriptions to individuals with a previous opioid prescription. In contrast, the warnings 
did not reduce prescriptions to individuals who are at objectively higher risk or to the specifically 
targeted groups. The only group that exhibits a consistently statistically significant effect of 
boxed warnings is individuals with a previous opioid prescription. The point estimate is 
extremely stable across models; the full model estimate indicates that the 2013 boxed warning 
decreased the probability than an individual who previously had an opioid prescription received 
a prescription by 17.1 percentage points. The 17.1 percentage point estimate corresponds to a 
35.5% decrease in the mean probability that an individual with a previous opioid prescription 
receives another relative to the pre-boxed warning mean. The 35.5% decrease for the repeat user 
subpopulation implies a 20.2% decrease for the entire population. As illustrated in Figure 3, the 
effect of the law developed over time, as expected given that the information contained in the 
warnings needed to spread to prescribers. This delayed effect is consistent with previous research 
on the effect of boxed warnings (Viscusi 1991). Given that recent research has demonstrated that 
individuals who have previously used opioids are significantly more likely to abuse them in the 
future (Mierch et al. 2015; Shah et al. 2017), it makes sense that the boxed warnings prompted 
prescribers to provide fewer opioids to individuals that have previously had an opioid.  
However, the boxed warnings did not have a statistically significant impact on 
prescriptions for riskier users or targeted groups. While Figure 5 shows that some of the post 
effects are individually distinguishable from zero for the specifically targeted group, the overall 
effect is not. Moreover, the point estimates for both riskier users and targeted groups is very 
small relative to the estimates for previous users. Two explanations present themselves for why 
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the difference-in-differences estimates do not find an effect based on fatality risk. Prescribers 
may be unable to characterize their patients as more or less likely to fatally abuse opioids based 
on characteristics like sex, race, age, or where they live, or underlying risky behaviors that 
correlate with such demographic characteristics. Or more simply, demographic characteristics 
may not provide sufficient explanatory power to predict opioid fatalities, such that my measure 
of opioid risk suffers from too much measurement error, attenuating my estimates of the effect of 
boxed warnings on high-risk individuals.  
Likewise, the lack of result for the specifically targeted categories is striking. The result 
is in contrast with previous boxed warning studies finding an effect of boxed warnings when the 
warning explicitly identifies a targeted group (Bradford and Kleit 2014; Parkinson et al. 2012). 
One explanation (that is untestable here) is that the boxed warning caused prescribers to warn 
patients about the risk of accidental ingestion of opioids by children but did not alter their 
prescribing patterns. Such a reaction would meaningfully change prescriber behavior but not in a 
way that the MEPS data can reveal. Another untestable possibility about why the warnings did 
not reduce prescriptions to pregnant women is that before the warning, many prescribers thought 
it was categorically unsafe to prescribe opioids to pregnant women, leading those prescribers to 
interpret the warnings to say that prescriptions to pregnant women are safe under some 
circumstances. Finally, it may be that prescribers and patients are generally attuned to the risks 
of drugs to children and pregnant women, such that identifying a risk to these particular groups 
actually has no effect on individual risk beliefs. 
 
B. Prescription Length 
As further evidence of the effect of boxed warnings on prescribing behavior, Table 4 
presents difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of the boxed warnings on the supply of 
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opioids prescribed to individuals, measured in days.22 As with Table 3, Table 4 only contains the 
coefficients of interest from each regression.23 While the results of Table 3 demonstrate that 
fewer individuals are received prescriptions generally, Table 4 provides evidence about whether 
prescription length is changing even for patients who prescribers deem sufficiently safe to 
receive a prescription. Table 4 also serves as a robustness check for the results in Table 3. 
Table 4 provides evidence that individuals with a previous opioid prescription received 
statistically significantly shorter prescriptions after the FDA’s boxed warning requirement. The 
base and covariate model in the first and second columns find that individuals with a previous 
prescription received one day’s supply fewer pills per month. However, the effect is statistically 
insignificant in the full model, suggesting that the effect in the base and covariate model is 
driven by a general trend to prescribe fewer opioids to repeat users separate from the effect of the 
boxed warning. On the whole, the results in Table 3 and 4 provide strong evidence that the 2013 
boxed warning decreased the prescribing of opioids to individuals with a previous opioid 
prescription. The model also finds a statistically significant (! < 0.10) decrease in days supplied 
for individuals in the targeted group in the base model, and an increase in days supplied in the 
full model (! > 0.10). The divergent results between the two models and the lack of 
corroboration of an effect on specifically targeted groups in the other tables indicate that this 
result is likely error rather than finding a true effect. 
 
C. Annual Health Care Appointments 
 The previous sections have demonstrated that opioid boxed warnings decreased the 
opioids that individuals with a previous prescription consumed. However, the tests above have 
                                                        
22 I use days of prescription because it ensures that different drugs at different strengths are measured consistently. 
Individuals who did not have an active opioids prescription are coded as a 0.  
23 Full results for each model are presented in the Appendix.   
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not resolved whether the reduction in consumption occurred because boxed warnings made users 
believe opioids were riskier, thereby reducing demand for opioids at any price, or made 
prescribers believe opioids were riskier, thereby decreasing the available supply of opioids for 
any user. The model in Section IV demonstrates that if users’ risk beliefs are driving the decrease 
in opioid prescriptions, we would expect individuals to seek care less often. Conversely, if office 
visits remain constant it would indicate that patient risk beliefs remain unchanged, but 
prescribers provided fewer prescriptions even as patients continued to seek them. It could even 
be possible for appointments to increase while prescriptions decreased, if patients who could not 
get a prescription from a first prescriber visit others until they receive a prescription.  
 Table 5 presents my difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of boxed warnings 
on the number of annual visits to health care providers’ offices.24 As in my previous tables, the 
first column presents a base model, while the second column presents the difference-in-
differences estimates for the effect of boxed warnings on the indicated group. Because the MEPS 
data only ask respondents about their annual visits, the data contain only two observations per 
individual and it is impossible to control for individual time trends. As Tables 3 and 4 
demonstrate, individual time trends control for time-invariant characteristics that increase the 
likelihood that I am identifying the causal effect of boxed warnings. As a result, the estimates in 
Table 5 should be considered suggestive of the effect of boxed warning but are weaker evidence 
than the full model estimates in Table 3 and Table 4.  
 The analysis presented in Table 5 provides some evidence that patients had fewer 
appointments per year following the introduction of the opioid boxed warning. In the previous 
prescription model, I estimate that individuals with a previous prescription had 0.3 fewer annual 
visits on average, a decrease of approximately 15% relative to the mean. The decrease is 
                                                        
24 As with Tables 3 and 4, only the coefficients of interest are presented. The tables in the present the full results.  
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consistent with the boxed warning increasing patients’ perceived risk of opioids or their 
perception of prescribers’ risk beliefs, thereby decreasing multiple provider episodes. The 
estimated coefficients for the fatality risk and specifically targeted models are small and 
statistically insignificant. Because I cannot control for individual time trends, it is impossible to 
know whether the identified effects would persist after doing so.  
 
D. Substitution to Other Pain Medications 
 The evidence discussed above demonstrate that opioid prescriptions to individuals with a 
previous prescription decreased because of the boxed warning but do not identify whether 
prescribers substituted to writing prescriptions for other pain medications. Such substitution is 
critical to determining whether the boxed warnings provided an aggregate social benefit. Repeat 
opioid users clearly gain some benefit from using the medication and lose that benefit when they 
stop receiving a prescription unless they substitute to an alternative product or therapy or 
adequately taper off the medication so that it is not necessary. In the case of individuals who are 
using opioids to treat pain, substitution to non-opioid prescription pain medications would 
substantially mitigate the welfare loss to such individuals. Research has demonstrated that some 
combinations of non-opioid pain medication drugs are more effective than opioids at treating 
acute pain (Holdgate 2004; Moore and Hersh 2013).  
 Table 6 estimates the effect of opioid boxed warnings on non-opioid pain medication 
prescriptions. The estimating equation behind Table 6 is identical to equation 1, but I use non-
opioid pain prescriptions as the dependent variable rather than opioid prescriptions.25 The results 
from Table 6 provide weak evidence that boxed warnings increased prescriptions of non-opioid 
                                                        
25 Data on non-opioid prescription consumption are also from the MEPS. The Multum codes associates with non-
opioid pain medications are as follows: 57-58-59 (miscellaneous analgesics), 57-58-61 (non-steroidal anti-
inflammatory agents), 57-58-62 (salicylates), 57-58-63 (analgesic combinations), 57-58-193 (antimigraine 
combinations), and 57-58-278 (cox-2 inhibitors). Some medications have multiple Multum codes that include both 
opioid and non-opioid combinations; in such cases I classify opioid and non-opioid combination drugs as opioids.   
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pain medications by 0.9 percentage points to individuals who previously had an opioid 
prescription. While 0.9 appears small relative to the magnitudes of the opioid prescription 
decreases observed in Table 3, it is nearly a 20% increase in non-opioid pain medication 
prescriptions. The effects are small and only significant at the ten percent level in the base and 
full models, but the estimated coefficients are remarkably stable across the three models. 
Substitution may not have been necessary for many patients if they tapered use such that an 
alternative medication was not necessary following the boxed warning. Of course, my data make 
it impossible to identify whether repeat opioid prescription users switched to illicit opioid 
sources or physical therapy or some other non-pharmaceutical pain therapy.  
 
VII. Discussion 
 My results indicate that the FDA’s boxed warnings decreased the quantity of opioids 
prescribed to individuals that had a previous opioid prescription but not to other groups that the 
warnings targeted. Boxed warnings decreased the probability of a prescription for repeat users 
and may have marginally decreased the quantity of pills such users received. The boxed warning 
also caused a 20% increase in non-opioid prescription pain medication use as previous opioid 
users substituted to other pain medications. These results indicate that the boxed warning 
generally benefited such users, as many individuals who still needed medication for pain 
following the introduction of the warning received it. My results indicate that at least some of the 
change in prescribing was due to patients’ increased perceptions regarding the riskiness of 
opioids, though the results would also be consistent with decreasing multiple provider episodes 
in response to an increased perception of risk among prescribers. 
The results provide evidence that repeat users of prescription medications that they 
acquire through legitimate medical channels are a population at relatively lower risk of fatal 
overdose. If that were not the case, the results for repeat users and individuals at a relatively 
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higher risk of opioid overdose would have been consistent. These results therefore add to the 
evidence that illicit opioid use now drives the fatal overdose epidemic, rather than prescription 
opioids. Illicit opioids are a diverse set of drugs, containing both illegally obtained and 
counterfeit prescriptions as well as heroin and compounds containing fentanyl. To the extent that 
the primary goal of opioid policy is to reduce opioid fatalities, regulatory responses must aim to 
reduce the use of such illicit opioids in addition to decreasing prescriptions. However, it does not 
follow that the boxed warnings studied here were a failure. Reducing the use of an addictive 
substance when patients can (and do) substitute to alternative medications or non-pharmaceutical 
interventions is beneficial on its own.  
 Additionally, these results demonstrate that information-based efforts to reduce opioid 
use may be modestly successful. Beyond the boxed warnings studied here, the FDA required 
boxed warnings be placed on immediate release opioids in late 2016, and those warnings are 
substantially similar to those studied here (U.S. FDA 2016). Though there are some differences 
in language between the two warnings, prescribers may react to both warnings similarly and 
decrease prescriptions of immediate release opioids further. However, if the warnings studied in 
this paper had a large spillover effect, such a response may have occurred before the warnings 
were even implemented. Additional efforts to reduce opioid use through warnings and public 
information campaigns may be successful, though they may be unlikely to curtail use among the 
most dangerous users. 
 My results also indicate that the FDA (and regulators generally) should expect prescribers 
and patients to respond to warnings about the risks of opioids in a boundedly rational way. 
Prescribers apparently use previous opioid prescriptions as a shortcut to determine whether a 
patient is at greater risk from taking opioids. Previous research has demonstrated similar 
heuristic-based decisionmaking on the part of prescribers (Marewski and Gigerenzer 2012). 
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result, regulators that incorporate boundedly rational responses into policy are more likely to 
achieve optimal outcomes (Sunstein 1997; Jolls et al. 1998; Cooper and Kovacic 2012). 
Regulators must appropriately calibrate warnings knowing that prescribers will take shortcuts 
and that patients are probably not self-assessing their own risk in light of the warning.  
 
VIII. Conclusion 
 This paper has demonstrated that the FDA’s 2013 requirement that manufacturers place a 
boxed warning on extended release opioids was generally successful at reducing repeat opioid 
prescriptions. Using difference-in-differences regression models, I find that the providers 
prescribed opioids to previous opioid users 35.5% less often, and with 1 day fewer opioids, 
following the boxed warning. Prescribers did not alter their opioid prescribing behavior to 
individuals at a higher fatal overdose risk or to those who were specifically targeted by the 
warning on the basis of their demographics, despite language in the boxed warning that should 
have caused fewer prescriptions to these groups.  
 The evidence I present here suggests that future boxed warnings from the FDA could 
have more success if they are more explicit about the groups to whom prescribers should provide 
fewer prescriptions. Prescribers responded to the boxed warning in this case by utilizing a clear 
heuristic (previous prescriptions) in the absence of clear standards to evaluate patient riskiness. 
Clear factors about how to evaluate patients may result in warnings that reduce the occurrence of 
extreme adverse events, though there is a persistent risk that prescribers may not incorporate a 
long list of risks into their prescribing behavior even when the instructions are as clear as 
possible. More pertinent to the ongoing opioid epidemic, the results demonstrate that the boxed 
warnings and similar information-providing policies can be of substantial utility in decreasing 
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the use of risky prescription pain medications. Even if such policies cannot stem fatal overdoses, 
decreasing the use of opioids by repeat users has substantial private and social benefits.   
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Figure 1: Current OxyContin boxed warning 
  
HIGHLIGHTS OF PRESCRIBING INFORMATION 
These highlights do not include all the information needed to use 
OXYCONTIN® safely and effectively.  See full prescribing information 
for OXYCONTIN.   
 
OXYCONTIN® (oxycodone hydrochloride) extended-release tablets, for 
oral use, CII 
Initial U.S. Approval: 1950 
 
WARNING: ADDICTION, ABUSE AND MISUSE; LIFE-
THREATENING RESPIRATORY DEPRESSION; ACCIDENTAL 
INGESTION; NEONATAL OPIOID WITHDRAWAL SYNDROME; 
CYTOCHROME P450 3A4 INTERACTION; and RISKS FROM 
CONCOMITANT USE WITH BENZODIAZEPINES AND OTHER 
CNS DEPRESSANTS 
See full prescribing information for complete boxed warning. 
• OXYCONTIN exposes users to risks of addiction, abuse and misuse, 
which can lead to overdose and death. Assess patient’s risk before 
prescribing and monitor regularly for these behaviors and conditions. 
(5.1) 
• Serious, life-threatening, or fatal respiratory depression may occur. 
Monitor closely, especially upon initiation or following a dose increase.  
Instruct patients to swallow OXYCONTIN tablets whole to avoid 
exposure to a potentially fatal dose of oxycodone. (5.2)  
• Accidental ingestion of OXYCONTIN, especially by children, can 
result in a fatal overdose of oxycodone. (5.2) 
• Prolonged use of OXYCONTIN during pregnancy can result in 
neonatal opioid withdrawal syndrome, which may be life-threatening if 
not recognized and treated. If prolonged opioid use is required in a 
pregnant woman, advise the patient of the risk of neonatal opioid 
withdrawal syndrome and ensure that appropriate treatment will be 
available. (5.3) 
• Concomitant use with CYP3A4 inhibitors (or discontinuation of 
CYP3A4 inducers) can result in a fatal overdose of oxycodone. (5.4, 7, 
12.3) 
• Concomitant use of opioids with benzodiazepines or other central 
nervous system (CNS) depressants, including alcohol, may result in 
profound sedation, respiratory depression, coma, and death. Reserve 
concomitant prescribing for use in patients for whom alternative 
treatment options are inadequate; limit dosages and durations to the 
minimum required; and follow patients for signs and symptoms of 
respiratory depression and sedation. (5.5, 7) 
 
----------------------------RECENT MAJOR CHANGES-------------------------- 
Box Warning     12/2016 
Warnings and Precautions (5)    12/2016 
 
----------------------------INDICATIONS AND USAGE--------------------------- 
OXYCONTIN is an opioid agonist indicated for the management of pain 
severe enough to require daily, around-the-clock, long-term opioid treatment 
and for which alternative treatment options are inadequate in: 
 
• Adults; and 
• Opioid-tolerant pediatric patients 11 years of age and older who are 
already receiving and tolerate a minimum daily opioid dose of at least 
20 mg oxycodone orally or its equivalent. 
 
Limitations of Use  
• Because of the risks of addiction, abuse and misuse with opioids, even at 
recommended doses, and because of the greater risks of overdose and 
death with extended-release opioid formulations, reserve OXYCONTIN 
for use in patients for whom alternative treatment options (e.g. non-
opioid analgesics or immediate-release opioids) are ineffective, not 
tolerated, or would be otherwise inadequate to provide sufficient 
management of pain. (1)  
• OXYCONTIN is not indicated as an as-needed (prn) analgesic. (1) 
 
----------------------DOSAGE AND ADMINISTRATION------------------------ 
• To be prescribed only by healthcare providers knowledgeable in use of 
potent opioids for management of chronic pain. (2.1) 
• OXYCONTIN 60 mg and 80 mg tablets, a single dose greater than 40 mg, 
or a total daily dose greater than 80 mg are only for use in patients in whom 
tolerance to an opioid of comparable potency has been established. (2.1) 
• Patients considered opioid-tolerant are those taking, for one week or 
longer, at least 60 mg oral morphine per day, 25 mcg transdermal fentanyl 
per hour, 30 mg oral oxycodone per day, 8 mg oral hydromorphone per 
day, 25 mg oral oxymorphone per day, 60 mg oral hydrocodone per day, or 
an equianalgesic dose of another opioid. (2.1) 
• Use the lowest effective dosage for the shortest duration consistent with 
individual patient treatment goals (2.1). 
• Individualize dosing based on the severity of pain, patient response, prior 
analgesic experience, and risk factors for addiction, abuse, and misuse. 
(2.1) 
• Instruct patients to swallow tablets intact and not to cut, break, chew, crush, 
or dissolve tablets (risk of potentially fatal dose). (2.1, 5.1) 
• Instruct patients to take tablets one at a time, with enough water to ensure 
complete swallowing immediately after placing in mouth. (2.1, 5.10) 
• Do not abruptly discontinue OXYCONTIN in a physically dependent 
patient. (2.9)  
 
Adults: For opioid-naïve and opioid non-tolerant patients, initiate with 10 mg 
tablets orally every 12 hours. See full prescribing information for instructions 
on conversion from opioids to OXYCONTIN, titration and maintenance of 
therapy. (2.2, 2.3, 2.5) 
Pediatric Patients 11 Years of Age and Older 
• For use only in pediatric patients 11 years and older already receiving and 
tolerating opioids for at least 5 consecutive days with a minimum of 20 mg 
per day of oxycodone or its equivalent for at least two days immediately 
preceding dosing with OXYCONTIN. (2.4) 
• See full prescribing information for instructions on conversion from 
opioids to OXYCONTIN, titration and maintenance of therapy. (2.4, 2.5) 
Geriatric Patients: In debilitated, opioid non-tolerant geriatric patients, initiate 
dosing at one third to one half the recommended starting dosage and titrate 
carefully. (2.7, 8.5) 
Patients with Hepatic Impairment: Initiate dosing at one third to one half the 
recommended starting dosage and titrate carefully. (2.8, 8.6) 
 
---------------------DOSAGE FORMS AND STRENGTHS---------------------- 
Extended-release tablets: 10 mg, 15 mg, 20 mg, 30 mg, 40 mg, 60 mg, and 80 
mg. (3) 
 
-------------------------------CONTRAINDICATIONS------------------------------ 
• Significant respiratory depression (4) 
• Acute or severe bronchial asthma in an unmonitored setting or in absence 
of resuscitative equipment (4) 
• Known or suspected gastrointestinal obstruction, including paralytic ileus 
(4) 
• Hypersensitivity to oxycodone (4) 
 
-----------------------WARNINGS AND PRECAUTIONS------------------------ 
• Life-Threatening Respiratory Depression in Patients with Chronic 
Pulmonary Disease or in Elderly, Cachectic, or Debilitated Patients: 
Monitor closely, particularly during initiation and titration. (5.6)  
• Adrenal Insufficiency: If diagnosed, treat with physiologic replacement of 
corticosteroids, and wean patient off of the opioid. (5.7) 
• Severe Hypotension: Monitor during dosage initiation and titration. Avoid 
use of OXYCONTIN in patients with circulatory shock. (5.8) 
• Risks of Use in Patients with Increased Intracranial Pressure, Brain 
Tumors, Head Injury, or Impaired Consciousness: Monitor for sedation and 
respiratory depression.  Avoid use of OXYCONTIN in patients with 
impaired consciousness or coma. (5.9) 
• Risk of Obstruction in Patients who have Difficulty Swallowing or have 
Underlying GI Disorders that may Predispose them to Obstruction: 
Consider use of an alternative analgesic. (5.10) 
 
------------------------------ADVERSE REACTIONS------------------------------- 
Most common adverse reactions (incidence >5%) were constipation, nausea, 
somnolence, dizziness, vomiting, pruritus, headache, dry mouth, asthenia, and 
sweating. (6.1)  
 
To report SUSPECTED ADVERSE REACTIONS, contact Purdue 
Pharma L.P. at 1-888-726-7535 or FDA at 1-800-FDA-1088 or 
www.fda.gov/medwatch. 
 
------------------------------DRUG INTERACTIONS------------------------------- 
• CNS Depressants: Concomitant use may cause hypotension, profound 
sedation, respiratory depression, coma, and death. If co-administration is 
required and the decision to begin OXYCONTIN is made, start with 1/3 to 
1/2 the recommended starting dosage, consider using a lower dosage of the 
concomitant CNS depressant, and monitor closely. (2.6, 5.5, 7) 
• Serotonergic Drugs:  Concomitant use may result in serotonin syndrome.  
Discontinue OXYCONTIN if serotonin syndrome is suspected. (7)  
Reference ID: 4028307
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Figure 2: Game tree for patient-provider interaction 
 
 
  
Patient 
Health care 
provider 
Seeks 
care 
\00] 
Does not 
seek care 
Prescribes 
opioid 
Best alternative 
medication 
\; − (< + *] _+(-=) − (4(-5) + *` 
No medication  
\−(* ] 
 118 
Figure 3: Event study of boxed warning effect on previous opioid users 
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Figure 4: Event study of boxed warning effect on riskier users 
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Figure 5: Event study of boxed warning effect on targeted groups 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Variable Mean Median Standard Deviation 
Opioid prescription (%) 0.072 0.000 0.258 
   Previous opioid prescription 0.569 1.000 0.495 
   Days supplied 10.161 7.500 19.454 
Non-opioid pain prescription (%) 0.048 0.000 0.214 
Annual health care appointments 2.352 2.000 1.989 
Male 0.488 0.000 0.500 
White 0.779 1.000 0.415 
Married 0.402 0.000 0.490 
Pregnant 0.012 0.000 0.108 
Family size 3.177 3.000 1.657 
Weekly Wage ($ thousands) 0.366 0.000 0.608 
Prescription drug insurance 0.556 1.000 0.497 
Age    
  14 years or younger 0.193 0.000 0.394 
  15 to 24 years 0.138 0.000 0.345 
  25 to 34 years 0.134 0.000 0.341 
  35 to 44 years 0.126 0.000 0.332 
  45 to 54 years 0.138 0.000 0.345 
  55 to 64 years 0.126 0.000 0.332 
  65 years or older 0.144 0.000 0.351 
Education    
  Less than high school 0.341 0.000 0.474 
  High school 0.269 0.000 0.443 
  Some college 0.196 0.000 0.397 
  Bachelor’s or higher 0.223 0.000 0.417 
Census region    
  Northeast 0.177 0.000 0.382 
  South 0.373 0.000 0.484 
  Midwest 0.213 0.000 0.410 
  West 0.236 0.000 0.425 
Riskier than the average person    
  Strongly agree 0.046 0.000 0.210 
  Agree 0.158 0.000 0.365 
  Neutral 0.158 0.000 0.364 
  Disagree 0.224 0.000 0.417 
  Strongly disagree 0.413 0.000 0.492 
Health status    
  Excellent 0.327 0.000 0.469 
  Very good 0.323 0.000 0.467 
  Good 0.244 0.000 0.430 
  Fair 0.082 0.000 0.275 
  Poor 0.024 0.000 0.154 
Note: N = 2,000,734. 
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Table 2: OLS regressions of opioid prescriptions 
 
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Male -0.013 -0.013 -- -- 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)***   
White 0.013 0.013 -- -- 
 (0.001)*** (0.001)***   
Married -0.008 -0.008 -0.002 -0.006 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.007) (0.009) 
Weekly wage  -0.029 -0.029 -0.012 -0.012 
  ($ thousands) (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.006)** (0.006)* 
Weekly wage  0.007 0.007 0.004 0.003 
  ($ thousands) squared (0.001)*** (0.001)*** (0.002)** (0.002)* 
Prescription drug  0.007 0.007 0.011 0.013 
  insurance (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Age     
  14 years or younger -0.046 -0.046 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.011) (0.016) 
  15 to 24 years -0.027 -0.027 0.014 0.013 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.010) (0.015) 
  25 to 34 years -0.007 -0.007 0.002 -0.002 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.007) (0.011) 
  45 to 54 years 0.014 0.014 -0.006 -0.026 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.007) (0.012)** 
  55 to 64 years 0.027 0.027 0.004 -0.030 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.011) (0.018)* 
  65 years or older 0.020 0.020 0.035 0.010 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.015)** (0.024) 
Education     
  Less than high school -0.018 -0.018 -- -- 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)***   
  Some college 0.007 0.005 -- -- 
 (0.003)** (0.003)*   
  Bachelor’s or more -0.015 -0.015 -- -- 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)***   
Census region     
  South 0.015 0.015 0.003 -0.011 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.015) (0.024) 
  Midwest 0.021 0.021 0.003 -0.012 
 (0.003)*** (0.003)*** (0.017) (0.026) 
  West 0.011 0.011 0.009 -0.010 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.016) (0.023) 
Riskier than average     
  Strongly agree -0.003 -0.003 0.001 -0.005 
 (0.005) (0.005) (0.006) (0.010) 
  Agree -0.001 -0.001 -0.004 0.006 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
  Disagree -0.001 -0.001 -0.005 -0.009 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) 
  Strongly disagree 0.006 0.006 0.001 0.006 
 (0.003)** (0.003)** (0.004) (0.006) 
Health status     
  Excellent -0.049 -0.049 -0.023 -0.021 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
  Very good -0.035 -0.035 -0.015 -0.013 
 (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
  Fair 0.093 0.093 0.032 0.031 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
 123 
  Poor 0.254 0.254 0.081 0.066 
 (0.009)*** (0.009)*** (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
     
Monthly Fixed Effects  X X X 
Individual Fixed Effects   X X 
Individual Time Trends    X 
     
R2 0.079 0.080 0.518 0.650 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. Dashes indicate variables excluded by 
the use of fixed effects. The age group “35 to 44 years” is omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high 
school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted 
health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table 3: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of boxed warnings on receiving any opioid 
prescriptions 
 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Base model Covariate model Full model 
Previous prescription -0.190 -0.191 -0.171 
 (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*** 
Opioid fatality risk 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Specifically targeted -0.000 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Dependent variable is a binary variable equal to one if the individual had filled an opioid 
prescription in the relevant month. Base models include the identifying variable, its interaction with a variable 
indicating the boxed warning requirement is in place, and individual and month-by-year fixed effects. Except in 
the opioid fatality risk regression, covariate models include each covariate from Table 2. The covariate model in 
the fatality risk regression omits the marital status, region, and age variables. Full models augment covariate 
model with individual level time-trends. Standard errors robust and clustered on individual respondent. All 
regressions control for individual and month-by-year fixed effects. *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table 4: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of boxed warnings on days of opioid supply 
prescribed 
 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Base model Covariate model Full model  
Previous prescription -0.967 -0.966 -0.317 
 (0.166)*** (0.168)*** (0.251) 
Opioid fatality risk 0.059 0.060 0.005 
 (0.037) (0.037) (0.020) 
Specifically targeted -0.097 -0.084 0.133 
 (0.058)* (0.052) (0.061)** 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Dependent variable is days of opioids supplied to an individual in a given month. Base 
models include the identifying variable, its interaction with a variable indicating the boxed warning requirement 
is in place, and individual and month-by-year fixed effects. Except in the opioid fatality risk regression, covariate 
models include each covariate from Table 2. The covariate model in the fatality risk regression omits the marital 
status, region, and age variables. Full models augment covariate model with individual level time-trends. 
Standard errors robust and clustered on individual respondent. All regressions control for individual and month-
by-year fixed effects. *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table 5: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of 2014 boxed warnings on annual number of health 
care appointments 
 
Variable 
(1) (2) 
Base model Covariate model 
Previous prescription -0.323 -0.309 
 (0.124)*** (0.123)*** 
Opioid fatality risk 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Specifically targeted -0.004 -0.020 
 (0.080) (0.081) 
Note: N = 142,974. Dependent variable is annual number of appointments. Base models include the identifying 
variable, its interaction with a variable indicating the boxed warning requirement is in place, and individual and 
month-by-year fixed effects. Except in the opioid fatality risk regression, covariate models include each covariate 
from Table 2. The covariate model in the fatality risk regression omits the marital status, region, and age 
variables. The full model cannot be estimated for this dependent variable because each respondent only answers 
the question corresponding to number of appointments once per year. Standard errors robust and clustered on 
individual respondent. All regressions control for individual and month-by-year fixed effects. *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table 6: Difference-in-differences estimates of the effect of boxed warnings on nonopioid pain prescriptions 
 
Variable 
(1) (2) (3) 
Base model Covariate model Full model  
Previous prescription 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.005)* (0.005)** (0.005)* 
Opioid fatality risk 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Specifically targeted -0.000 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Dependent variable is days of opioids supplied to an individual in a given month. Base 
models include the identifying variable, its interaction with a variable indicating the boxed warning requirement 
is in place, and individual and month-by-year fixed effects. Except in the opioid fatality risk regression, covariate 
models include each covariate from Table 2. The covariate model in the fatality risk regression omits the marital 
status, region, and age variables. Full models augment covariate model with individual level time-trends. 
Standard errors robust and clustered on individual respondent. All regressions control for individual and month-
by-year fixed effects. *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Appendix 
 
This Appendix presents how I calculated individual level opioid fatality risks. I draw 
upon three data sources: the National Vital Statistics System’s (“NVSS”) multiple cause of death 
data files, the Current Population Survey, and Census population counts. The NVSS data contain 
detailed information on individual deaths in the United States, including the decedent’s sex, race, 
marital status, census region of death, month of death, and cause of death indexed by ICD-10 
code.26 The Current Population Survey contains estimates of the proportion of the U.S. 
population bearing the same characteristics. I draw data from 2011–2016 for all three data 
sources.  
From the NVSS data I construct counts of individuals who experienced fatal opioid 
overdoses indexed by sex, race, census region of death, and month of death. Because the NVSS 
data are a census of fatalities, the remainder of the U.S. population contains all individuals who 
did not die of opioid fatalities. Using the Current Population Survey’s information on national 
demographics and population counts from the United States Census Bureau, I create a 
complimentary count of all individuals who did not die of an opioid overdose, indexed by the 
exact same categories. These counts of deaths and non-deaths indexed by individual 
characteristics are organized into a dataset containing approximately 2,500 cells.  
After constructing the dataset, I run a regression using these cells as observations. The 
estimating equation takes the following form: 
 a;F;bEF*c = N + YP + dc +	Uc (A1) 
The dependent variable a;F;bEF*c is equal to one if the cell represents a count of 
individuals who died of an overdose, and zero otherwise. The independent variables Y	include 
                                                        
26 The ICD-10 codes associated with opiate poisonings are T40.0 (opium), T40.1 (heroin), T40.2 (other opioids), 
T40.3 (methadone), T40.4 (other synthetic narcotics), and T40.6 (other/unspecified narcotics). 
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variables indicating whether a cell represents individuals who are male, white, married, what 10-
year age group individuals represented by the cell are in, and which census region individuals 
represented by the cell live in. The variables dc are annual fixed effects. I weight each 
observation by the quantity of individuals that the observation represents. The estimated fatality 
rates that I assign to each individual in my sample are the fitted values from that regression. 
Appendix Table 1 provides the estimated coefficients from regressing equation A1.  
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1: Predicted annual opioid fatality risk (per 10,000 individuals)  
 
Variables  
Male 0.938 
 (0.006)*** 
White 1.110 
 (0.006)*** 
Married -2.894 
 (0.011)*** 
Age  
  14 years or younger -3.964 
 (0.141)*** 
  15 to 24 years -2.909 
 (0.015)*** 
  25 to 34 years -0.165 
 (0.015)** 
  45 to 54 years 0.212 
 (0.014)*** 
  55 to 64 years -0.363 
 (0.014)*** 
  65 years or older -1.933 
 (0.012)*** 
Census region  
  South 0.212 
 (0.008)*** 
  Midwest 0.298 
 (0.009)*** 
  West -0.279 
 (0.008)*** 
  
Year  
  2012 -0.005 
 (0.009) 
  2013 0.071 
 (0.009)*** 
  2014 0.210 
 (0.009)*** 
  2015 0.386 
 (0.010)*** 
  2016 0.746 
 (0.011)*** 
  
Note: N = 2,496 (1,480,865,347 frequency-weighted observations). The year 2011 is the omitted year category 
variable.  
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Table A2: Full results for “Table 3 – Previous prescriptions” Model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × previous opioid prescription -0.190 -0.191 -0.171 
 (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.013)*** 
Previous opioid prescription 0.061 0.062 -0.042 
 (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)*** 
Married  -0.001 -0.002 
  (0.007) (0.009) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.015 -0.015 
  (0.006)*** (0.006)** 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.004 0.003 
  (0.002)** (0.002)* 
Prescription drug insurance  0.010 0.013 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Age: 14 years or younger  0.004 -0.000 
    (0.011) (0.016) 
         15 to 24 years  0.013 0.003 
  (0.010) (0.014) 
         25 to 34 years  0.001 -0.005 
  (0.007) (0.010) 
         45 to 54 years  -0.003 -0.021 
  (0.007) (0.012)* 
         55 to 64 years  0.010 -0.019 
  (0.011) (0.017) 
         65 years or older  0.046 0.024 
  (0.015)*** (0.023) 
Census region: South  0.004 -0.019 
    (0.015) (0.023) 
                         Midwest  0.003 -0.023 
  (0.017) (0.025) 
                         West  0.010 -0.013 
  (0.016) (0.022) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.001 -0.004 
    (0.006) (0.009) 
                                   Agree  -0.005 0.006 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
                                   Disagree  -0.005 -0.009 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.001 0.005 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.022 -0.017 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Very good  -0.015 -0.010 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Fair  0.032 0.030 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
                       Poor  0.080 0.065 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
    
R2 0.522 0.523 0.655 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A3: Full results for “Table 3 – Fatality risk” Model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × fatality risk 0.000 0.000 -0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Fatality risk -0.003 -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.013 -0.012 
  (0.006)** (0.006)* 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.004 0.004 
  (0.002)** (0.002)* 
Prescription drug insurance  0.010 0.013 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.001 -0.005 
    (0.006) (0.010) 
                                   Agree  -0.004 0.006 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
                                   Disagree  -0.005 -0.009 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.001 0.006 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.023 -0.021 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Very good  -0.016 -0.013 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Fair  0.032 0.031 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
                       Poor  0.081 0.066 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
    
R2 0.517 0.518 0.650 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. “Neutral” is the omitted riskiness 
response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A4: Full results for “Table 3 – Specifically targeted” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × specifically targeted -0.000 -0.001 0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Specifically targeted 0.055 0.056 0.065 
 (0.006)*** (0.006)*** (0.008)*** 
Married  -0.003 -0.006 
  (0.007) (0.009) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.011 -0.011 
  (0.006)** (0.006)* 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.003 0.003 
  (0.002)* (0.002) 
Prescription drug insurance  0.011 0.013 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Age: 14 years or younger  0.002 0.004 
    (0.011) (0.016) 
         15 to 24 years  0.016 0.013 
  (0.010) (0.014) 
         25 to 34 years  0.003 -0.003 
  (0.007) (0.011) 
         45 to 54 years  -0.006 -0.026 
  (0.007) (0.012)** 
         55 to 64 years  0.002 -0.030 
  (0.011) (0.018)* 
         65 years or older  0.032 0.010 
  (0.015)** (0.024) 
Census region: South  0.003 -0.010 
    (0.015) (0.024) 
                         Midwest  0.003 -0.011 
  (0.017) (0.026) 
                         West  0.008 -0.010 
  (0.016) (0.023) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.001 -0.005 
    (0.006) (0.010) 
                                   Agree  -0.004 0.005 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
                                   Disagree  -0.005 -0.009 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.001 0.006 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.024 -0.021 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Very good  -0.015 -0.013 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Fair  0.032 0.031 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
                       Poor  0.081 0.066 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
    
R2 0.518 0.519 0.650 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A5: Full results for “Table 3 – Pregnancy” Model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × pregnancy 0.021 0.021 0.038 
 (0.016) (0.016) (0.020)* 
Pregnancy 0.081 0.081 0.077 
 (0.011)*** (0.011)*** (0.014)*** 
Married  -0.004 -0.007 
  (0.007) (0.009) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.012 -0.011 
  (0.006)** (0.006)* 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.003 0.003 
  (0.002)* (0.002) 
Prescription drug insurance  0.011 0.013 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Age: 14 years or younger  0.000 0.004 
    (0.011) (0.016) 
         15 to 24 years  0.015 0.014 
  (0.010) (0.014) 
         25 to 34 years  0.002 -0.003 
  (0.007) (0.011) 
         45 to 54 years  -0.005 -0.026 
  (0.007) (0.012)** 
         55 to 64 years  0.004 -0.030 
  (0.011) (0.018)* 
         65 years or older  0.035 0.010 
  (0.015)** (0.024) 
Census region: South  0.003 -0.010 
    (0.015) (0.024) 
                         Midwest  0.003 -0.011 
  (0.017) (0.026) 
                         West  0.008 -0.011 
  (0.016) (0.023) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.001 -0.005 
    (0.006) (0.010) 
                                   Agree  -0.004 0.005 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
                                   Disagree  -0.005 -0.009 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.000 0.006 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.023 -0.021 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Very good  -0.015 -0.013 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Fair  0.032 0.031 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
                       Poor  0.081 0.066 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
    
R2 0.518 0.519 0.650 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A6: Full results for “Table 3 – Children” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × child -0.004 -0.004 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
Child 0.005 0.004 0.008 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.010) 
Married  -0.002 -0.006 
  (0.007) (0.009) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.012 -0.012 
  (0.006)** (0.006)* 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.004 0.003 
  (0.002)** (0.002)* 
Prescription drug insurance  0.011 0.013 
  (0.003)*** (0.004)*** 
Age: 14 years or younger  -0.001 0.003 
    (0.011) (0.016) 
         15 to 24 years  0.014 0.013 
  (0.010) (0.015) 
         25 to 34 years  0.003 -0.002 
  (0.007) (0.011) 
         45 to 54 years  -0.006 -0.026 
  (0.007) (0.012)** 
         55 to 64 years  0.003 -0.030 
  (0.011) (0.018)* 
         65 years or older  0.034 0.010 
  (0.015)** (0.024) 
Census region: South  0.003 -0.011 
    (0.015) (0.024) 
                         Midwest  0.003 -0.012 
  (0.017) (0.026) 
                         West  0.009 -0.010 
  (0.016) (0.023) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.001 -0.005 
    (0.006) (0.010) 
                                   Agree  -0.004 0.006 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
                                   Disagree  -0.005 -0.009 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.001 0.006 
  (0.004) (0.006) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.023 -0.021 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Very good  -0.015 -0.013 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Fair  0.032 0.031 
  (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
                       Poor  0.081 0.066 
  (0.008)*** (0.008)*** 
    
R2 0.517 0.518 0.650 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × previous opioid prescription -0.967 -0.966 -0.317 
 (0.166)*** (0.168)*** (0.251) 
Previous opioid prescription 0.879 0.881 -0.740 
 (0.166)*** (0.161)*** (0.163)*** 
Married  -0.245 -0.259 
  (0.149) (0.280) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.090 -0.102 
  (0.085) (0.081) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.028 0.016 
  (0.024) (0.021) 
Prescription drug insurance  -0.024 -0.004 
  (0.058) (0.071) 
Age: 14 years or younger  -0.816 -0.272 
    (0.952) (0.303) 
         15 to 24 years  -0.777 -0.208 
  (0.944) (0.295) 
         25 to 34 years  0.093 -0.050 
  (0.095) (0.103) 
         45 to 54 years  -0.097 -0.098 
  (0.102) (0.151) 
         55 to 64 years  -0.018 0.056 
  (0.158) (0.268) 
         65 years or older  0.427 0.603 
  (0.224)* (0.346)* 
Census region: South  -0.176 -0.108 
    (0.141) (0.244) 
                         Midwest  -0.143 -0.402 
  (0.154) (0.291) 
                         West  -0.342 -0.346 
  (0.158)** (0.262) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.143 -0.073 
    (0.145) (0.176) 
                                   Agree  0.147 -0.168 
  (0.171) (0.190) 
                                   Disagree  0.022 -0.196 
  (0.093) (0.116)* 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.066 -0.089 
  (0.101) (0.127) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.169 -0.080 
    (0.035)*** (0.033)** 
                       Very good  -0.115 -0.026 
    (0.039)*** (0.036) 
                       Fair  0.239 0.201 
  (0.059)*** (0.071)*** 
                       Poor  0.871 0.725 
  (0.159)*** (0.163)*** 
    
R2 0.529 0.529 0.720 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A8: Full results for “Table 4 – Fatality risk” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × fatality risk 0.076 0.077 0.007 
 (0.047) (0.047) (0.026) 
Fatality risk 0.109 0.108 0.047 
 (0.130) (0.131) (0.078) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.097 -0.085 
  (0.081) (0.081) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.028 0.018 
  (0.023) (0.021) 
Prescription drug insurance  -0.024 -0.010 
  (0.058) (0.071) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.140 -0.072 
    (0.144) (0.175) 
                                   Agree  0.148 -0.174 
  (0.168) (0.191) 
                                   Disagree  0.025 -0.201 
  (0.094) (0.115)* 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.065 -0.079 
  (0.101) (0.126) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.163 -0.106 
    (0.032)*** (0.033)*** 
                       Very good  -0.111 -0.041 
    (0.037)*** (0.036) 
                       Fair  0.239 0.205 
  (0.059)*** (0.071)*** 
                       Poor  0.872 0.734 
  (0.159)*** (0.163)*** 
    
R2 0.528 0.529 0.719 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. “Neutral” is the omitted riskiness 
response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A9: Full results for “Table 4 – Specifically targeted” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × specifically targeted -0.097 -0.084 0.133 
 (0.058)* (0.052) (0.061)** 
Specifically targeted 0.266 0.249 0.174 
 (0.081)*** (0.078)*** (0.083)** 
Married  -0.240 -0.284 
  (0.149) (0.278) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.089 -0.079 
  (0.082) (0.081) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.025 0.017 
  (0.024) (0.021) 
Prescription drug insurance  -0.018 -0.010 
  (0.058) (0.071) 
Age: 14 years or younger  -0.830 -0.254 
    (0.952) (0.303) 
         15 to 24 years  -0.799 -0.145 
  (0.952) (0.297) 
         25 to 34 years  0.083 -0.029 
  (0.095) (0.103) 
         45 to 54 years  -0.097 -0.131 
  (0.102) (0.151) 
         55 to 64 years  -0.003 -0.016 
  (0.157) (0.267) 
         65 years or older  0.448 0.508 
  (0.223)** (0.346) 
Census region: South  -0.197 -0.061 
    (0.142) (0.248) 
                         Midwest  -0.176 -0.328 
  (0.154) (0.294) 
                         West  -0.355 -0.331 
  (0.161)** (0.266) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.138 -0.073 
    (0.144) (0.176) 
                                   Agree  0.152 -0.174 
  (0.172) (0.190) 
                                   Disagree  0.024 -0.200 
  (0.094) (0.116)* 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.064 -0.079 
  (0.100) (0.127) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.163 -0.106 
    (0.033)*** (0.033)*** 
                       Very good  -0.111 -0.041 
    (0.037)*** (0.036) 
                       Fair  0.240 0.204 
  (0.059)*** (0.071)*** 
                       Poor  0.873 0.735 
  (0.159)*** (0.163)*** 
    
R2 0.528 0.529 0.720 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A10: Full results for “Table 4 – Pregnancy” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × pregnancy 0.323 0.318 0.470 
 (0.192)* (0.193)* (0.170)*** 
Pregnancy 0.120 0.121 0.111 
 (0.184) (0.184) (0.150) 
Married  -0.245 -0.285 
  (0.149) (0.278) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.092 -0.080 
  (0.081) (0.080) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.026 0.017 
  (0.024) (0.021) 
Prescription drug insurance  -0.017 -0.010 
  (0.058) (0.071) 
Age: 14 years or younger  -0.828 -0.252 
    (0.949) (0.303) 
         15 to 24 years  -0.807 -0.142 
  (0.954) (0.297) 
         25 to 34 years  0.078 -0.029 
  (0.095) (0.103) 
         45 to 54 years  -0.089 -0.132 
  (0.102) (0.151) 
         55 to 64 years  0.014 -0.016 
  (0.157) (0.267) 
         65 years or older  0.472 0.507 
  (0.222)** (0.346) 
Census region: South  -0.193 -0.058 
    (0.142) (0.249) 
                         Midwest  -0.173 -0.324 
  (0.154) (0.295) 
                         West  -0.353 -0.330 
  (0.161)** (0.266) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.137 -0.073 
    (0.144) (0.176) 
                                   Agree  0.151 -0.175 
  (0.172) (0.190) 
                                   Disagree  0.024 -0.200 
  (0.094) (0.116)* 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.064 -0.080 
  (0.100) (0.127) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.163 -0.106 
    (0.033)*** (0.033)*** 
                       Very good  -0.111 -0.041 
    (0.038)*** (0.036) 
                       Fair  0.241 0.204 
  (0.059)*** (0.071)*** 
                       Poor  0.873 0.734 
  (0.159)*** (0.163)*** 
    
R2 0.528 0.529 0.720 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A11: Full results for “Table 4 – Child” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × child -0.148 -0.134 0.067 
 (0.056)*** (0.047)*** (0.060) 
Child 0.178 0.152 -0.012 
 (0.074)** (0.067)** (0.082) 
Married  -0.235 -0.282 
  (0.149) (0.278) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.091 -0.082 
  (0.082) (0.081) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.026 0.018 
  (0.024) (0.021) 
Prescription drug insurance  -0.018 -0.010 
  (0.058) (0.071) 
Age: 14 years or younger  -0.840 -0.257 
    (0.951) (0.303) 
         15 to 24 years  -0.798 -0.148 
  (0.951) (0.297) 
         25 to 34 years  0.085 -0.028 
  (0.095) (0.103) 
         45 to 54 years  -0.098 -0.132 
  (0.102) (0.151) 
         55 to 64 years  -0.004 -0.016 
  (0.157) (0.267) 
         65 years or older  0.447 0.507 
  (0.223)** (0.346) 
Census region: South  -0.194 -0.064 
    (0.142) (0.249) 
                         Midwest  -0.176 -0.331 
  (0.154) (0.294) 
                         West  -0.353 -0.327 
  (0.161)** (0.266) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.138 -0.073 
    (0.144) (0.176) 
                                   Agree  0.152 -0.174 
  (0.172) (0.190) 
                                   Disagree  0.025 -0.200 
  (0.094) (0.116)* 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.065 -0.079 
  (0.100) (0.127) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.163 -0.106 
    (0.033)*** (0.033)*** 
                       Very good  -0.111 -0.041 
    (0.037)*** (0.036) 
                       Fair  0.240 0.204 
  (0.059)*** (0.071)*** 
                       Poor  0.873 0.735 
  (0.159)*** (0.163)*** 
    
R2 0.528 0.529 0.719 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A12: Full results for “Table 5 – Previous prescriptions” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model 
Boxed warning × previous opioid prescription -0.323 -0.309 
 (0.124)*** (0.123)** 
Previous opioid prescription 0.470 0.462 
 (0.100)*** (0.099)*** 
Married  0.102 
  (0.098) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.014 
  (0.004)*** 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.000 
  (0.000)*** 
Prescription drug insurance  0.161 
  (0.047)*** 
Age: 14 years or younger  -0.019 
  (0.200) 
         15 to 24 years  0.145 
  (0.171) 
         25 to 34 years  0.121 
  (0.129) 
         45 to 54 years  -0.004 
  (0.111) 
         55 to 64 years  0.074 
  (0.165) 
         65 years or older  0.137 
  (0.227) 
Census region: South  0.127 
    (0.332) 
                         Midwest  0.096 
  (0.353) 
                         West  0.171 
  (0.347) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.021 
    (0.065) 
                                   Agree  -0.054 
  (0.039) 
                                   Disagree  0.027 
  (0.037) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.052 
  (0.036) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.307 
    (0.044)*** 
                       Very good  -0.169 
    (0.036)*** 
                       Fair  0.355 
  (0.060)*** 
                       Poor  0.959 
  (0.157)*** 
   
R2 0.762 0.764 
Note: N = 142,230. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A13: Full results for “Table 5 – Fatality risk” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model 
Boxed warning × fatality risk 0.001 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Fatality risk -0.003 -0.003 
 (0.003) (0.003) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.014 
  (0.004)*** 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.000 
  (0.000)*** 
Prescription drug insurance  0.162 
  (0.047)*** 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.023 
    (0.066) 
                                   Agree  -0.052 
  (0.040) 
                                   Disagree  0.045 
  (0.038) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.074 
  (0.036)** 
Health status: Excellent  -0.372 
    (0.035)*** 
                       Very good  -0.221 
    (0.031)*** 
                       Fair  0.416 
  (0.054)*** 
                       Poor  1.057 
  (0.130)*** 
   
R2 0.762 0.764 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. “Neutral” is the omitted riskiness 
response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A14: Full results for “Table 5 – Specifically targeted” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model 
Boxed warning × specifically targeted -0.004 -0.020 
 (0.080) (0.081) 
Specifically targeted 1.893 1.892 
 (0.112)*** (0.113)*** 
Married  0.062 
  (0.095) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.012 
  (0.004)*** 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.000 
  (0.000)*** 
Prescription drug insurance  0.158 
  (0.046)*** 
Age: 14 years or younger  0.040 
  (0.193) 
         15 to 24 years  0.171 
  (0.162) 
         25 to 34 years  0.118 
  (0.119) 
         45 to 54 years  -0.031 
  (0.111) 
         55 to 64 years  0.037 
  (0.165) 
         65 years or older  0.089 
  (0.227) 
Census region: South  -0.297 
    (0.338) 
                         Midwest  -0.204 
  (0.337) 
                         West  -0.298 
  (0.312) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.022 
    (0.065) 
                                   Agree  -0.053 
  (0.040) 
                                   Disagree  0.036 
  (0.037) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.064 
  (0.036)* 
Health status: Excellent  -0.367 
    (0.034)*** 
                       Very good  -0.214 
    (0.030)*** 
                       Fair  0.425 
  (0.054)*** 
                       Poor  1.054 
  (0.129)*** 
   
R2 0.760 0.763 
Note: N = 142,230. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A15: Full results for “Table 5 – Pregnancy” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model 
Boxed warning × pregnancy 0.384 0.366 
 (0.355) (0.356) 
Pregnancy 2.409 2.427 
 (0.242)*** (0.242)*** 
Married  0.031 
  (0.101) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  -0.010 
  (0.004)*** 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  0.000 
  (0.000)** 
Prescription drug insurance  0.138 
  (0.056)** 
Age: 15 to 24 years  0.146 
  (0.161) 
         25 to 34 years  0.081 
  (0.121) 
         45 to 54 years  -0.103 
  (0.113) 
         55 to 64 years  -0.152 
  (0.169) 
         65 years or older  -0.145 
  (0.236) 
Census region: South  0.091 
    (0.331) 
                         Midwest  0.129 
  (0.346) 
                         West  0.150 
  (0.352) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.012 
    (0.064) 
                                   Agree  -0.060 
  (0.039) 
                                   Disagree  0.013 
  (0.037) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.036 
  (0.036) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.300 
    (0.043)*** 
                       Very good  -0.160 
    (0.035)*** 
                       Fair  0.371 
  (0.060)*** 
                       Poor  0.965 
  (0.156)*** 
   
R2 0.768 0.770 
Note: N = 142,230. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A16: Full results for “Table 6 – Previous prescriptions” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × previous opioid prescription 0.009 0.009 0.009 
 (0.005)* (0.005)** (0.005)* 
Previous opioid prescription -0.009 -0.009 0.001 
 (0.004)** (0.004)** (0.004) 
Married  0.006 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.007) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  0.004 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  -0.001 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Prescription drug insurance  0.004 0.005 
  (0.002)* (0.003) 
Age: 14 years or younger  0.008 0.007 
    (0.008) (0.012) 
         15 to 24 years  0.002 -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.011) 
         25 to 34 years  0.001 0.001 
  (0.006) (0.008) 
         45 to 54 years  0.002 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.009) 
         55 to 64 years  0.007 0.013 
  (0.009) (0.013) 
         65 years or older  0.005 0.009 
  (0.012) (0.017) 
Census region: South  0.001 0.010 
    (0.010) (0.016) 
                         Midwest  -0.003 -0.001 
  (0.012) (0.020) 
                         West  0.004 0.022 
  (0.011) (0.015) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  -0.004 -0.006 
    (0.004) (0.007) 
                                   Agree  0.001 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.005) 
                                   Disagree  0.002 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.000 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.015 -0.016 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Very good  -0.008 -0.009 
    (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Fair  0.010 0.008 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
                       Poor  0.000 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
    
R2 0.490 0.491 0.633 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A17: Full results for “Table 6 – Fatality risk” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × fatality risk 0.001 0.001 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fatality risk -0.003 -0.002 -0.001 
 (0.002)* (0.002) (0.002) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  0.004 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  -0.001 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Prescription drug insurance  0.004 0.005 
  (0.002)* (0.003) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  0.000 0.001 
    (0.003) (0.004) 
                                   Agree  0.002 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
                                   Disagree  0.001 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.005) 
                                   Strongly disagree  -0.004 -0.006 
  (0.004) (0.007) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.015 -0.016 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Very good  -0.008 -0.009 
    (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Fair  0.010 0.008 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
                       Poor  0.000 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
    
R2 0.490 0.491 0.633 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. “Neutral” is the omitted riskiness 
response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A18: Full results for “Table 6 – Specifically targeted” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × specifically targeted -0.000 -0.000 0.002 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Specifically targeted 0.019 0.019 0.014 
 (0.004)*** (0.004)*** (0.005)*** 
Married  0.005 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.007) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  0.005 0.004 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Prescription drug insurance  0.004 0.005 
  (0.002)* (0.003) 
Age: 14 years or younger  0.009 0.007 
    (0.008) (0.012) 
         15 to 24 years  0.004 -0.002 
  (0.007) (0.011) 
         25 to 34 years  0.001 0.001 
  (0.006) (0.008) 
         45 to 54 years  0.002 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.009) 
         55 to 64 years  0.006 0.014 
  (0.009) (0.013) 
         65 years or older  0.004 0.009 
  (0.012) (0.017) 
Census region: South  0.001 0.010 
    (0.010) (0.016) 
                         Midwest  -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.012) (0.020) 
                         West  0.004 0.022 
  (0.011) (0.015) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  -0.004 -0.006 
    (0.004) (0.007) 
                                   Agree  0.001 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.005) 
                                   Disagree  0.002 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.000 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.015 -0.016 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Very good  -0.008 -0.009 
    (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Fair  0.010 0.008 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
                       Poor  0.000 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
    
R2 0.490 0.491 0.633 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A19: Full results for “Table 6 – Pregnancy” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × pregnancy 0.005 0.005 0.012 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.012) 
Pregnancy 0.027 0.027 0.022 
 (0.008)*** (0.008)*** (0.010)** 
Married  0.005 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.007) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  0.004 0.004 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  -0.001 -0.000 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Prescription drug insurance  0.004 0.005 
  (0.002)* (0.003) 
Age: 14 years or younger  0.008 0.007 
    (0.008) (0.012) 
         15 to 24 years  0.003 -0.002 
  (0.007) (0.011) 
         25 to 34 years  0.001 0.001 
  (0.006) (0.008) 
         45 to 54 years  0.002 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.009) 
         55 to 64 years  0.006 0.014 
  (0.009) (0.013) 
         65 years or older  0.005 0.009 
  (0.012) (0.017) 
Census region: South  0.000 0.010 
    (0.010) (0.016) 
                         Midwest  -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.012) (0.020) 
                         West  0.004 0.022 
  (0.011) (0.015) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  -0.004 -0.006 
    (0.004) (0.007) 
                                   Agree  0.001 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.005) 
                                   Disagree  0.002 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.000 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.015 -0.016 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Very good  -0.008 -0.009 
    (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Fair  0.010 0.008 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
                       Poor  0.000 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
    
R2 0.490 0.491 0.633 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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Table A20: Full results for “Table 6 – Children” model 
 
Variables Base model Covariate model Full model 
Boxed warning × child -0.001 -0.001 0.000 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.003) 
Child 0.005 0.005 -0.010 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.007) 
Married  0.006 0.004 
  (0.005) (0.007) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands)  0.004 0.003 
  (0.004) (0.005) 
Weekly wage ($ thousands) squared  -0.001 0.000 
  (0.001) (0.002) 
Prescription drug insurance  0.004 0.005 
  (0.002)* (0.003) 
Age: 14 years or younger  0.008 0.007 
    (0.008) (0.012) 
         15 to 24 years  0.003 -0.002 
  (0.008) (0.011) 
         25 to 34 years  0.001 0.001 
  (0.006) (0.008) 
         45 to 54 years  0.002 0.006 
  (0.007) (0.009) 
         55 to 64 years  0.006 0.014 
  (0.009) (0.013) 
         65 years or older  0.005 0.009 
  (0.012) (0.017) 
Census region: South  0.001 0.010 
    (0.010) (0.016) 
                         Midwest  -0.002 -0.001 
  (0.012) (0.020) 
                         West  0.004 0.022 
  (0.011) (0.015) 
Riskier than average: Strongly agree  -0.004 -0.006 
    (0.004) (0.007) 
                                   Agree  0.001 -0.003 
  (0.003) (0.005) 
                                   Disagree  0.002 0.003 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
                                   Strongly disagree  0.000 0.001 
  (0.003) (0.004) 
Health status: Excellent  -0.015 -0.016 
    (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Very good  -0.008 -0.009 
    (0.001)*** (0.002)*** 
                       Fair  0.010 0.008 
  (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
                       Poor  0.000 -0.002 
  (0.005) (0.006) 
    
R2 0.490 0.491 0.633 
Note: N = 2,000,734. Standard errors robust and clustered on respondent. The age group “35 to 44 years” is 
omitted, “northeast” is the omitted census region, “high school” is the omitted education category, “neutral” is the 
omitted riskiness response, and “good” is the omitted health status.  *** ! < 0.01, ** ! < 0.05, * ! < 0.10. 
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CHAPTER 3: THE EFFECT OF OPIOID ABUSE ON FATAL WORKPLACE INJURIES 
 
 
I. Introduction 
 Policy responses to the ongoing opioid epidemic have generally focused on making 
prescription opioids less available and abusable and on decreasing deaths from opioid overdoses. 
Examples include the naloxone access laws and opioid boxed warnings that the first two chapters 
of this dissertation studied, as well as prescription drug monitoring programs (Buchmueller and 
Carey 2017; Dave et al. 2017), abuse deterrent reformulations of prescription opioids (Alpert et 
al. 2016), and pain clinic regulations (Popovici et al. 2017). Overdose fatalities are the most 
widely discussed consequence of the opioid epidemic—from 2006 to 2016, more than 280,000 
individuals in the United States overdosed on opioids. The White House Council of Economic 
Advisers (2016) estimated that the economic costs attributable to overdose fatalities in 2015 
alone reached approximately $430 billion. But, focusing on overdose fatalities ignores the many 
other social costs of opioid abuse that researchers have identified, including increased health care 
costs (Johnston et al. 2016; Kirson et al. 2017), labor market effects, and criminal enforcement 
costs (Hansen et al. 2011).   
 In this chapter, I identify a category of collateral consequences to the opioid epidemic 
that remains unidentified in the literature: increases in fatal occupational injuries. Opioid use can 
impair individuals’ ability to perform fine motor tasks and operate machinery (Hegmann et al. 
2014); as a result, it is possible that rising opioid abuse increases workplace injury risks. In 
particularly dangerous industries and occupations opioid abuse could even increase the 
probability that workers suffer fatal injuries. If opioid abuse in a geographic area increases 
fatality rates from nominally unrelated causes such as worker fatalities, policymakers will 
underestimate the true cost of the epidemic. Moreover, policymakers could misdiagnose a spike 
in worker injuries and misallocate resources as a result.  
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 I estimate the effect of opioid abuse on fatal worker injuries using two-way fixed effects 
models and county-level vital statistics data. My ordinary least squares results demonstrate that 
counties with relatively higher rates of opioid overdoses exhibit higher rates of fatal worker 
injuries. A 1% increase in opioid overdose rates is associated with a 0.05% percent increase in 
worker injury rates. In other words, from 2006 to 2016 the opioid epidemic has been associated 
with approximately 2,827 excess worker fatalities. The effect is concentrated in rural and 
suburban areas with relatively higher pain medication overdose rates.   
 To ensure that simultaneity bias is not driving the positive relationship between fatal 
overdoses and fatal worker injuries, I augment my ordinary least squares models with 
instrumental variables (“IV”) estimates of the effect of overdoses on worker injuries. Opioid 
prescriptions are a common medical treatment for individuals who are injured at work (Bernacki 
et al. 2012), and a growing body of evidence suggests that prescriptions for acute injuries often 
result in a person using opioids long after the individual has recovered from the injury (Shah et 
al. 2017; Mierch et al. 2015). It is therefore plausible that opioid abuse is not increasing worker 
injuries, but rather, worker injuries are causing an increase in opioid overdoses as individuals 
receiving repeat opioid prescriptions for acute injuries become opioid dependent and begin 
misusing. To address potential endogeneity attributable to such reverse causation, I instrument 
for county-level opioid overdose rates using naloxone access laws and prescription drug 
monitoring program laws. These state policies influence opioid overdose rates and abuse rates 
but have no direct impact on the conditions that workers face in the workplace. Previous research 
demonstrates that after controlling for state and county characteristics, these policies are 
plausibly exogenous shocks to opioid overdose and use rates (Rees et al. 2019; Buchmueller and 
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Carey 2017).1 The IV models demonstrate that the opioid epidemic is fueling a sizeable increase 
in workplace fatalities—increases in opioid abuse yielding a 1% increase in overdose deaths 
result in a 0.31–0.46% increase in worker fatalities. As further evidence, I estimate IV models 
examining whether higher fatal worker injury rates cause higher opioid overdose rates, 
instrumenting for worker fatality rates using worker fatality rates in border counties. Border 
county fatal injury rates correlate with fatal injury rates in the county of interest because of 
shared industry and occupation characteristics. Neighbor county labor market characteristics 
have been applied as an instrument for county-of-interest characteristics in a variety of previous 
studies, such as the use of neighboring county unemployment rates in Mahershri and Winston 
(2016) and border county minimum wages in Dube et al. (2010). The second set of instrumental 
variables models provide no evidence of the reverse causal effects that motivated the IV models.   
 
II. Background 
 The most salient result of the opioid epidemic is the large number of overdose fatalities 
that have occurred in the United States in recent years. Figure 1 presents the evolution of opioid 
overdose fatality rates from 1999 to 2016 for the entire United States. Figure 1 demonstrates that 
opioid fatality rates grew every year from 1999 to 2016. In 2006, approximately 3.5 individuals 
died of an opioid overdose for every 100,000 individuals in the U.S. population. The amount 
steadily increased until 2013, when it began to sharply rise. The rate of overdose fatalities in 
2016 was approximately 16 fatalities per 100,000 individuals, more than quadruple the rate in 
1999.  
But, the staggering number of overdose fatalities is not the only consequence of opioid 
abuse. Researchers have identified several other categories of social costs attributable to opioid 
                                                        
1 Chapter 1, Appendix Table 1 and 2 provides further evidence that naloxone access laws are exogenous with respect 
to overdose deaths.  
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abuse, including increased health care costs, increased criminal enforcement costs, decreased 
labor force participation, and increased unemployment. Opioid users utilize more health care 
resources than non-users, including direct medical care and drug costs, as well as substance 
abuse treatment and additional public health research (Birnbaum et al. 2011; Kirson et al. 2017). 
Criminal enforcement costs arise because opioid abuse can be associated with illegal activity 
such as property damage and theft that requires the use of police and adjudicatory resources and 
results in incarceration of some users (Birnbaum et al. 2011; Florence et al. 2016). Labor market 
effects are extensive as well, including disability, lost wages, and premature death of workers 
(Birnbaum et al. 2011; Harris et al. 2018).   
These collateral consequences of the opioid epidemic are substantial. Birnbaum et al. 
(2011) estimated that the total social cost of opioid abuse, including each of the above 
components, was $61.5 billion in 2007. Florence et al. (2016) estimated that in 2013, opioid 
overdoses, abuse, and dependence cost the United States approximately $57 billion in economic 
costs not attributable to fatalities. The White House Council of Economic Advisers (2016) drew 
on Florence et al. (2016)’s estimate to calculate that the costs of opioid abuse not attributable to 
fatalities in 2015 reached $72.3 billion. This chapter contributes to the ongoing effort to 
catalogue the costs of opioid abuse by demonstrating that opioid abuse causes a significant 
increase in the rate of fatal worker injuries.  
Worker safety has been the subject of several other strands of the health and labor 
economics literature. National worker injury rates have followed a very different pattern from 
opioid overdose fatalities. Figure 2 presents the evolution of fatal worker injury rates in the 
United States from 1999 to 2016. In 1999, approximately 4.5 individuals per 100,000 workers 
suffered a fatal on-the-job injury per year. There was a sharp jump in 2001 as a result of the 
approximately 3,000 victims of the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001. Following 2001, the 
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rate of worker fatalities was relatively constant at the 1999 level until 2006. From 2006 to 2009, 
the rate of fatal worker injuries fell by approximately 25% to 3.6 fatalities per 100,000 workers. 
The rate plateaued in 2009; while the cause is not clear, it is noteworthy that the change occurred 
as the Great Recession began. The rate remained relatively steady until 2015 and showed a small 
but significant increase from 2015 to 2016. 
The most salient determinant of workplace safety is the nature of the workplace that an 
individual works in; in particular, workplace fatality rates are strongly associated with industry 
and occupation. For example, the rate of fatal on-the-job injuries for mining machine operators is 
more than ten times as large as manufacturing executives and managers (Viscusi 2004). A 
variety of demographic characteristics correlate with worker safety, including race, union 
membership, immigration status, and whether an individual is a smoker (Leeth and Ruser 2003; 
Viscusi and Hersch 2008; Viscusi and Hersch 2010). Worker injuries may be positively 
correlated with macroeconomic conditions, though evidence of this may be a function of 
increased reporting of worker injuries when the economy is thriving (Farris 1998; Boone et al. 
2011). This chapter demonstrates that opioid abuse is an additional determinant of workplace 
safety that remains overlooked in the literature.  
 
III. Methods 
 
 A. Data Sources 
This chapter demonstrates that opioid abuse most likely causes an increase in worker 
fatalities, rather than worker injuries causing more opioid overdoses. As such, the key variables 
in this project are measures of opioid overdoses and worker fatal injuries, which I draw from the 
National Vital Statistics System’s (“NVSS”) multiple cause of death all county micro data files. 
The data contain detailed information on each individual death certificate issued in the United 
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States, including the decedent’s date of death, the location of death at the state and county level, 
the decedent’s education, sex, race, age, and marital status, whether the decedent died of an 
injury at work, and the decedent’s causes of death indexed by International Classification of 
Diseases (Tenth Revision) (“ICD-10”) code. The ICD-10 coding system is the standard method 
for classifying causes of death in U.S. government data (CDC 2018). As in Chapter 1, I count 
fatalities based on the county an individual died in, rather than their county of residence.2 My 
sample utilizes NVSS data covering the period from 2006–2016.  
From the fatality counts in the vital statistics data, I construct monthly counts of fatalities 
due to any opioid; additionally, I disaggregate the data into non-mutually exclusive counts of 
fatalities associated with heroin, pain medications, synthetic opioids, and other opioids.3 I also 
construct a count of the quantity of individuals who died of a work-related injury. The work-
related injury classification is separate from the ICD-10 cause of death; all injuries that occur 
while an individual is on the job that result in death are classified as a work injury fatality. I 
transform all fatality counts into monthly fatality rates. For opioid fatalities, I calculate fatalities 
rates per 100,000 county residents by dividing each count by the population of the relevant 
county and multiplying by 100,000. For fatal work injuries, I analogously calculate fatalities per 
100,000 individuals employed in a county. The monthly rates of fatal work injuries constitute the 
primary dependent variables in my analyses that follow, while the opioid overdose fatality rates 
are my primary explanatory variable of interest.  
                                                        
2 The vast majority of overdose fatalities (86%) occur in the decedent’s county of residence. I use the county of 
death in this research because it is likely a better measure of where opioid use is occurring, which will likely relate 
more strongly to additional risks from opioid abuse at work.  
3 The ICD-10 codes associated with fatal overdoses from opiates are T40.0 (opium), T40.1 (heroin), T40.2 (other 
opioids), T40.3 (methadone), T40.4 (other synthetic narcotics), and T40.6 (other/unspecified narcotics). I classify 
any fatality with an ICD-10 code of T40.2 and T40.3 as pain medication fatalities, T40.4 deaths are classified as 
synthetic opioid fatalities, and T40.6 are classified as other opioid fatalities. This classification scheme is consistent 
with other work documenting opioid fatalities (Rudd et al. 2016).  
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The fatal occupational injury data in the NVSS is often subject to measurement error, but 
I mitigate such measurement error to the extent possible using the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ 
Census of Fatal Occupational Injuries (“CFOI”). Because the NVSS data are coded using death 
certificates and not all certifiers record whether a fatality occurred as a result of an occupational 
injury, approximately 80% of the observations in the data are missing an entry for whether an 
individual died of an occupational fatality. Cross-referencing with the Census of Fatal 
Occupational Injuries, a full census of all individuals who died of occupational injuries, 
demonstrates that the Vital Statistics data accurately identify approximately 90% of occupational 
fatalities within states. For the individuals for whom data is missing, I use publicly available 
state level data from the CFOI to identify the residual probability that each fatality marked as 
“unknown” actually occurred on the job.4 I impute these probabilities when I construct worker 
fatality counts and rates to reduce the measurement error in my worker fatality data.  
I combine the vital statistics data with several other data sources containing state and 
county time-variant characteristics. I gather data on county-level macroeconomic characteristics 
from the Bureau of Labor Statistics’ Quarterly Census of Employment and Wages. The Quarterly 
Census on Employment and Wages publishes quarterly reports on employment and wages at the 
county level. Controlling for local macroeconomic conditions is important given that several 
papers have demonstrated that substance abuse is positively associated with macroeconomic 
conditions (Carpenter et al. 2017), although opioid-specific studies have found the opposite 
effect (Hollingsworth et al. 2017). I use county-level demographic information from the Census 
                                                        
4 The difference between the CFOI fatality count and the NVSS data for a given state and year provides the quantity 
of “residual” workplace fatalities that the NVSS data fail to identify. I estimate the quantity of unknown fatalities in 
a county and month that are actually workplace fatalities as the number of unknown fatalities in the relevant county 
and month divided by the annual unknown fatalities in the relevant state, multiplied by the number of residual 
fatalities in the state.  
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Bureau, including county population, the percentage of the county population that is white, and 
the average age of county residents.  
I also draw on the National Provider Identifier (“NPI”) database to construct counts of 
various medical providers and facilities at the county level from 2006 to 2016. The availability of 
medical services is plausibly associated with both fatal worker injuries as well as opioid 
overdoses. For example, Bertoli and Grembi (2017) demonstrated greater distances to the nearest 
hospital increases car accident fatality rates. Similarly, quick access to emergency medical care 
can increase the probability that an individual who is injured at work or who is overdosing 
survives. All medical providers who are required to comply with the Health Insurance Portability 
and Accountability Act of 1996 (more commonly referred to by its acronym, “HIPAA”) or who 
bill Medicare for services must obtain an NPI. The information associated with any given NPI is 
publicly available in the National Plan and Provider Enumeration System’s NPI Registry. The 
NPI Registry provides the taxonomy of the provider as well as the provider’s street address. I 
collapse the NPI registry’s data into a count of pharmacies, hospitals, and emergency medical 
technicians in each county in the United States for each month that my data cover. The NPI data 
will not capture every such medical provider or facility, as some may choose not to accept 
Medicare. EMTs are relatively more likely to be undercounted in the data as they will not 
generally be required to register individually. To better capture how many first responders are 
available to respond to either a fatal workplace injury or an overdose, I also gather an annual 
count of the amount of police officers in each county in the United States from the 2006 to 2016 
FBI Crime in the United States Publications. 
Finally, I gather data on several state statutes that are relevant to opioid overdose 
fatalities. I gather information on whether each state in my data had a naloxone access law, a 
medical marijuana law permitting marijuana to be dispensed to treat pain, a recreational 
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marijuana law, any prescription drug monitoring program, (“PDMP”) and whether prescribers 
are required to access the PDMP before prescribing. Information on each of these statutes are 
from the Prescription Drug Abuse Policy System’s database. PDMPs require or permit 
dispensers to record prescriptions of controlled substances in a database that medical providers 
can access (Paulozzi et al. 2011). Such programs provide more information to clinicians, 
enabling them to provide better care. State PDMPs have been an effective tool in reducing 
concurrent opioid prescriptions (Griggs 2015; Johnson et al. 2014). Some studies have found that 
medical marijuana laws are associated with opioid fatalities, although the results are inconclusive 
and have varied greatly depending on the exact provisions in such statutes (Buchmueller and 
Carey 2018; Powell et al. 2018).  
Table 1 provides summary statistics for each of the variables I utilize in this chapter. The 
average county exhibits an opioid fatality rate of 0.82 fatal overdoses from any opioid per 
100,000 residents per month, just under 10 fatalities per 100,000 residents annually. The average 
rates mask a large amount of county-level heterogeneity; counties at the 95th percentile exhibited 
2.9 fatalities per 100,000 county residents per month, while the majority of county-months in my 
sample actually exhibited no overdose fatalities.5 The average rate of opioid overdoses exceeds 
the rate of fatal worker injuries.6 In the average county, 0.37 workers per 100,000 workers per 
month experience a fatal injury on the job—about 4.4 workers annually per 100,000 individuals 
employed. Like the overdose rates, individual counties differed substantially from the mean rate. 
County-months at the 95th percentile exhibited 1.2 fatal worker injuries per 100,000 individuals 
                                                        
5 Of the 414,498 county-months included in my analysis, 319,602 exhibited 0 opioid overdose fatalities. After 
weighting each county-month by its population as I do in my regression analysis, the 0 overdose counties account 
for 34.1% of the weighted observations. 
6 The number of opioid overdose fatalities exceeds the number of worker fatalities in 79.9% of county-months 
exhibiting at least one opioid overdose fatality or worker fatality.  
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employed in the county, and most county-months exhibited no workplace fatalities.7 The mean 
weekly wage in the average county is $890 and the average age is 38 years old. When weighting 
by county population, the average county has an employment-to-population ratio of 0.50, though 
the unweighted average is substantially smaller at 0.35, indicating that high-population areas 
exhibit better macroeconomic conditions generally across the U.S.  
 
B. Empirical Methodology 
I estimate the relationship between fatal opioid overdoses and fatal injuries using a two-
way fixed effects model and ordinary least squares.8 My initial empirical specification regresses 
the rate of fatal worker injuries, VcL, on the rate of fatal opioid overdoses, GcL, and county opioid 
prescriptions per capita, J(cL.	The estimating equation is as follows, where 4 indexes counties 
and F indexes months:  
 VcL = N + PQGcL + PSJ(cL + YcLP + dc + [L + UcL (1) 
The vector of variables YcL includes the mean weekly wage in the county, the employment to 
population ratio, the county population, the percent of the population which is white, the average 
age in the county, the number of pharmacies, hospitals, and EMTs per 1,000 residents in the 
county, and the number of police officers per 1,000 county residents. The final variables, dc and [L are fixed effects for each county and month in my sample. Including these fixed effects 
controls for time-invariant characteristics of counties or time that may be correlated with opioid 
fatalities, such as national macroeconomic trends or the rural character of a county. 
                                                        
7 Before adding the residual fatality probability to each county-month as described in footnote 30, 378,989 of 
414,498 county-months exhibited no worker fatalities. After weighting each county-month by its population as I do 
in my regression analysis, the zero worker fatality county-months account for 68.0 % of the weighted observations. 
In the instrumental variable models of Section V, 311,838 county-months had no worker fatalities in neighboring 
counties. After weighting each observation by its population, the zero border fatality county-months account for 
57.6% of the weighted observations.  
8 I utilize the reghdfe Stata package to perform the ordinary least squares estimation, as it is dramatically faster than 
the default package in Stata (Correia 2017). 
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 Upon first glance, measuring the relationship between opioid abuse and job 
dangerousness using fatality rates may seem peculiar. Generally, if an individual is fatally 
injured at work they did not fatally overdose on opioids (and the reverse is true as well).9 Opioid 
fatality rates serve as a proxy for underlying opioid abuse, though it is a noisy measure in 
circumstances where increases in opioid abuse do not increase fatal opioid overdoses. Including 
county-level prescription rates in equation 1 controls for some, but not all, of the opioid use that 
would lead to a divergence between opioid fatality rates and opioid abuse rates.  
Fatal occupational injury rates similarly measure general job dangerousness. Fatal 
occupational injuries are strongly correlated with non-fatal injuries and are routinely used to 
measure job risks (Viscusi 2004; Viscusi and Gentry 2015). Fatal injury rates are easier to 
measure than non-fatal injury rates; ambiguity in injury rates can arise when individuals have 
different thresholds at which they consider a non-fatal workplace injury serious enough to report. 
Non-fatal injury data mask substantial heterogeneity in the nature of injuries that they count. 
Moreover, government data sources on non-fatal workplace injuries are substantially less 
complete10 and reliable than comparable fatal worker injury data (Rappin et al. 2016). As a 
result, workplace fatality rates are more appropriately viewed as a proxy for general job 
dangerousness in a county rather than only measuring the worker fatalities. However, this 
measure will fail to capture any increases in job place risks that opioid abuse causes which does 
not correlate with increases in fatal injuries. My empirical estimates will fail to identify the total 
effect of opioid abuse on worker injuries if, for example, individuals who abuse opioids in very 
safe jobs have increased nonfatal injury risks, but not increased fatal injury risks. As a result, my 
                                                        
9 It is theoretically possible, though quite unlikely, that a given individual could suffer a fatal workplace injury for 
which an opioid overdose is a cause of death. For example, an individual at work could fall upon the onset of an 
overdose and sustain a fatal injury as a result of the fall. Such niche cases are not my focus here.  
10 The Survey of Occupational Injuries and Illnesses from the Bureau of Labor Statistics provides data from only 41 
states and Washington, D.C. at the state-year level, unlike the fatality data I use here which is at the county-month 
level.  
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estimates should be considered a lower bound on the aggregate effect of opioid abuse on worker 
injuries. 
Additionally, my data do not provide good measures of the availability of products that 
may be opioid substitutes, such as marijuana. Like opioids, marijuana is used both medically to 
treat pain and used nonmedically (Ilgen et al. 2013). As a result, opioids and marijuana may be 
substitutes for opioid users, though the probability of substitution will likely be lower among 
individuals who are opioid-dependent. Some drugs, such as benzodiazepines, may be opioid 
complements (Ladapo et al. 2018), at least in the sense that changes in opioid overdose fatalities 
are positively correlated with prescriptions or changes in deaths associated with such drugs. If 
marijuana or other non-opioid drugs are substitutes for opioids and affect the probability of 
injury at work (and at least some studies have found an association between marijuana use and 
workplace injuries (Ramchan et al. 2009), their omission from the ordinary least squares model 
in equation 1 will bias the estimate of the relationship between opioid overdoses and worker 
fatality rates. If a drug is a substitute of opioids and increases the rate of worker injuries, then the 
results will be biased downward so that my estimate is a lower bound on the actual relationship 
between opioid overdoses and workplace fatalities. If a drug is an opioid compliment and 
increases the rate of worker injuries, then the results from equation 1 will be biased upwards.11  
 
IV. Ordinary Least Squares Estimates 
 Table 2 provides the results of estimating equation 1 on my sample. The dependent 
variable is fatal worker injuries per 100,000 employees in a county. The first column corresponds 
to the standard two-way fixed effects model. Column 2 augments the model with state-specific 
time trends and column 3 augments the model with county-specific time trends. The results 
                                                        
11 Further, because the passage of state level opioid policies should be unrelated to the use and abuse of opioid 
substitutes or compliments, the IV estimates using state laws in Section V should reduce any potential bias 
attributable to substitutes.  
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indicate that higher opioid fatality rates in a county are associated with higher worker fatality 
rates. A one-unit increase in opioid fatalities per 100,000 residents gives rise to a 0.02 unit 
increase in the worker fatality rate per 100,000 workers. In other words, fatal opioid overdoses 
are associated with an average of approximately 206 excess worker fatalities per year, or 2,827 
total fatalities from 2006 to 2016. Expressed as an elasticity, a 1% increase in fatal opioid 
overdose rates is associated with a 0.05% increase in worker fatal injury rates. The estimate is 
remarkably stable across the three models, with a range of 0.020–0.021. An increase in opioid 
prescriptions per capita has a statistically significant effect only in the base model. On balance, 
the results indicate that the increase in worker fatality rates is due to increases in opioid abuse 
rather than increases in medical use of opioid prescriptions.  
 The other effects in Table 2 are generally consistent with expectations and previous 
research. The coefficients on mean weekly wages and employment-to-population ratios 
demonstrate that worker fatalities increase as macroeconomic conditions improve. The 
coefficient on population is significant and positive in the model with county-specific time 
trends, suggesting that increases in population marginally increase the worker fatality rate. 
Pharmacies are associated with a lower worker fatality rate and hospitals are associated with a 
higher worker fatality rate, consistent with hospitals self-sorting into health care markets with 
higher injury rates or possibly being more-dangerous-than-average workplaces (OSHA 2013). 
The remaining variables do not have a significant or consistent effect on the fatal worker injury 
rate. 
 It is plausible that there are differences in the relationship between opioid fatality rates 
and worker injury rates by opioid type, as there may be substantial demographic differences by 
type of opioid used. Individuals who work in more dangerous jobs may be more willing to 
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tolerate risk and therefore use riskier opioids when they choose to do so.12 Alternatively, such 
users may be risk averse, as dangerous jobs are often lower-paying blue-collar jobs that may 
leave workers less able to weather financial shocks. Heroin users are more likely to be male, 
nonwhite, and young (Jones et al. 2015), while individuals receiving prescription opioids are 
more likely to be female, white, and older.13  
Table 3 re-estimates equation 1, replacing the unitary opioid fatality rate with four rates: 
the heroin, pain medication, synthetic opioids, and other opioids fatality rates. The estimates in 
Table 3 indicate that the increase in worker fatalities associated with opioid abuse is most 
strongly related to pain medication abuse, rather than heroin, synthetic, or other opioids.14 The 
coefficient on the heroin rate is not statistically significant in any of the models. The pain 
medication rate coefficient is significant at the five percent level in all three models. The point 
estimate is 80% as large as the any opioid estimate from Table 2. The coefficients for the 
synthetic opioid rates and other opioid rates are significant at the ten percent level in the base 
model, but not the models that include state or county specific time trends.  
The results here contrast starkly with the results in chapter 2 indicating that individuals 
who receive pain medication prescriptions are less likely to overdose. The significant effect on 
the pain medication rate would be consistent with such users exposing themselves to greater 
workplace risks as a result of their use. However, individuals who use counterfeit pain 
medications or purchase pain medications from illicit sources could also be driving the effect, 
and my data do not enable me to disentangle these possibilities. Nevertheless, the effects suggest 
that reducing employee use of pain medication opioids is likely to decrease the fatal risk 
identified in Tables 2 and 3.  
                                                        
12 But see Chapter 2, Table 2, indicating no relationship between self-assessed riskiness and opioid prescriptions. 
13 See chapter 2, Table 2.  
14 Because overdose fatalities by drug type are not mutually exclusive, some fatalities are included in multiple rates. 
Approximately 15% of opioid overdose fatalities in the NVSS data involved more than one opioid type. 
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Finally, Table 4 investigates whether there are substantial differences in the relationship 
between opioid abuse and worker injuries by county urbanization. While urban counties have the 
highest average rate of fatal opioid overdoses, rural counties constitute a disproportionate 
amount of the right tail of the distribution of fatality rates. Moreover, a disproportionate number 
of counties with the highest rates of opioid prescribing are rural, which Table 2’s results indicate 
are a key factor behind the relationship between opioid overdoses and worker fatal injury rates. 
Combined with the fact that rural counties and suburban counties have significantly larger 
worker fatality rates than urban counties (0.63 and 0.38 fatalities per 100,000 workers versus 
0.26 fatalities per 100,000 workers), it is plausible that worker fatalities are more likely to 
manifest as a consequence of the opioid epidemic in rural and suburban areas.  
 Table 4 breaks the sample into three subsamples: rural counties, suburban counties, and 
urban counties.15 Each entry in the table corresponds to the estimated coefficient of the opioid 
overdose fatality rate for a different regression. As with Tables 2 and 3, the three columns of 
Table 4 correspond to a base model, a model including state time trends, and a model including 
county time trends. The first row corresponds to regressions ran on my rural county subsample, 
the second row corresponds to suburban counties, and the third row corresponds to urban 
counties. Table 4 demonstrates that the effects from Tables 2 and 3 occur predominantly in rural 
and suburban counties. A one unit increase in the opioid overdose fatality rate is significantly (at 
the ten percent level) associated with 0.03 more worker fatalities per 100,000 employees in a 
county. In suburban counties the effect is significant at the one percent level; the effect is smaller 
(by 0.01–0.02 fatalities per 100,000 individuals), but more precisely estimated. The estimate is 
significant in the urban county subsample only in the base model.  
                                                        
15 I adapt the National Council of Health Statistics (“NCHS”) Urban-Rural Classification scheme for this analysis. I 
classify a county as urban if the NCHS classification of a county is “Large central metro” or “Large fringe metro.” I 
classify a county as suburban if the NCHS classification of a county is “Medium metro” or “Small metro.” Finally, I 
classify a county as rural if the NCHS classification is “Micropolitan” or “Noncore.”  
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V. Instrumental Variables Estimates 
 
A. Instruments and First Stage Results 
 It is possible that the OLS estimates in Section 3 suffer from simultaneity bias. Injured 
workers may receive prescription opioids, which may lead to such workers abusing opioids, 
possibly increasing the fatal opioid overdose rate in a county. Alternatively, individuals who 
abuse opioids may have different risk preferences and sort into riskier jobs. Previous research 
has demonstrated that individuals who smoke sort into more dangerous jobs (Viscusi and Hersch 
2008); opioid users could resemble smokers in this regard.16 The model in equation (1) could 
therefore be written with opioid overdose rates and prescriptions as the dependent variables, as in 
the following equations:  
 GcL = N + PQ ∗ VcL + YcLP + dc + [L + UcL (2) 
 J(cL = N + PQ ∗ VcL + YcLP + dc + [L + UcL (3) 
I will address potential simultaneity using instrumental variables estimation. Instrumental 
variables estimation requires identifying an instrument that is (1) relevant (i.e., correlates 
sufficiently with the endogenous explanatory variable of interest), and (2) excludable (i.e, 
uncorrelated with the dependent variable except though its relationship with the endogenous 
explanatory variable) (Angrist and Pischke 2009). The instruments I use for fatal worker injury 
rates are the rate of fatal worker injuries in all neighboring counties. The instruments I use for 
opioid fatality rates are naloxone access laws and prescription drug monitoring program policies. 
Figure 3 provides a graphic illustration of the instrumental variables model. 
                                                        
16 The estimates in Table 2 of chapter 2 suggest that this is unlikely, as there is little relationship between self-
assessed riskiness and the probability of receiving an opioid prescription.  
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Neighboring county fatal worker injury rates are relevant and excludable instruments. 
The first stage results are detailed in Appendix Table A1. The estimates demonstrate that border 
county worker fatality rates are a strong instrument for worker fatality rates in the county of 
interest. The exclusion restriction will be satisfied as long as border county worker fatality rates 
are not directly related to opioid fatality rates in the county of interest. While no statistical test 
exists that can directly demonstrate whether the exclusion restriction is met, the data yield 
evidence that apparent mechanisms that would threaten the validity of the instrument do not 
exist. 
 One mechanism that could cause a violation of the exclusion restriction would be for 
individuals to commute across county lines to acquire and abuse opioids, but not to work. If 
opioid commuting is unrelated to the worker fatality rate, then it would suggest that this 
mechanism does not threaten the validity of my instrument. To test this relationship, I measure 
opioid commuting as the percent of overdose deaths in a county that represent deaths of 
individuals who live in another county. Regressing either the worker fatality rate or the worker 
fatality rate in neighboring counties on this measure of opioid commuting, controlling for county 
and time fixed effects, the coefficient on opioid commuting is statistically insignificant with ! >0.75.	 
Another mechanism would be for social networks among opioid users to stretch across 
counties, so that individuals who use opioids in a given county may cause individuals to use 
opioids in a neighboring county. This is particularly plausible given that communities are often 
not segregated across county lines. Particularly in rural counties, individuals frequently travel 
across county lines to socialize or work. Social networks are unlikely to threaten the validity of 
my instrument here, however. Previous research suggests that social networks will be a primary 
method of opioid distribution in isolated and rural communities (Runyon 2017). Such isolated 
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and rural communities are the communities where border county fatalities rates are not likely to 
provide identification in regressions using the border-county instrument because their labor 
markets will likely be relatively less similar to the labor markets in neighboring counties than in 
less rural areas. Finally, even if the instrument is not perfectly exogenous, because the border 
county instrument is strong, any residual bias will likely be in the same direction as ordinary 
least squares and smaller in magnitude, so that the results would be biased in the direction of the 
OLS estimate though smaller in magnitude.  
State laws regulating naloxone access and prescription drug monitoring programs 
(“PDMPs”) are likewise relevant and excludable instruments for opioid overdose rates. The first 
stage results for my instrumental variables estimation are detailed in Appendix Table A2 and 
demonstrate that naloxone access laws combined with PDMP laws are relevant instruments for 
fatal opioid overdose rates and opioid prescription levels. There is no direct mechanism by which 
naloxone access could affect worker fatality rates, as standalone naloxone products are only 
useful for reversing an ongoing opioid overdose. Moreover, as demonstrated in the Technical 
Appendix to Chapter 1, the adoption of a naloxone access law is exogenous with respect to 
overdose fatalities. As a result, worker fatality rates cannot have some attenuated effect on the 
adoption of a naloxone access law, even if such rates have a reverse causal effect on overdose 
rates themselves. Likewise, prescription drug monitoring programs and laws requiring 
prescribers to consult them do not affect labor markets directly but rather change the probability 
that an individual is able to acquire prescription opioids or other controlled substances.   
Using naloxone access laws and prescription drug monitoring programs as an instrument 
presents one unique challenge, however. If these policies only affect the probability that an 
individual suffers an opioid overdose without affecting the extent to which individuals use or 
abuse opioids, the statutes would not be appropriate instruments. In this case, naloxone access 
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would merely change the probability an individual dies conditional on an overdose, without 
changing the probability that the population of employed individuals will be injured on the job. 
As a result, it is necessary to demonstrate that naloxone access laws not only affect opioid 
overdose rates but also opioid use rates themselves. Appendix Table A2 demonstrates that these 
laws are strong instruments for opioid prescribing rates as well as fatality rates alone.  
 
B. Instrumental Variable Results 
Table 5 presents my IV estimates examining whether simultaneity bias exists in the 
relationship between opioid use and overdose rates and fatal worker injuries. Columns 1, 2, and 3 
estimate the effect of job dangerousness on overdose fatality rates, while columns 4, 5, and 6 
estimate the effect of job dangerousness on opioid prescribing rates. These estimates directly test 
for whether simultaneity bias exists in the results from Tables 2, 3, and 4. Columns 1 and 4 
correspond to the base models, columns 2 and 5 include state-specific time trends, and columns 3 
and 6 augment the previous models with county-specific time trends. 
The results in Table 5 demonstrate that increases in fatal worker injuries have no 
statistically significant relationship with opioid overdoses or prescriptions. Across all six models, 
the estimated coefficient on the instrumented worker fatality rate is small and insignificant. It is 
somewhat counterintuitive that job dangerousness does not increase opioid prescriptions per 
capita. The results suggest that increases in job dangerousness do not increase opioid 
prescriptions after controlling for fixed geographic characteristics and general time trends. In 
particular, prescribers nationwide have become more reluctant to prescribe opioids for injuries in 
recent years.17 The national time trends combined with the null result in columns 4, 5, and 6 
indicate that the relationship between acute worker injuries and opioid prescriptions may be 
                                                        
17 The month fixed effects in columns 4, 5, and 6 indicate that nationwide opioid prescription rates decreased in 
2015 and 2016, after controlling for all other variables in the model. 
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weakening. Table 5’s results indicate that simultaneity bias is not likely a large concern in the 
OLS estimates from Tables 2, 3, and 4. Another explanation which cannot be ruled out is that 
border county worker fatality rates may have been too weak or too inadequate of an instrument 
to identify any effect if one existed. While the instrument plausibly provides exogenous variation 
sufficient to identify an effect, it remains possible that the instrument itself is faulty. 
Table 6 provides my IV estimates of the relationship of opioid overdose rates with 
worker fatalities. Columns 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the base model, the model including state 
time trends, and the model including county time trends. The results are entirely consistent with 
the ordinary least squares results above: increases in the opioid overdose fatality rate yield 
increases in the fatal worker injury rate. However, the IV estimates are substantially larger than 
the OLS estimates. The opioid fatality rate coefficients indicate that an increase in the fatal 
opioid overdose rate of 1 per 100,000 individuals increases the worker fatal injury rate by 0.139–
0.185 fatalities per 100,000 employees. In other words, an increase in opioid abuse that causes a 
1% increase in the fatal opioid overdose rate is associated with a 0.30–0.41% increase in fatal 
work injuries. Put more concretely, the IV estimates indicate that the nationwide increase in fatal 
overdose rates from 2014 to 2015 led to an additional 307 worker fatalities relative to 2014.   
Because Table 5 demonstrated no evidence that worker injuries are fueling opioid abuse, the 
smaller OLS estimates in Table 2 are likely preferable to the estimates here. The reason for the 
substantially larger estimates is likely two-fold. First, IV estimation is less efficient than ordinary 
least squares, and the higher estimate may be a function of the larger variance of the estimator. 
Second, the F-test for instrument strength indicates that even though naloxone access and 
prescription drug monitoring program legal provisions are sufficient to predict opioid fatalities or 
opioid prescriptions, they are weak instruments for predicting both simultaneously. As a result, 
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the estimates may suffer from a positive weak instrument bias, which pushes the estimates 
upward.  
 
VI. Conclusion 
 The analysis in this chapter provides evidence that opioid abuse has substantially 
increased risks that workers in the United States face. Between 2006 and 2016, opioid abuse was 
associated with at least 2,800 excess worker fatalities. In 2016, approximately 8% of the 5,313 
worker fatalities were likely related to opioid abuse. Identifying this new source of fatalities 
attributable to the opioid epidemic is the primary contribution of this chapter. This research adds 
to the mounting evidence that the impacts of the opioid epidemic stretch into labor markets in 
addition to increasing overdoses and drug use.  
 My results do not provide any evidence that dangerous jobs are currently fueling the 
opioid epidemic, however. The IV estimates provide no evidence that geographic concentration 
of worker injuries causes an increase in worker fatalities or opioid prescriptions per capita, at 
least in the years that my data cover. These findings could be because individuals who are 
injured on the job rarely begin abusing opioids in a manner that exposes them to higher risks of 
opioid overdose, even if such individuals do use opioids repeatedly. This would be consistent 
with my findings in chapter 2, which demonstrate that sizeable decreases in the probability of 
opioid prescriptions to repeat opioid users have no effect on the opioid overdose fatality rate.  
 The results here indicate that collateral policy responses by occupational safety agencies 
may be appropriate in addition to the policy responses that state and federal governments have 
taken so far to reduce fatalities from the opioid epidemic. The Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration (“OSHA”) and its state-level counterparts have wide discretion to set 
enforcement priorities and implement strategic safety programs. Guidance from OSHA indicates 
that the agency focuses its inspection resources, in order of importance, in workplaces that: (1) 
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present imminent danger situations, (2) report a severe injury and illness, (3) are subject to 
worker complaints, (4) are referred from other agencies or the media, (5) are historically high-
hazard industries or employers, and (6) require follow-up inspections to ensure compliance with 
an order of abatement (OSHA 2016). Federal law empowers the agency to shift these priorities 
as workplace risks evolve over time.18 Under this authority, OSHA has previously established 
alliances with other federal agencies and private organizations to decrease methamphetamine 
abuse in the workplace and promote drug-free work environments (OSHA 2008). Prioritizing 
and increasing inspections in counties with particularly large concentrations of opioid overdoses 
could stem the flow of worker fatalities attributable to opioids. This policy shift has the added 
advantage of mitigating the impact of worker injuries on opioid use and abuse if such effects 
truly exist and the model presented here merely failed to identify them.  
 More broadly, the results indicate that individuals who medically use prescription opioids 
to treat acute injuries are not the individuals who are fueling the dramatic increase in overdose 
deaths that has occurred in recent years. Even though abuse of medications (or illicit substances 
containing the same compounds) drive the increased worker injury rate, there is no evidence that 
increases in job injuries increase overdoses. Efficient opioid policy must shift away from its 
laser-like focus on prescription supply toward reducing the availability of and the demand for 
these illicit drugs. Particularly because these drugs function as substitutes for one another, 
without a cohesive strategy for reducing fatalities from all opioids, policy efforts are likely to 
merely shift users from one drug to another rather than cause meaningful change.   
                                                        
18 See Industrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607 (1980), which recognizes that 29 
U.S.C. § 655(g) requires the Secretary of Labor, acting through OSHA, to establish priorities in setting occupational 
safety standards that address more serious risks first, taking into account the benefits and costs of various priorities.  
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Figures 
 
Figure 1: Opioid fatal overdose rates over time 
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Figure 2: Worker fatal injury rates over time 
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Figure 3: Graphic representation of the instrumental variable model  
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary statistics 
 
Variables Mean Median Standard deviation 
Opioid overdose fatalities per 100,000 individuals 0.815 0.486 1.174 
Fatal worker injuries per 100,000 employees 0.369 0.067 1.984 
    
County characteristics:    
 Opioid prescriptions per capita 0.870 0.814 0.476 
 Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.892 0.849 0.212 
 Employment to population ratio 0.498 0.413 0.434 
 Population (hundreds of thousands) 4.235 3.072 3.710 
 White population (%) 0.769 0.834 0.204 
 Mean age 38.101 37.901 2.964 
 Pharmacies 1.126 0.190 5.369 
 Hospitals 0.249 0.060 0.539 
 EMTs per 1,000 residents 0.006 0.002 0.025 
 Police per 1,000 residents 0.819 0.614 0.950 
    
 Opioid policies:    
 Naloxone provider legal immunity 0.157 0.000 0.364 
 Naloxone administrator legal immunity 0.200 0.000 0.400 
 Third party naloxone prescribing  0.202 0.000 0.401 
 No patient-specific naloxone prescription req’t 0.167 0.000 0.373 
 PDMP 0.883 1.000 0.321 
 Must access PDMP 0.086 0.000 0.281 
 Medical marijuana 0.147 0.000 0.354 
 Recreational marijuana 0.013 0.000 0.114 
    
Note: N = 414,498. Observations are at the county-month level. Summary statistics are weighted by county 
population.  
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Table 2: OLS estimates of the effect of opioid abuse on worker fatal injury rates 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Opioid fatality rate 0.021 0.020 0.020 
 (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.009)** 
Opioid prescriptions per capita 0.064 0.025 -0.016 
 (0.031)** (0.034) (0.047) 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.121 0.129 0.118 
 (0.041)*** (0.042)*** (0.039)*** 
Employment to population ratio -0.069 -0.124 0.021 
 (0.052) (0.057)** (0.065) 
Population (hundreds of thousands) 0.007 -0.002 0.045 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.019)** 
White population (%) -0.275 -0.265 -0.416 
 (0.208) (0.212) (0.403) 
Mean age 0.006 0.005 -0.003 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Pharmacies -0.001 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)*** 
Hospitals -0.006 -0.023 0.071 
 (0.012) (0.012)* (0.034)** 
Pain clinics -0.059 -0.034 -0.222 
 (0.098) (0.080) (0.174) 
EMTs per 1,000 residents 0.023 0.040 -0.059 
 (0.168) (0.167) (0.315) 
    
State specific time trends  X X 
County specific time trends   X 
Note: N = 414,498. Dependent variable is fatal worker injuries per 100,000 workers. Standard errors robust and 
clustered on county. All regressions include county and month-by-year fixed effects and are weighted by county 
population.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 3: OLS estimates of fatal worker injuries by opioid type 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Heroin fatality rate 0.003 -0.000 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.006) 
Pain medication fatality rate 0.016 0.017 0.017 
 (0.008)** (0.008)** (0.008)** 
Synthetic opioids fatality rate 0.010 0.007 0.008 
 (0.005)* (0.006) (0.006) 
Other opioids fatality rate 0.016 0.015 0.011 
 (0.009)* (0.010) (0.010) 
Opioid prescriptions per capita 0.062 0.024 -0.016 
 (0.032)** (0.034) (0.048) 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.118 0.129 0.119 
 (0.041)*** (0.042)*** (0.039)*** 
Employment to population ratio -0.074 -0.125 0.031 
 (0.051) (0.057)** (0.062) 
Population (hundreds of thousands) 0.007 -0.001 0.047 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.019)** 
White population (%) -0.317 -0.359 -0.513 
 (0.214) (0.215)* (0.394) 
Mean age 0.007 0.006 -0.002 
 (0.006) (0.005) (0.007) 
Pharmacies -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001) (0.001)** (0.001)*** 
Hospitals -0.002 -0.019 0.066 
 (0.012) (0.013) (0.032)** 
Pain clinics -0.063 -0.027 -0.245 
 (0.098) (0.079) (0.175) 
EMTs per 1,000 residents 0.021 0.042 -0.078 
 (0.168) (0.168) (0.318) 
    
State specific time trends  X X 
County specific time trends   X 
Note: N = 414,498. Dependent variable is fatal worker injuries per 100,000 workers. Standard errors robust and 
clustered on county. All regressions include county and month-by-year fixed effects and are weighted by county 
population.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 4: OLS estimates of fatal worker injuries on fatal opioid overdose rates by urbanization 
 
Subsample (1) (2) (3) 
Rural counties 0.027 0.027 0.027 
 (0.016)* (0.016)* (0.016)* 
Suburban counties 0.016 0.014 0.015 
 (0.005)*** (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Urban counties 0.011 0.009 0.007 
 (0.005)** (0.005)* (0.006) 
    
State specific time trends  X X 
County specific time trends   X 
Note: N = 414,498. Each entry is the estimated coefficient of the fatal opioid overdose rate from the regression of 
fatal worker injury rates on fatal overdose rates. Standard errors robust and clustered on county. All regressions 
control for opioid prescribing rates, mean weekly wages, employment to population ratios, county population, the 
percent of the county population that is white, the mean age in the county, the number of pharmacies, hospitals, 
and pain clinics in the county, and the number of EMTs per 1,000 residents. All regressions also include county 
and month-by-year fixed effects and are weighted by county population.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 5: IV Estimates of the effect of worker fatal injury rates on opioid overdoses and prescription rates 
 
Variables 
Fatal overdose rate Prescriptions per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Worker fatality rate 0.015 -0.056 -0.071 0.021 0.007 -0.008 
 (0.131) (0.133) (0.140) (0.015) (0.016) (0.013) 
Mean weekly wage  0.018 0.074 0.084 0.011 0.012 0.029 
 ($ 2015 thousands) (0.088) (0.082) (0.086) (0.011) (0.009) (0.009)*** 
Employment to  0.547 0.764 1.604 -0.062 -0.011 0.098 
 population ratio (0.379) (0.330)** (0.808)** (0.055) (0.052) (0.044)** 
Population (hundreds  -0.217 -0.145 -0.180 -0.012 -0.020 0.002 
 of thousands) (0.055)*** (0.048)*** (0.164) (0.009) (0.008)** (0.015) 
White population (%) 1.062 -0.803 -2.928 1.000 0.870 0.451 
 (1.322) (1.025) (1.801) (0.153)*** (0.145)*** (0.266)* 
Mean age -0.093 -0.095 -0.020 0.001 0.000 -0.002 
 (0.029)*** (0.028)*** (0.037) (0.003) (0.003) (0.005) 
Pharmacies -0.000 -0.006 -0.016 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)*** (0.001)** (0.000) (0.000) 
Hospitals 0.107 0.058 -0.455 -0.003 -0.020 0.006 
 (0.110) (0.086) (0.365) (0.014) (0.013) (0.017) 
Pain clinics 0.228 0.938 0.730 -0.145 -0.017 0.175 
 (0.324) (0.272)*** (1.761) (0.131) (0.086) (0.334) 
Police per 1,000  -0.054 -0.040 -0.025 -0.000 -0.001 -0.001 
 residents (0.037) (0.033) (0.025) (0.005) (0.005) (0.004) 
EMTs per 1,000  -0.237 -0.035 -0.410 0.027 -0.004 0.004 
 residents (0.110)** (0.105) (0.289) (0.032) (0.029) (0.064) 
Must access PDMP  0.198 0.074 0.073 -0.040 -0.021 -0.019 
 law (0.043)*** (0.036)** (0.035)** (0.007)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Any PDMP -0.001 0.130 0.137 -0.004 -0.006 -0.005 
 (0.030) (0.025)*** (0.026)*** (0.004) (0.003)* (0.003) 
Medical marijuana 0.192 0.159 0.148 0.023 0.019 0.020 
 (0.049)*** (0.050)*** (0.047)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Recreational  -0.381 -0.133 -0.135 -0.052 0.024 0.025 
 marijuana (0.084)*** (0.059)** (0.058)** (0.009)*** (0.010)** (0.010)** 
Noneconomic  0.024 -0.019 -0.022 -0.006 0.004 0.004 
 damage caps (0.023) (0.027) (0.027) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Punitive damage caps 0.101 0.113 0.113 -0.019 0.014 0.012 
 (0.042)** (0.037)*** (0.038)*** (0.013) (0.009) (0.009) 
Joint and several  0.363 -0.161 -0.169 0.023 -0.002 -0.003 
 liability reform (0.045)*** (0.059)*** (0.059)*** (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
       
F-test for instrument 14.91 13.91 12.64 14.91 13.91 12.64 
  relevance       
State time trends  X X  X X 
County time trends   X   X 
Note: N = 414,498. Dependent variable in columns 1–3 is the fatal opioid overdose rate. Dependent variable in 
columns 4–6 is opioid prescriptions per capita. Observations are at the county-month level. Worker fatality rate is 
instrumented using border county worker fatality rate; first stage results are in Appendix Table A1. Standard errors 
robust and clustered on county. All regressions include county and month-by-year fixed effects and are weighted 
by county population.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table 6: Estimates of the effect of opioid abuse on worker fatal injury rates 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Opioid fatality rate 0.139 0.209 0.185 
 (0.069)** (0.079)*** (0.073)** 
Opioid prescriptions per capita 0.583 0.279 0.099 
 (0.363) (0.415) (0.395) 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.124 0.113 0.109 
  (0.041)*** (0.040)*** (0.038)*** 
Employment to population ratio -0.090 -0.198 -0.038 
  (0.081) (0.081)** (0.125) 
Population (hundreds of thousands) 0.042 0.029 0.071 
  (0.025)* (0.020) (0.039)* 
White population (%) -0.839 -0.245 0.008 
 (0.426)** (0.355) (0.618) 
Mean age 0.016 0.021 0.001 
 (0.008)** (0.009)** (0.011) 
Pharmacies -0.000 -0.000 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Hospitals -0.020 -0.032 0.116 
 (0.025) (0.022) (0.072) 
Pain clinics -0.008 -0.194 -0.451 
 (0.102) (0.101)* (0.362) 
Police per 1,000 residents 0.006 0.011 0.004 
  (0.021) (0.021) (0.022) 
EMTs per 1,000 residents 0.044 0.044 0.014 
  (0.167) (0.170) (0.332) 
Medical marijuana -0.007 -0.024 -0.015 
 (0.015) (0.018) (0.017) 
Recreational marijuana -0.004 0.016 0.017 
  (0.037) (0.032) (0.030) 
Noneconomic damage caps 0.007 -0.035 -0.035 
  (0.015) (0.021)* (0.021)* 
Punitive damage caps -0.018 -0.062 -0.057 
 (0.021) (0.033)* (0.032)* 
Joint and several liability reform -0.078 -0.022 -0.027 
  (0.044)* (0.051) (0.051) 
    
F-test for instrument relevance 2.719 6.817 6.855 
    
State time trends  X X 
County time trends   X 
Note: N = 414,498.  Dependent variable is worker fatality rate. Opioid fatality rate and opioid prescriptions per 
capita are instrumented using naloxone access law provisions and prescription drug monitoring program 
provisions; first stage results are in Appendix Table A2. Standard errors robust and clustered on county. All 
regressions include county and month-by-year fixed effects and are weighted by county population.  *** p<0.01, 
** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Appendix  
 
This Appendix presents the results associated with my IV models. Tables A1 and A2 
present the first stage estimates. In Table A1, columns 1, 2, and 3 correspond to the base model, 
models including state time trends, and models including county time trends. Table A1 provides 
direct evidence that border county worker fatality rates serve as a relevant instrument for worker 
fatality rates. The base model, model with state trends, and model with county time trends, yield 
F-statistics of 14.92, 13.90, and 12.63. Table A2 presents estimates of the effect of naloxone 
access laws and prescription drug monitoring programs on both opioid overdose fatality rates 
and opioid prescriptions per capita. Columns 1 and 4 present the base model estimates. Columns 
2 and 5 augment the base models with state-level time trends, and columns 3 and 6 further 
augment the models with county-level time trends. The F-tests for instrument significance range 
from 6.96 to 18.33 across the six models. In all models except the opioid mortality models 
including geographic specific time trends, the instruments exceed the rule of thumb threshold 
that F should exceed 10. (Staiger and Stock 1997; Stock and Yogo 2005). 
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Appendix Tables 
 
Table A1: Worker fatality rates and neighboring county worker fatality rates 
 
Variables (1) (2) (3) 
Neighboring county worker deaths per 100,000 0.007 0.007 0.006 
  residents (0.002)*** (0.002)*** (0.002)*** 
Mean weekly wage ($ 2015 thousands) 0.149 0.149 0.141 
   (0.053)*** (0.053)*** (0.048)*** 
Employment to population ratio -0.072 -0.151 -0.024 
 (0.082) (0.094) (0.120) 
Population (hundreds of thousands) 0.003 -0.012 0.050 
   (0.017) (0.017) (0.024)** 
White population (%) -0.280 -0.305 -0.712 
 (0.252) (0.262) (0.518) 
Mean age 0.005 0.003 -0.005 
 (0.006) (0.006) (0.009) 
Pharmacies -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
 (0.001)* (0.001)** (0.001)*** 
Hospitals -0.009 -0.026 0.066 
 (0.014) (0.015)* (0.036)* 
Pain clinics -0.077 -0.031 -0.207 
 (0.122) (0.088) (0.185) 
Police per 1,000 residents 0.007 0.012 0.004 
 (0.022) (0.021) (0.023) 
EMTs per 1,000 residents 0.028 0.045 -0.009 
 (0.168) (0.167) (0.323) 
Medical marijuana 0.026 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.009)*** (0.012) (0.012) 
Recreational marijuana -0.051 -0.026 -0.025 
 (0.021)** (0.027) (0.027) 
Noneconomic damage caps 0.008 -0.035 -0.035 
 (0.014) (0.021) (0.022) 
Punitive damage caps -0.014 -0.036 -0.036 
 (0.018) (0.030) (0.030) 
Joint and several liability reform -0.010 -0.055 -0.057 
 (0.031) (0.049) (0.050) 
    
F-statistic for border county worker fatality rate 14.91 13.91 12.64 
  significance    
    
State specific time trends  X X 
County specific time trends   X 
    
Note: N = 414,498. Dependent variable is the quantity of worker fatalities per 100,000 county residents. Standard 
errors robust and clustered on county. All regressions include county and month-by-year fixed effects.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
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Table A2: Effect of naloxone access laws on opioid overdoses and prescriptions 
 
Variables Opioid fatality rate Opioid prescriptions per capita 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Naloxone provider legal -0.043 0.027 0.044 0.017 -0.002 -0.002 
  immunity (0.064) (0.070) (0.072) (0.007)** (0.004) (0.004) 
Lay naloxone administrator 0.141 0.087 0.088 -0.002 0.016 0.016 
  legal immunity (0.055)** (0.055) (0.050)* (0.007) (0.005)*** (0.005)*** 
Third party naloxone  0.082 -0.031 -0.042 -0.037 -0.024 -0.024 
  Prescribing (0.030)*** (0.027) (0.026) (0.005)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
Relaxed prescription  -0.161 -0.075 -0.076 0.022 0.005 0.005 
 requirements (0.044)*** (0.038)** (0.035)** (0.005)*** (0.004) (0.004) 
Must access PDMP law -0.048 0.063 0.034 0.007 0.011 0.023 
 (0.067) (0.059) (0.059) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)*** 
PDMP 0.297 0.412 0.398 -0.008 0.010 0.088 
 (0.279) (0.267) (0.512) (0.046) (0.037) (0.030)*** 
Mean weekly wage  -0.225 -0.136 -0.148 -0.014 -0.020 -0.013 
  ($ 2015 thousands) (0.048)*** (0.039)*** (0.140) (0.008)* (0.007)*** (0.012) 
Employment to population  0.989 -1.054 -3.259 0.858 0.676 0.469 
  ratio (1.162) (0.865) (1.761)* (0.143)*** (0.126)*** (0.206)** 
Population  -0.078 -0.082 -0.016 -0.001 -0.002 -0.003 
  (hundreds of thousands) (0.026)*** (0.024)*** (0.035) (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) 
White population (%) 0.000 -0.006 -0.016 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.006)** (0.001)* (0.000) (0.000) 
Mean age 0.109 0.077 -0.258 -0.002 -0.017 -0.004 
 (0.097) (0.075) (0.269) (0.015) (0.013) (0.012) 
Pharmacies 0.186 0.829 1.042 -0.122 0.000 0.208 
 (0.332) (0.262)*** (1.528) (0.107) (0.067) (0.282) 
Hospitals -0.039 -0.026 -0.019 -0.001 -0.001 -0.003 
 (0.035) (0.030) (0.025) (0.005) (0.004) (0.004) 
Pain clinics -0.235 -0.010 -0.355 0.022 -0.001 0.009 
 (0.114)** (0.118) (0.287) (0.034) (0.029) (0.064) 
Police per 1,000 residents 0.274 0.108 0.108 -0.044 -0.027 -0.026 
 (0.039)*** (0.035)*** (0.035)*** (0.006)*** (0.004)*** (0.004)*** 
EMTs per 1,000 residents 0.029 0.107 0.106 -0.001 -0.005 -0.005 
 (0.030) (0.025)*** (0.024)*** (0.004) (0.003) (0.003) 
Medical marijuana 0.073 0.124 0.116 0.016 0.010 0.011 
 (0.043)* (0.046)*** (0.042)*** (0.005)*** (0.003)*** (0.003)*** 
Recreational marijuana -0.236 -0.067 -0.068 -0.030 0.015 0.016 
 (0.064)*** (0.054) (0.054) (0.009)*** (0.007)** (0.007)** 
Noneconomic damage caps 0.030 -0.015 -0.017 -0.005 0.005 0.006 
 (0.024) (0.026) (0.026) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) 
Punitive damage caps 0.073 0.105 0.103 -0.015 0.016 0.015 
 (0.042)* (0.035)*** (0.036)*** (0.013) (0.009)* (0.009) 
Joint and several liability caps 0.335 -0.157 -0.156 0.015 -0.002 -0.002 
 (0.047)*** (0.058)*** (0.057)*** (0.020) (0.022) (0.022) 
       
F-statistic for naloxone 12.01 7.496 6.958 18.33 14.05 14.13 
provisions’ joint significance       
       
State specific time trends  X X  X X 
County specific time trends   X   X 
Note: N = 414,498. Dependent variable is the quantity of worker fatalities per 100,000 county residents. Standard 
errors robust and clustered on county. All regressions include county and month-by-year fixed effects.  *** 
p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 
 
